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ABSTRACT 
 
  
Several extreme events are examined in this dissertation to better understand the 
implications of such events for expanding the existing knowledge of crisis leadership.  
Through interviews with leaders that had direct leadership roles in extreme events such as 
the Fukushima nuclear reactor explosions, Deepwater Horizon oilrig explosion, and 
Super Storm Sandy, in addition to national leadership, e.g. White House Situation Room, 
an in-depth, cross-case analysis of leadership in extreme crises is presented.  Previous 
literature concludes that the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of the event 
itself in determining the outcome of a disaster but due to the rarity of these events, there 
has been limited scholarly consideration of the implications of these events for leadership 
research and practice.  Using an inductive, qualitative approach to analyze the interviews, 
the results lead to several conclusions.  First, there is a need for this and additional 
research to clarify the meaning or unique challenges that define the characteristics of an 
extreme event crisis especially in the most extreme cases.  Second, the importance of the 
effects of felt emotions including mortality salience on extreme leadership is profound on 
the thinking and actions of leaders in these events.  Third, classic crisis management and 
leadership theories are insufficient for explaining the needed actions in responding to 
extreme events. 
 
viii 
 
These conclusions were integrated with prior research to develop a model of crisis 
leadership based on a continuum of crisis events from routine to extreme.  This model is 
developed around six leadership concepts either identified in prior research or developed 
based on the findings of this study.  The model also identifies threshold points where 
routine crisis events become more extreme.  At these threshold points the demands on all 
actors in the event, especially the leaders, become more non-linear and can result in great 
emotional influences on sensemaking and subsequent decision making.  This dissertation 
concludes that leadership in this context can almost exclusively be focused on life-saving, 
and instinctual or emotional responses.  Further the differences between leadership in 
dangerous military and non-military domains are examined.  The implication of these 
findings for practitioners and future researchers is also discussed.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A Qualitative Study of Extreme Event Leadership 
 As the world ―flattens‖ (Friedman, 2006) exposure of more populations to the 
risks of extreme events expands.  An extreme events is defined as ―a discrete episode or 
occurrence that may result in an extensive and intolerable magnitude of physical, 
psychological, or material consequences to or in close physical or psycho-social 
proximity to organization members‖ (Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio & Caverretta, 2009, p. 
898).  A hundred years ago, in a simpler world, people considered a dam failure resulting 
in hundreds of deaths an extreme event.  Today, we prevent dam failures and many other 
events of that scale; however, with the global expansion of our world, we are vulnerable 
to extreme events on a more massive scale.  For example, with extensive worldwide 
participation in air travel by different cultures, epidemics, e.g., SARS, are likely to spread 
much faster today than just a few decades ago (Lagadec, 2009).   
With significant advances in communications technologies over the past decades, 
we now also have the ability to create massive worldwide fear as extreme events occur 
(Hannah, Uhl-Bien, Avolio & Caverretta, 2009).  A recent example of the global 
―flatness‖ and global fear caused by an extreme event is the Great Japan earthquake, 
tsunami and Fukushima nuclear event of 2011.  As the first web-streamed nuclear event, 
it raised fears of a harmful radioactive plume reaching globally.  Conversely, during the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident (1986) there were few pictures of the accident as the event 
transpired.  In fact, the world did not learn of the event until several days afterwards 
when radiation appeared in milk in neighboring countries.  During the Fukushima event, 
cameras showed the world the explosion of nuclear reactors in real-time.  Real-time 
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images of the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear event exacerbated fear around the world 
and thus added to the social disaster.  This social disaster resulted in a major leadership 
challenge for not only the Japanese but much of the international leadership community 
as well.  The international context altered the management of the crisis in Japan and the 
manner in which their leaders resolved the event.  That context raises questions regarding 
how the existing crisis leadership theories address the new era of extreme events. 
According to some researchers (Dynes, 1974; Dynes, Quarentelli & Kreps, 1981), 
the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of the event itself in determining the 
outcome of a disaster.  A leader‘s ability to control fear and to mitigate the impact of a 
crisis at the earliest point in the progression of the crisis to avoid turning a ―routine‖ 
crisis, e.g., a hurricane, into an extreme crisis, e.g., Hurricane Katrina, is critical.  
Allowing a ―routine‖ crisis to cascade into an extreme event significantly increases the 
leadership challenges.  Additionally, in many ways the ―reach‖ of a crisis around the 
globe, regardless of whether the crisis is man-made or natural, is increasing.  Because of 
the international political pressures brought to an event, the importance of understanding 
extreme crisis leadership becomes even more important (Nafday, 2009).  Crisis 
leadership in extreme events is a relatively underdeveloped domain of research (Boin, 
2009).  Through this research, a better understanding of crisis leadership in extreme 
events emerged.   
In sum, the world is shrinking; extreme events by nature and impact are growing; 
modern communications systems are expanding fear; leadership of extreme events 
increases in complexity; and the crisis management research is struggling to explain the 
theories in these contexts (Mikusova, 2011).  This research intends to expose the 
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theoretical elements of this new era of extreme events and gather up those elements to 
understand better their theoretical linkages.  My hope is to extend or discover leadership 
theories or insights that explain those linkages.  Then new theories allow leaders to 
understand better the effective approaches to resolving the modern extreme event.  
Finding these theories might help turn the modern dam failure, e.g., Fukushima, into a 
manageable crisis. 
Research Threads 
Many different research threads exist in the extreme crisis literature.  There are 
few links among the theories or systematic approaches to crisis management theory 
building (Mikusova, 2011).  There are three important areas of research gaps or threads 
identified in the existing crisis management literature (Mikusova, 2011):  first, there is a 
tendency for researchers to oversimplify insights from the more routine crisis; second is 
the multiplicity of researchers who study in this domain; and finally, researchers tend to 
miss the changing nature of crisis over time.  The next few paragraphs will describe these 
treads in detail. 
One thread comes from the methodology used by a number of researchers.  
Mikusova (2011) describes the existing body of crisis management literature as ―the 
Tower of Babel
1‖. Many researchers simplify the research by studying more routine 
events such as first responders and then attempt to extrapolate their insights to extreme 
                                                          
1
 “The Tower of Babel is a story told in the Book of Genesis of the Bible.  According to the story, a united humanity of the 
generations following the Great Flood, speaking a single language and migrating from the east, came to the land of Shinar, where they 
resolved to build a city with a tower "whose top may reach unto heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon 
the face of the whole earth‖.  God came down to see what they did and said: "They are one people and have one language, and nothing 
will be withheld from them which they purpose to do‖.  "Come, let us go down and confound their speech‖.  And so God scattered 
them upon the face of the Earth, and confused their languages, so that they would not be able to return to each other, and they left off 
building the city, which was called Babel "because God there confounded the language of all the Earth."‖ (In Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia. Retrieved 20:43, March 1, 2013, from http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tower_of_Babel&oldid=540947902) 
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events.  This research fails to grasp all of the complications that come from extreme 
events, and it limits the appropriate insights. 
Further, the second research gap or thread discussed by Mikusova (2011) 
concludes that scientists from many disciplines have added to the research of crisis 
management, studying it from their perspective with their own context, language, 
theories, and approaches.  Consequently, as illustrated in the literature review in this 
dissertation, this haphazard approach, while resulting in a broad scope of crisis leadership 
insights, neglects to create an integrated theory of leadership in extreme events.   
Finally, Boin (2009) describes a significant research thread in the crisis 
management literature that has come with the changing nature of crisis over time.  Boin 
(2009) concludes that few researchers have delved into ―transboundary‖ effects of crisis.2  
This insight relates to the ―flattening‖ of our cultures and thus the corresponding ―reach‖ 
of a crisis.  The reach of a crisis may not only physically transcend national boundaries, 
e.g., SARS, but certainly, with communications advances the reach has expanded the 
potential for fear across national boundaries.  Further, his analysis of the crisis 
management literature has highlighted a heavy concentration of articles focused on the 
United States and Canada with a scarcity of research about transboundary effects in Asia.   
Additionally, Lettieri, et al. (2009) discovered gaps in crisis management 
literature including the lack of research on setback management, policy mapping, 
capacity mapping, and incident command.  Those research threads all involve routine 
crisis preparation, not extreme crisis leadership.  While these gaps identified by Lettieri, 
                                                          
2 The definition of the transboundary crisis considers the functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems, functions, or infrastructures 
that are threatened by the crisis and cause uncertainty of outcomes.  Essentially, the transboundary effects are different from a routine 
crisis in that the effects involve the coupling of systems within and among countries (Boin, 2009). 
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et al. (2009) are important, because they do not directly apply to extreme events they are 
not in the scope of this dissertation. 
Research Directions 
As illustrated in the current literature review, a new generation of crisis 
management research has emerged in the last half-decade.  Rather than focusing on the 
basic elements of a crisis and its phases, the emerging research addresses strategic topics 
such as sensemaking (Weick 1978), complexity (Mirvis, 1996), and failure theories 
(Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  Boin (2009) discusses three 
current crisis management research directions.  First, Boin (2009) highlights the need to 
know and understand the political-leadership linkages involved in extreme events, that is, 
how elected political leaders who are responsive to public outcry might influence the 
decision-making of the leaders who are managing the crisis.  The second direction is to 
understand how resiliency of leaders and organizations influences how leaders respond to 
events, that is, how firm or committed the leaders and the organization are to resolving 
the crisis itself.  Might they lose their resolve under pressure from the public or 
politicians?  The last direction is to understand that these events necessitate the need for 
deep thinking.  Deep thinking is essentially sensemaking (Weick 1978).  Extreme events 
are very complicated and need a cognitive form of sensemaking well beyond that of a 
routine crisis.  Thus, given the intensity of these topics, I believe that a qualitative 
methods approach would be useful in generating theory that links the research threads 
together in a manner that explains the complicated leadership challenges during extreme 
events. 
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Consequently, my study conducted an in-depth investigation into these and other 
directions by using a qualitative research methodology.  Conger (1998) lays out a sound 
case for the qualitative method.  Driven mainly by the multi-dimensional aspects of 
leadership, qualitative methods are best suited for understanding the ―whys‖ behind 
research.  This has led to heavy use of qualitative theory and case-study examination of 
leadership in crisis contexts (House, 1977; Berlew, 1974; Katz & Kahn, 1978).  Conger‘s 
(1998) main caution in using qualitative methods is to ensure that researchers ―lead‖ by 
not just cataloging leadership abilities but extensively investigating the unexpected and 
unexplored aspects of leadership.  An extensive review of Conger‘s (1998) insights 
follows in the methods section of this dissertation.  Several other serious methodological 
issues exist when studying leadership using the qualitative approach.  This dissertation 
addresses those issues in the literature and methods sections.   
Next, this dissertation reviews the extant literature around crisis management.  
My qualitative research tends to follow the methodologies of contemporary researchers 
such as Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) who offer a number of recommendations to 
qualitative researchers, two of which address how researchers should approach the extant 
literature.  The authors recommend that researchers identify clear research threads, and 
justify why theory building is better than theory testing in addressing those gaps.  In 
addition, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that qualitative research rests on broad 
research threads involving interesting phenomena and lack of associated theory; this 
gives the researcher the potential to develop new theories.  Given that the domain of 
crisis leadership is relatively broad, a literature review beforehand is not only helpful but 
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also necessary in determining the scope of the research and identifying clear research 
threads. 
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CHAPTER 2: EXTREME EVENT LITERATURE 
 
This literature review provides an overview of the existing state of research in extreme 
crisis management.  It establishes a broad foundation for guiding my qualitative study of 
leadership in extreme contexts.  Normally, when using quantitative methods, researchers 
hone their foundational hypotheses through deductive reviews of the literature.  My study 
uses an inductive approach; therefore, the overview of the existing literature allows for 
post-hoc incorporation of the observations and results made in the research.  
Incorporating my findings with the existing literature complements the commonalities, 
differences, and extensions of the existing extreme crisis management theories.  In 
addition, by providing a broad perspective of the literature, this review highlights specific 
areas of focus for my qualitative analysis.  By providing a broad overview of the 
literature first, I identify the concepts that led to specific questions that I developed for 
interview subjects.  Additionally, in this review, I summarize, where applicable, the focus 
areas that inform the qualitative method used in my research.   
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Figure 1 - Flowchart of Research 
 
 
The literature review is necessarily dense.  The literature review intends to 
capture a broad perspective of crisis leadership in extreme events to avoid biasing the 
qualitative research.  Nevertheless, because this literature review is dense, I provide a 
general roadmap that depicts the fundamental process that is contained in this dissertation 
(Figure 1, Flowchart of Research).  I discuss many theories, characteristics of both 
extreme events and leadership, and methods in this section.  Appendices A-D capture the 
essential points made in throughout the literature review.  The summaries in the 
Appendices allow for post-hoc simplicity.  Figure 1 shows that after the interviews, the 
data is screened to ensure that the event meets the definition of an extreme event.  If the 
data meets the extreme event definition, then I proceeded to conduct the qualitative 
review.  I compared the output of the qualitative review to the open research areas and 
the characteristics of leadership.  From that comparison, I built upon or generated new 
theory. 
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Characteristics of Extreme Events 
In exploring the existing literature in detail, it is necessary to describe the 
characteristics of extreme events.  Outlining the characteristics of extreme events sets the 
stage for an explanation of the subsequent theories and associated concepts explored by 
researchers.  Appendix A provides a list of unified extreme event characteristics.  
Characteristics of extreme events have implications on the concepts used to investigate 
crisis leadership.  For example, in some contexts, a ―crisis‖ might involve a threat to the 
achievement of a corporate goal or layoff of workers.  That threat is distinct from a threat 
experienced under an extreme crisis condition, which might include life and death 
situations; therefore, this implies that like concepts such as trust, or followership, among 
others, can be non-linear (Thompson & Hunt 1997).  For example, in quantitative 
leadership research, the construct of ―trust‖ is commonly included as a leadership 
variable (Hannah, et al. 2009; Weick, 1978; Shrivastava, et al. 1988).  In extreme events, 
beyond the threshold of life and death, a survey or even an experiment struggle to 
replicate the stress of a life and death situation, and therefore, those research methods are 
slightly more limited than a deeper study based on the qualitative approach that actually 
studies an extreme event.  These non-linear effects are important as ―threshold‖ effects in 
crisis events (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).  Concepts like trust may be linear up to the 
point where life and death of the people involved become part of the decision-making.  
Non-linearity suggests that beyond an undefined threshold, some concepts may take on 
completely new meanings (Thompson & Hunt 1997; Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).   
Threshold effects can influence the way researchers might measure concepts such 
as trust (Thompson & Hunt 1997).  Within the leadership literature, common leadership 
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concepts take on an entirely new meaning in extreme crisis as compared to a routine 
crisis, and the difference will affect the research methodology.  Thus, knowing the 
specific characteristics of an extreme event becomes important not only in defining the 
concepts but also in how one approaches the research methodology.  This is one reason 
that inductive research is appropriate in this domain.  Inductive research through rich 
discussions can explore and draw-out the issue of non-linear construct thresholds.  
Section 2.12 covers extensively the science of inductive research on the non-linearity of 
leadership. 
  My review of the literature did not yield a unified list of extreme event 
characteristics.  Some researchers have identified their own unique descriptions of the 
characteristics of extreme events (Hannah, et al. 2009; Taleb, 2010).  Those 
characteristics, as discussed in the following paragraphs, serve as part of a foundation for 
the qualitative research. 
The characteristics that differentiate a routine crisis from an extreme event are 
important in defining an extreme event.  I believe that those characteristics are also a 
prime consideration for using the qualitative method in this research.  Primarily there are 
four differentiators of a routine crisis from an extreme event (Hannah, et al. 2009).  First, 
whereas crisis involves the threat to a high priority goal, e.g., a corporate or 
organizational goal, the definition of an extreme event holds a tighter requirement.  Such 
threats must reach the threshold of ―intolerable magnitude‖ (Hannah, et al. 2009, p. 898) 
where goals are imperative, such as life and death, and require a level of leadership much 
beyond that of a routine crisis.  I believe that the study of life and death situations, or 
situations under which major damage to infrastructure, e.g., hurricanes, nuclear events, 
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etc., requires a deep understanding of the parameters and decision-making involved in the 
event as best investigated by qualitative methods. 
Second, preparation time is a non-characteristic in describing the differences 
between a routine crisis and an extreme crisis (Hannah, et al. 2009).  One would think 
that extreme events might come without warning and with little preparation time; 
however, Hannah, et al. (2009) assert that organizations involved in extreme events may 
have lengthy preparation time yet still be unprepared when the event occurs.  Hannah, et 
al. (2009) cite as an instance the U.S. military preparation for Operation Desert Storm.  
For Operation Desert Storm, there was a lengthy force buildup prior to the event, yet 
military planners did not comprehend all aspects of the ―crisis‖, for example, the 
deliberate burning of oil wells.  This characteristic implies that strategic considerations 
are involved in the research of extreme events.  Thus, through interviews of leaders 
involved in the event, I discovered a deeper understanding of the leadership 
considerations of readiness.  
Third, ―probability‖ is an ingredient, but not necessarily a stand-alone 
characteristic (Hannah, et al. 2009).  Fire departments sometimes face severe fires that 
might involve life and death, but that consideration alone is not enough to qualify as an 
extreme event.  Low probability must be accompanied with other characteristics, e.g., an 
intolerable magnitude, to truly qualify as an extreme event; therefore, low probably is a 
constituent characteristic of an extreme event but low probably alone is not enough.  An 
intense investigation of the probabilities and consequences is an essential element in 
using the qualitative method in this research.  
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Finally, the fourth characteristic separating a crisis from an extreme crisis is 
―ambiguity of cause, effect, and means resolution‖ (Hannah, et al. 2009, p. 899).  
Organizations may find themselves in an extreme crisis with the capacity to respond but 
may not be able to execute the capacity adequately or may become hampered by 
ineffective decision-making.  This characteristic rests on the shoulders of leaders who 
may be ineffectual in organizing the proper means of resolution.  Through interviews I 
delved deeply into the considerations and thought processes used by leaders in making 
crucial decisions.  Using open interview questioning I found that leaders ―opened-up‖ 
and were willing to explain how difficult the decision-making process is during extreme 
events.   
 ―Black Swan‖ events (Taleb, 2010) are events which come out of nowhere with 
many unknown consequences.  It seems that no one ever plans for Black Swan events, or 
one does not recognize the possibility of an impossible catastrophe.  Taleb (2010) focuses 
on the human element that often ignores the possibility of Black Swan events.  Taleb 
(2010) provides five unique characteristics of human behavior that lead to blindness of 
the possibility of Black Swan events.  Those unique characteristics include confirmation 
biases, narrative fallacy, lack of human imagination, signal theory (missing signals), and 
ludic fallacy (tunnel vision).   
In sum, while the characteristics of extreme events are not well defined in the 
crisis literature, other theories, such as sensemaking, and transboundary theory offer more 
insights into the characteristics involved in extreme events.  Later in this dissertation is a 
discussion of extreme event characteristics.  Exploring the characteristics of an extreme 
event is an important consideration in developing the concepts and is a foundation for the 
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research.  I use the extreme event characteristics to develop research areas and interview 
questions. 
Extreme Event Context 
Defining extreme event context is the first step of the leadership concepts 
discovery process.  Hannah, et al. (2009) define extreme ―contexts‖ as:  
 
Environments where one or more extreme events are occurring or are likely to 
occur  that may exceed the organization‘s capacity to prevent and result in an extensive 
and intolerable magnitude of physical, psychological, or material consequences to—or in 
close physical or psycho-social proximity to—organization members (p. 898).   
 
The difference between an extreme event and an extreme context is that extreme 
contexts can involve multiple extreme events.  Some extreme events cascade into 
extreme contexts.  This is a very important concept that is essentially uncovered in the 
research.  For instance, in Japan, the Great Eastern Earthquake (an extreme event) 
cascaded into a tsunami (extreme event), which caused a nuclear meltdown (extreme 
event), and resulted in a social disaster (extreme event); all four extreme events combined 
to create an extreme context.  This is likely to be one of the greatest extreme contexts 
ever.  Outside of war, humankind has rarely ever faced the forces of nature and the forces 
of physics that the Japanese faced at that time.  We remember that America bore the 
brunt of several extreme contexts for example, the Great San Francisco earthquake, 
Hurricane Katrina, and the attacks of September 11, 2001, to mention only three.  In 
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Fukushima, Japan, the extreme events leading to an extreme context all happened at one 
time and in one place.  The uniqueness of that context makes it rich in research potential. 
 Extreme contexts may be global in nature, likely unknown, and beyond the 
control of the responsible organizations.  Lagadec (2009) terms the extreme event 
context, as the ―Wilderness of the Unknown‖ (p. 478).  Lagadec (2009) describes an 
extreme event context as an unstable world with events that display a domino effect.   
Theories Used in Extreme Event Research 
Within this dissertation, I reviewed crisis theories, leadership theories and 
decision-making theories, as those theories relate to extreme crisis management.  
Extreme crisis leadership lies at the heart on a continuum of crises.  Figure 2, Hierarchy 
of Crisis Management Theories, depicts the relationships of major crisis leadership 
theories to the continuum of crises.  Crises range from the routine, to extreme, to Black 
Swan and dangerous events.  This dissertation focuses specifically on extreme crisis and 
Black Swan and delves a little into the other ends of the crises leadership continuum 
(routine and dangerous).  
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Figure 2 - Hierarchy of Crisis Management Theories
 
Source: Casto 2014 
 
As depicted in Figure 2, as the complexity of crisis increases, each of the crisis 
management, leadership, and decision-making theories has special applicability.  For 
instance, readiness theory has special applicability to routine crises.  Routine crisis are 
frequent events, not complex and generally predictable.  Thus, for routine events, 
readiness theory generally explains the type of crisis management needed for these 
events, i.e., typically prevention and reaction.  Crisis leaders do not need to possess 
superior cognitive abilities to react to these types of events.  Fire departments are a good 
example of a ―readiness‖ organization that often faces routine crises.  Readiness is less 
effective and applicable for Black Swan events where by nature, events are rarely 
predictable, thus unpreventable, and they are extremely complex requiring a superior 
cognitive response by crisis leaders.  As extreme events escalate into transboundary or 
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international events, greater cognitive abilities are required of crisis leaders.  
Understanding that demand for greater cognitive abilities for extreme events is an 
essential point of this dissertation. 
Next, this literature review catalogs the theories used in crisis management 
literature (seen in Figure 2).  My review finds that Sementelli‘s (2007) taxonomy of the 
disaster and crisis theories is useful.  Sementelli (2007) bundles a sampling of basic crisis 
theories in an attempt to gain a broad perspective on the state of crisis literature and 
theory.  With regard to the applicability of leadership theories in crisis management, 
Sementelli (2007) concludes that there is little in the way of leadership theory 
development in the crisis literature.  Specifically, Sementelli (2007) concludes that 
leadership theories remain ―heavily examined yet poorly understood‖ (p. 501) in the 
crisis context.  It appears that most researchers stay in their lane in that most researchers 
do not compare and contrast theories.  Apparently, most researchers approach the domain 
strictly from their own perspectives and do not contrast their findings with extant 
theories.  I have integrated these theories with my research results.  I develop a a theory 
that integrates the existing literature  as an expansion of the extreme crisis leadership 
theories. 
While Sementelli‘s (2007) taxonomy is thorough, because he focuses mainly on 
the basic crisis research, it does omit several theories used in the crisis management 
literature.  Sementelli‘s (2007) focuses on decision, administrative readiness, economic, 
and social theories, even though I found significant research in the more advanced 
research areas of complexity, failure, sensemaking, and transboundary theories in the 
literature.  These areas will be reviewed later.  Further, despite the research gaps or 
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threads mentioned by Sementelli (2007) regarding cross-disciplinary research, there 
appears to be some work not considered in his paper in the area of multi-team linkages 
which is essentially cross-disciplinary research (e.g., DeChurch, et al. 2011; Gill, 2007). 
Sementelli (2007) captures most of the theories used in the crisis management 
literature.  Nevertheless, my literature review consists of a brief summary of the insights 
from the theories in Sementelli (2007) that I believe are most applicable to the extreme 
context, including readiness, complexity, failure, sensemaking, transboundary, and 
administrative (leadership and decision-making).  These theories are necessary to provide 
the overall landscape of the literature and serve as the foundation of my literature review.  
The associated concepts were the starting point for my inductive approach to advance the 
theories of extreme crisis management and crisis leadership.  As stated earlier, there can 
be many theoretical approaches to this topic.  For completeness, I discuss a broad set of 
theories; however, this dissertation ultimately focuses on administrative theories, 
especially leadership theories.  My goal with this literature review was to identify the 
applicable concepts from the existent literature that enriched my qualitative study; 
therefore, I review each theory for its specific application to extreme contexts.   
Consolidation of Extreme Event Theoretical Concepts 
 Before I delve into each theory in detail, a brief overview of each theory and its 
relationships is helpful.  Table 1 - Matrix of Theoretical Relationships depicts how each 
theory manages uncertainty, the related advantages and disadvantages of theory.  The 
goal of this research is to tie the research threads together in ways that explain leadership 
in an extreme crisis.  As shown in Table 1, each crisis theory has its own approach to 
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dealing with a crisis (uncertainty), and some theories are better at explaining how leaders 
should approach extreme events.  
 
Table 1 – Matrix of Theoretical Relationships 
Crisis Theories, Leadership & 
Decision-making processes 
Uncertainty Management Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s) 
Readiness Prevention Based in educational theory - 
Learning & preparation skills 
Blind spots; Signal theory 
flaws 
Complexity Absorbs Based in human behavior 
theories - flexibility in 
response 
Somewhat antithetical to 
organization theories  
Failure Acknowledges reality & 
copes 
Recognizes latent 
organizational errors & 
human errors 
Theory not well developed; 
conflict between High 
Reliability (prevention) & 
Normal Accidents (inevitable) 
Sensemaking “Enacts” – frames  Shared understanding 
Adaptation & innovation 
Oversimplification; Optimism 
bias; and pluralistic ignorance 
Transboundary Controls failure & 
Mitigates impacts 
Allows for “clumsy solutions” 
& creative thinking 
Highways for failure & 
escalatory power 
Surprise Management Removes threats & Clears 
obstacles 
Read & react in an anticipated 
fashion 
Extensive education & 
training required 
Non-linear Leadership Embraces disorder & 
disequilibrium 
Rooted in chaos theory – 
creative breakdown 
Leaders must reject stability 
& equilibrium; live on verge of 
chaos 
Extreme Event Decision- 
Making 
Optimizes Based upon leader self-
efficacy 
Slow decisions and lack of 
accuracy; fuzzy organizational 
boundaries 
Social Amplification Manages risk perceptions Use of technical justice Disproportionate public 
response; secondary impacts 
Source: Casto (2013) 
 
Readiness Theory 
The readiness theory derives from Smits and Ezzat-Ally‘s (2003) discussion on 
the merger of the role theory and the learning theory.  Fundamentally, this theory asserts 
that organizations that are subject to crises or extreme events must establish a 
preparedness to face their roles and organizational lessons.  That includes the 
identification of emergency roles and responsibilities, role knowledge, training, 
rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during crisis.   
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Other important concepts in the readiness theory are command, control, and 
coordination.  For instance, Voogd (2004) investigated the impact of command and 
control on the readiness theory.  Voogd (2004) concludes that the existing personnel, 
structures, and emergency responders in a team context aid crisis preparation but have 
their limits.  Similarly, Smith (2004) investigates the role of disaster simulation, which is 
an element of readiness.  Through disaster simulation studies Smith (2004) finds that 
organizational decentralization often used to respond to extreme events becomes 
significant and complex thereby, challenging organizational success.  Quarantelli (1988) 
makes the strongest conclusion about prior planning.  In considering the elements of prior 
planning, e.g., identification of emergency roles and responsibilities, role knowledge, 
training, rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during crisis, Quarantelli (1988) 
concludes that prior planning is helpful, but prior planning cannot eliminate complexity; 
therefore, adaptations will be required under extreme conditions.  Finally, Quarantelli 
(1988) suggests that if the definition of extreme events is applied, organizations cannot 
predict or prepare for the unknown-unknowns.   
In another twist to the efficacy of readiness, Joffe (2003) suggests that optimistic 
bias actually reduces preparation.  Optimistic bias can falsely convince oneself that 
uncertainty can be controlled.  This means that as one trains and simulates, one is not 
only preparing oneself for events but that organizations are driving out uncertainty, 
thereby causing blind spots.  Such optimism causes one to ignore the multiplicity of 
factors that can come of extreme events.   
It seems that Smits and Ezzat-Ally‘s (2003) readiness theory adds little theoretical 
development to extreme crisis management for several reasons.  For example, readiness 
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concepts described as roles, responsibilities, command, control, simulation, and 
optimism, while practical, offer little in the way of supporting or advancing a scholarly 
theory of extreme event leadership.  Because extreme events by definition exceed the 
ability of the organization to cope, I believe the readiness theory is unlikely to provide 
any substantial foundation for extreme event theory development; nevertheless, I explore 
it for completeness.  Considering that Voogd (2004) identifies command and control 
limitations of the theory, Smith (2004) adds the challenges of decentralization and 
Quarentelli (1988) concludes extreme events necessitate adaptations, my research could 
potentially add value to readiness theory by addressing these limitations.  Knowing the 
important concepts associated with extreme event leadership could enable organizations 
to better inoculate themselves against the uncertainty of extreme events through 
improved readiness; however, as stated earlier, for extreme events, readiness might have 
limited inoculation power.  
Complexity Theory 
Readiness theory asserts that organizations should focus on preparation, while 
complexity theory asserts that organizations should develop an ability to embrace the 
complexity of a crisis.  The complexity approach can lead to a reframing of crisis 
management for organizations.  By reframing crisis management from an avoidance 
strategy to a strategy of absorption, organizations can better cope with the challenges of 
an extreme event through changes in their behaviors (Ashmos, Duchon & McDaniel, 
2000).  From the inception of the complexity theory, research (Mirvis, 1996) 
acknowledges that the complexity theory is counter-intuitive for organizations.  
Organizations seek to drive out uncertainty from their environments; however, the 
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complexity theory offers organizations a means to face a multiplicity of factors and make 
sense of rapidly changing circumstances (Mirvis, 1996).   
Fundamentally, Ashmos, et al. (2000) suggest that by using a behavioral 
approach, organizations can reduce and absorb complexity to limit the edge of chaos.  
Those behaviors include gathering information about threats, encouraging multiple and 
conflicting organizational goals, using sensemaking to understanding coupling, and by 
embracing complexity in their processes, that is, living with uncertainty, they become 
familiar with the complex.  Thus, when faced with a complex situation, the organization 
will be better prepared to deal with chaos.  This is the counterfactual thought to the 
readiness theory‘s optimistic bias.   
This multiplicity of factors involved in extreme events makes the complexity 
theory more attractive as a research theory compared to the readiness theory.  Because 
the complexity theory tries to unearth the surprising patterns in a complex interaction, it 
seems to be more enlightening in identifying leadership concepts for extreme events.  The 
complexity theory purports that when you step back from a set of complex interactions, 
unforeseen connections begin to appear (Muffet-Willett & Kruse, 2009).  Muffet-Willett 
and Kruse (2009) describe complexity as a rubric of complex responsive processes.  Abel 
(2011) describes it as dissipative structure that moves into the edge of chaos.  Abel 
(2011) explains that this self-organization is not chaos; it is near chaos, because chaos 
involves the study of simple patterns leading (linearly) into repeated patterns, while 
complexity involves simple patterns leading to higher-level patterns, which are multiple 
unique interactions, and usually non-linear. 
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While to some degree, organizations may be able to adopt the complexity theory 
approach; high-risk technological organizations
3
 are unlikely to do so.  Researchers (Daft 
& Weick, 2001, p. 255) recognize this tension and discuss what they call enacting 
organizations. Enacting organizations recognize the indeterminate nature of life, but 
actively engage with it rather than being reactive or passive.  Organizations often test and 
experiment with adaptive processes, models, and programs.  Organizations typically learn 
by doing and create a double-feedback loop to improve processes (Daft & Weick, 2001).  
Mental models affect the way people work with the information and determine the final 
decision (Argyris, 1977).  The decision itself changes, but the mental models remain the 
same.  Once fixed, the established mental model allows for quicker decision-making.  A 
double-feedback loop (Daft & Weick, 2001) suggests that organizations develop 
mechanisms to interpret ambiguous events and provide meaning and direction for 
participants.  Unlike single loops, this model includes a shift in understanding, from 
simple and static, to broader and more dynamic, such as taking into account the changes 
in the surroundings and the need for expression changes in mental models (Argyris, 
1977). 
I find the complexity theory model generally antithetical compared to other 
rational behavioral theories of individual and organizational behaviors, e.g., rational 
choice, theory of planned behavior, equity, and expectancy theories.  Most organizations 
want to limit uncertainty, and organizations do so by building procedures and processes 
that constrains individuals to behave in predictable ways for predicable events.  The 
concern then becomes for individual and organizational behavior during unperceived 
events.  Typically, when people behave outside expected norms, the organization seeks to 
                                                          
3 High-risk technical organizations often include industries such as nuclear power, airlines, and NASA (Weick 1979). 
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return the behavior to those within norms.  Complexity theory tends to require that 
people behave outside of norms in responding to a crisis.  As Mirvis (1996) stated, this 
requirement is counterintuitive.  
Nevertheless, the concept of an enacting organization leads one to a discussion of 
failure theories.  It seems that the complexity theory, while useful, actually serves as the 
foundation for failure theories (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  
Failure theory suggests that organizations structure themselves in uncertain frameworks, 
i.e., into organizations that are prepared for complexities but organizations also retain 
methods to avoid failure.  Thus, the failure theory is a compromise between relying solely 
on readiness, i.e., living with uncertainty, to organizations structuring organizations that 
both prevent and cope with complex situations. 
Failure Theory 
Early in the understanding of organizational disasters and disaster management, 
researchers blamed organizational failures simply on human error or errors that were 
beyond human control (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001).  These were simple explanations with single or few root causes.  As 
research progressed, these researchers began to see the multiplicity among high-risk 
technology, human error, organization culture, and their context.  Researchers discovered 
other more complex explanations of organizational failure. 
From this research emerged two main theories of failure.  Those theories are the 
normal accident theory and the high reliability theory.  I explore these two theories 
generally, and I explore them from the perspective of extreme events.  The question is 
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how these theories explain or provide insights into the potential for a new theory 
generated by this research.    
Perrow (1994) and Reason (1997) are the fathers of the normal accident theory.  
Perrow (1994) and Reason (1997) began the discussion of organizational failure with an 
assumption that accidents came from, ―just the right combination of circumstances to 
produce a catastrophe‖ (Perrow, 1994, p. 217).  Perrow (1994) and Reason (1997) viewed 
accidents as inevitable.  The signals of extreme events bypassed organizational controls 
and went unrecognized by the organization until the signals appeared and escalated into 
full-fledged events.  Miller (1988) suggests that it is not the ―sick‖ organization that 
produces disasters, but it is likely the complex, modern, and efficient organization that 
experiences major failure. 
Modern organizations assume rationality in their contexts (Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997).  The assumption of rationality can actually magnify small errors turning them into 
large-scale accidents.  Should individuals miss the signals of error in their work, those 
minor errors can stack-up and become errors that are bigger than the sum of their parts.  
Perrow (1984, 2009) extends this argument through his research on complexity and 
coupling.  Perrow (1984, 2009) asserts that the most knowledgeable people in the 
organization will undervalue errors.  Operators will miss signals in tightly coupled 
systems.  Then, these errors will reappear as major accidents called ―normal accidents‖.  
Others explain those missed signals as latent organizational issues (Aini & Fakhru‘l-Razi, 
2013; Vaughan, 1997).  These latent issues sit in the organization until the environmental 
conditions change, and then latent issues reemerge as much bigger issues.  Vaughan 
(1997) in her assessment of the NASA space shuttle accidents refers to this scenario as 
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the ―normalization of deviance‖.  Vaughan (1997) explains that organizations often miss 
signals that are counterfactual to the established mental models.    
Normal accident theory has yet to explain everything about the escalation of 
accidents.  If accidents are ―normal‖, then the question is why do most organizations 
avoid them?  Not every organization experiences accidents; therefore, perhaps most 
organizations have learned to become safer.  It could be that organizations learn to de-
couple their processes, or it could be that organizations have just become more reliable.  
Nutt (2004) suggests that these and other questions are questions that normal accident 
theory researchers have yet to answer.   
While Perrow (1984) does not subscribe to the theory that organizations can 
prevent accidents, other researchers (La Porte, 2011; La Porte & Rochlin, 1994; Sagan 
1994; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) argue that organizations can.  High reliability theory 
suggests that organizations could become reliable by using a dedicated safety culture 
(Egan, 2011; La Porte, 2011).  In fact, by using pervasive challenging and a questioning 
attitude, organizations can become highly reliable.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) go even 
further.  The authors insist that organizations can merge culture and organizational 
structure into a Highly Reliable Organization.  While La Porte (2011) and La Porte and 
Rochlin (1994) agree with the basic high reliability theory, they somewhat disagree with 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2011).  La Porte (2011) and La Porte and Rochlin (1994) challenge 
the ability of organizations to combine culture and structure to prevent events.  
Certainly, Perrow (1994, p. 213) doubts the ability of organizations to become 
―highly reliable‖.  Perrow (1994) insists that, ―trying hard will not be enough‖ and 
believes therefore that accidents are inevitable.  This debate between normal accident 
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theory and high reliability theory has reached a deadlock.  High reliability theory 
researchers (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; Sagan, 1994) believe that organizations do more 
than ―try hard‖.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) and Sagan (1993) claim organizations can 
erect defenses that prevent accidents.  LaPorte (2011) and La Porte & Rochlin (1994) are 
somewhere in the middle of this argument.  LaPorte (2011) and La Porte & Rochlin 
(1994) believe that organizations should try hard by implementing procedures and 
processes to minimize the possibility of failure (NASA), but LaPorte (2011) and La Porte 
and Rochlin (1994) do not go as far to claim that organizational culture relates to disaster.  
One aim of this research is to explore the disagreement between the theories that failures 
can be prevented (high reliability theory) and that culture matters (normal accident 
theory).  This disagreement is particularly relevant in the extreme event context.  
Developing extreme event leadership theory that addresses the efficacy of readiness for 
extreme events would help to advance the disagreement between the two theories and 
may tip the scale towards one or another.  Knowing more about how readiness would 
mitigate extreme events would help to determine readiness countermeasures as suggested 
by the two theories.  Advancing theory as to this disagreement could demonstrate to 
organizations whether readiness theory is more useful in the extreme context, that is, high 
reliability theory would assert readiness theory concepts apply and organizations can 
prepare adequately for extreme events.   
Other researchers weighed into the debate between normal accident and high 
reliability theories.  Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009) claim that the two theories 
are not incompatible but that there is a temporal relationship that allows the two theories 
to explain accidents at different times.  Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009) 
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describe this as an open-systems argument that views organizations as energy 
transformers.  As organizations expand from their stable state, organizations go through 
energy transformations and this open systems view accounts for both theoretical 
perspectives.  Further, Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009) acknowledge the 
fallibilities of humans and the bounded rationality assumed by the theories.   
Conversely, Perrow (2009) himself wrote a rejoinder to Shrivastava, et al. (2009). 
Perrow (2009) dismissed the temporal and open systems arguments.  Perrow (2009) 
reminds us that normal accident theory acknowledges the role of humans and that time 
was never a component of the theory.  Perrow (2009) states that normal accident theory 
rest beside the other failure theories.  Because normal accident theory explains the 
coupling concepts involved in accidents, there is no need to reconcile the two theories. 
There is only a need to find applications of normal accident theory.  Turner and Gray 
(2009) talked with Perrow (2009) about his comments.  In that article Perrow (2009) 
states that the temporal element is both immaterial and unnecessary because it is the 
coupling that causes the rare event not the time component. 
Shrivastava, et al. (2009) rebutted Perrow‘s (2009) comments.  Shrivastava, et al. 
(2009) reiterated that the normal accident theory applies only to a small set of accidents 
and that the theory does not account enough for human failures.  The debate continues 
and a conclusion is elusive.  
These arguments raise many important issues related to extreme events.  For 
instance, what is the role of norms on behaviors during an extreme event?  Do norms 
serve as constraints on humans and exacerbate the accident?  As mentioned earlier, latent 
organizational issues play a significant role in crises.  Vaughan‘s (1997) normalization of 
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deviance is but one example of how organizational errors lie dormant then split wide 
open during a crisis.  Organizational issues are an important factor in understanding a 
crisis.  Therefore, I gave particular attention to organizational matters as I formulated this 
research. 
To this point, research does not integrate high reliability and normal accident 
theory with complexity theory.  Integrating these theories could enable high-risk 
technological organizations with insight on the degree in which organizations should 
prepare for extreme events.  There is a balance between adding layers of prevention vice 
the acceptance of normal accidents.  Companies must judge their investment in 
prevention versus acknowledgement of the risks and establishing methods to cope with 
accidents when accidents happen.  Acceptance of the risks might imply that companies 
would rely more on the leadership theories and invest in training their leaders on the 
more complex leadership theories, e.g., sensemaking.  My research sheds some light on 
this integration.  My integrated model of crisis leadership might be helpful in resolving 
the deadlock to consider whether embracing complexity helps move the debate forward.  
Through the investigation of extreme events, my research may shed light on the argument 
and help to settle the deadlock.   
Sensemaking Theory 
The theories of readiness, complexity, and failure set the stage for more complex 
theories and thus should be useful in explaining crisis management or extreme event 
management.  While those theories shed some light on the scope of concepts surrounding 
complex events, other higher-level theories can more fully explain the concepts for 
extreme events.  The first of these high-level theories is sensemaking.  Sensemaking is 
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the process of social construction that occurs when discrepant cues interrupt individuals‘ 
ongoing activities, and involve the retrospective development of plausible meanings that 
rationalize what people are doing (Weick, Sutcliffe, Obstfeld & David, 2005, p. 409).  
Again, the intent of this review is to focus on the insights from the theory that would help 
give clarity and meaning to understanding extreme events by helping develop concepts 
and theories.    
Clearly, the seminal work in sensemaking is Karl Weick‘s (1988), ―Enacted 
Sensemaking in Crisis Situations‖, that appeared as part of the JMS Special Issue on 
Industrial Crisis Management: Learning from Organizational Failures.  This work broke 
new ground on the thought that technological failures had a strong construct of human 
failure associated with them.  Weick‘s conclusion that crises are not just the machines‘ 
fault but also the results of human-machine interactions sets the foundation for 
sensemaking.  It is a theory that tries to explain those interactions.  Sensemaking is about 
taking cues from the environment and framing those cues into a picture of what is 
transpiring.  This framing is where Weick suggests the enacting organization structure is 
created, although one caution comes from Hernes, et al. (2008), who concluded that 
sensemaking could lead to an oversimplification of an event because humans tended to 
consider only a few factors during crisis.  Humans have limitations on their cognitive 
abilities, and therefore, seek to simplify problems.  For example, bounded rationality 
suggests that (Simon, 1972) chess players can only envision about one hundred moves 
out of over 10
120
 possible moves.  Therefore, as I proceeded with my research I was 
conscious of information missed by leaders and thus the leaders never considered in their 
sensemaking.   
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In analyzing Weick‘s (1988) work regarding crisis management, there is a central 
argument that when organizations (people) sort out a crisis, organizations generate both 
the understanding used in sensemaking as it affects the crisis and the actions that changes 
the progression of the event.  Weick (1988) states, ―There is a delicate tradeoff between 
dangerous action which produces understanding and safe inaction which produces 
confusion‖ (p. 305). 
For instance, in the Bhopal (Weick, 1988) case
4, management‘s lack of 
commitment to the facility resulted in weak procedures, training, emergency planning 
and other latent organizational weaknesses.  Therefore, as the operators tried to respond 
to the event, i.e., they took actions to understand better the plant conditions, the latent 
weaknesses combined with the human interaction resulted in exactly what the operators 
were trying to prevent.  Thus, their actions led to the enactment of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  In sorting out hundreds of control room alarms, operators complicated the 
event through their actions of trying to mitigate the problem and understand it, 
simultaneously.  The operators themselves, while attempting to understand it, changed 
the event scenario.  This assessment is one of Weick‘s (2010) most powerful conclusions.  
Weick (2010) offers that sensemaking can improve crisis prevention and management by 
promoting shared beliefs about self-control and voluntary cooperation that will allow 
people to understand that their own actions and decisions can be determinants of the 
conditions that organizations try to prevent.  A caution is that if the shared belief is based 
                                                          
4 The Bhopal disaster was a gas leak incident in India, considered the world‘s worst industrial disaster.  It occurred on the night of 
December 2-3, 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. Over 500,000 people were 
exposed to methyl isocyanine gas and other chemicals. The toxic substance made its way in and around the shantytowns located near 
the plant. Estimates vary on the death toll.  The official immediate death toll was 2,259.  The government of Madhya Pradesh 
confirmed 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.    
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upon flawed thinking or ―collective stupidity‖ that would have serious implications on 
the outcome of the crisis. 
Sensemaking Diverges 
Research on sensemaking diverges into two paths from Weick‘s (1988) work.  
The first path describes sensemaking as the events unfold.  This path (Kayes, 2004; 
Vendelo & Rerup, 2009; Wicks, 2002) unpacks a wide-ranging set of disasters as they 
unfold.  The second is a retrospective path that looks for sensemaking post-hoc (Brown & 
Jones, 2000; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, Miglani & Anil, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997).  The retrospective path primarily bases the research upon public inquiry reports 
and others that describe the events post-hoc.  The purpose of these studies was to present 
institutional learning.  These articles are very beneficial sources for my inductive study.  
Using these retrospective path articles provided me with techniques to merge the 
retrospective articles with the interview results to triangulate on the facts from the event.  
Consequently, the interviews and retrospective views provided a clearer picture on the 
leadership issues faced by the personnel involved in the event(s).   
This divergent path of research, i.e., while events unfold or through retrospective 
review, is an important consideration that might enable a better understanding of extreme 
event responses.  First, the initial response by people makes up the sensemaking during 
crisis by blocking out contradictory cues until it is much too late causing an overly 
positive view of the situation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Salancik, 1977).  Again, the 
optimistic bias concept creeps into the research.  Second, research on collective 
sensemaking in crisis demonstrates that there is a range of challenges facing groups and 
teams (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).  These challenges generate obstacles to shared 
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understanding and coordination of action in conditions that are escalating and 
unfathomable.  Third, the institutional contexts in which the organization and its 
members are embedded influence sensemaking in crisis, and sensemaking often serves to 
maintain these institutions (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).   
Not explicitly discussed among the three themes is the role of ―felt‖ emotions in 
sensemaking.  Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) discuss the role of ―felt‖ emotions, such as 
panic, on sensemaking.  The next few sections discuss all of these themes in detail.  
Fallacy of Optimism 
An optimistic mindset that creates blind spots can be devastating for individuals.  
In uncertainty, i.e., crisis, once individuals begin to express optimism openly, individuals 
establish an unfounded commitment that begins a path to failure.  Kayes‘ (2004, p. 1277) 
study of eight climbing deaths on Mount Everest shows how pre-summit statements made 
by climbers, like, ‗as long as the weather holds, we will have success‘ and ‗we‘ve got the 
Big E [Everest] all figured out,‘ sounded overly positive and blocked out the 
contradictory clues that would allow them to sense that they were facing an ill-defined 
problem without clear goals, or solution paths.   
Weick (1993) also highlights the effect of public statements by spotters on the 
smokejumpers‘ aircraft during the Mann Gulch fire (1949) when 12 smoke jumpers who 
parachuted into the area to fight a fire in the Helena National Forest, Montana, United 
States, died.  The spotters stated, ―The crew would have it under control by 10:00 the 
next morning‖ (Maclean, 1992, p. 43).  Those optimistic statements constructed a blind 
spot that blocked out growing evidence to the contrary.  When commitments are active, 
voluntary, and public, those statements often create the biggest blind spots (Cialdini, 
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Trost & Newsom, 1995; Salancik, 1977).  Cialdini, Trost and Newsom (1995) find that 
publicly assessing, explaining, and recommending actions in response to a crisis causes 
people to feel much more bound to them than when people keep their commitments non-
public.  Over-commitment to a position along with the normalization of deviance creates 
these blind spots (Nickerson, 1998; Vaughan 1997; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  These 
public statements might increase accountability of the leader as the statements more 
strongly connect the leader‘s image to the position.  However, the accountability that 
those statements generate for the leader may have a detrimental effect if the leader is 
wrong. 
On the contrary, Landau and Chisholm (1995) argue that pessimism, with the 
failure-avoidance organizational perspective that it entails, can actually mitigate a crisis.  
Landau and Chisholm (1995) suggest that organizations should ―institutionalize 
disappointment‖ as a means to counteract self-deception.  This conclusion is consistent 
with the research articles on High Reliability Organizations.  High Reliability 
Organizations instill in their members a sense of a ―preoccupation with failure‖.  High 
Reliability Organizations are encouraged to use ―vigilant wariness‖ at all times (Weick, 
et al. 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  Optimism has a place in crisis management as it 
motivates individuals to take action; however, it can create blind spots and prevent 
individuals from adapting to circumstances.   
Establishing a Shared Understanding 
The second challenge for responders during a crisis lies in establishing a shared 
understanding of the environment, especially, in extreme events, when trying to 
formulate shared understanding among responders is difficult.  Weick (1995) discusses 
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three types of understandings: commitment, identity, and expectations.  Commitment is a 
foundation for sensemaking because responders often generate over-optimistic statements 
or even generate explanations retrospectively to justify their actions (Weick, 1995).  
While this has the potential to create helpful meanings in the wake of ambiguity, it can 
also create dangerous blind spots (Weick, 1995).   
Identity is another type of shared-understanding construct (Weick, 1995).  The 
importance of identity in such contexts becomes evident especially when it is threatened.  
In crisis, responders can lose their own identity.  Weick (1995) talks about this in the 
Mann Gulch study when the smokejumpers dropped their tools and ran.  The opposite 
can happen as well.  Wicks‘ (2002) study refers to the Westray mine disaster (1992) as an 
example, where miners‘ identities as ―real men‖ and ―providers‖ blinded them from 
seeing the dangers inherent in their work. 
The other type of shared understanding is expectations (Weick, 1995).  Weick 
(1995) suggests that expectations connect with cues to create understandings.  Individuals 
then filter subsequent cues against this understanding and slowly build up their 
confidence about a picture of the situation.  Of course, as in the other types of 
understandings, this can be good or bad.  As in the Mount Everest case, an over-
optimistic picture can be very detrimental.  The best strategy is for individuals to adjust 
their expectations throughout the disaster. 
In the end, shared understandings are difficult to gain, and create a positive or 
negative outcome (Weick, 1995).  Weick (1995, p. 148) suggests that, ―wisdom‖ can 
overcome the contradictions in developing shared understandings.  For Weick (1995) the 
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elements of wisdom are ―updating and doubt‖, and importantly, updating and doubt 
enable adaptation and innovation.  
Institutional Effects  
There is relatively little research on the institutional effects of sensemaking in 
crisis (Jennings & Greenwood, 2003).  Obviously, this would be a fruitful area of 
research.  One of the most useful studies on the institutional effects is contained in 
Wicks‘ (2002) study of the Westray mine disaster.  Wicks (2002) investigates the 
institutional causes of blind spots.  Wicks (2002) finds that the miners‘ daily practices led 
to the creation of blind spots for them.  There are a number of components leading to a 
―mindset of invulnerability‖ created by work rules, non-work rules, and the culture of the 
organization.  Much like the normalization of deviance, these miners normalized risk.  
The miners became overly comfortable with the risks that miners face every day in the 
mines.  Wicks (2002) echoes Weick‘s (1988) suggestions of enacted sensemaking.  The 
normalizing behavior of the miners became detrimental to safety.   
Role of ―Felt‖ Emotions 
Besides shared understandings, another area of sensemaking discussed earlier is 
panic.  Obviously, emotions play a role in crisis management.  Some research discusses 
how emotions, especially ―felt‖ emotions, can be detrimental to cognitive thought, 
especially in sensemaking (Shrivastava, et al. 1988).  Weick (1995) argues that felt 
emotion, which comes from arousal, makes use of cognitive ability.  It takes attention 
away from the task.  Conversely, as in much of sensemaking, felt emotions can also be 
helpful.  Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) argue that emotions can actually facilitate 
sensemaking.  Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) add that other emotions such as shame, 
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guilt, embarrassment, anxiety, and pride can play a role as well.  These negative and self-
conscious emotions can be the strongest of all emotions affecting sensemaking (Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010). 
Retrospective Sensemaking Research 
Regarding the post-hoc studies on sensemaking, some research (Brown & Jones, 
2000) concludes that public inquiries constitute a valuable source of insights for 
reviewing institutional sensemaking.  Brown and Jones (2000) find that these studies 
mostly focus on rebuilding trust and according legitimization to the organization.  
Another insight from these studies is that the post-hoc enquiries tend to rebuild 
authorities and leadership in the affected organization.  This stream of literature informed 
my research, in that my qualitative study used some inquiry reports.  In cases where this 
research could not find individuals directly associated with extreme events to interview, I 
reviewed a secondary data source.  For instance, an inquiry report from the Deepwater 
Horizon was used to develop the sensemaking concepts used by the leaders who were 
involved in the event.   
In Search of Common Characteristics 
In an attempt to identify operational characteristics of sensemaking, I conducted a 
mini-longitudinal review of sensemaking articles seeking a common set of characteristics 
that might be used to qualitatively review extreme events.  I developed a review of 
sensemaking characteristics for several significant disasters as summarized in Table 2, 
Characteristics of Specific Disasters.  I intend this review to identify trends or 
commonalities among sensemaking characteristics that might lead to the development of 
concepts.  The sources for the information are Weick‘s (1990) review of the Mann Gulch 
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disaster, Vendelo and Rerup‘s (2009) review of the Roskilde Festival disaster, and 
Dunbar and Garud‘s (2009) review of the Columbia shuttle disaster.  I chose these 
articles because they were case studies of single crisis (events), and each of the articles 
focused on understanding the characteristics of sensemaking.  
 
Definition of Terms: 
Risk Context – Vendelo and Rerup (2009) situations where threats are low; 
perceived low risk environments but risks can incubate. 
Incubation period – Self-explanatory; period where latent weaknesses are present 
but yet unobserved or active. 
Pluralistic ignorance – Weick (1990, p. 588) describes pluralistic ignorance as a 
view by crisis responders that they are, ―puzzled by what is going on, but I 
assume that no one else is‖.   
Collective sensemaking – Dunbar and Garud (2009) organizational members‘ 
struggle to make sense of the situation. 
Team trust – Self-explanatory. 
Panic – Self-explanatory. 
Length of disaster – Self-explanatory; units provided. 
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Table 2 - Characteristics of Specific Disasters
5
 
 
 
 
A few examples of this author‘s judgment on the codings illustrate how 
sensemaking characteristics reveal themselves through cross-case comparisons.  For 
example, for the risk context, my judgment is that it is reasonable to view a forest fire and 
a space shuttle launch as high-risk, while attending a rock concert is a low-risk 
environment.  People would not reasonably be worried about dying from attending a rock 
concert.  However, as the situation unfolds, I judge that panic grew in all three events as 
the situation deteriorated.  During the rock concert crush, people panicked.  Further, for 
the Columbia shuttle disaster there were over a hundred shuttle flights before the fateful 
loss of the Columbia; therefore, the incubation period was extremely lengthy, while the 
other two cases had short incubation periods.  These are examples of my rationale for 
determining the behaviors of the sensemaking characteristics. 
                                                          
5 Source: Casto (2014). The magnitudes are based upon my own personal judgment. 
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The conclusions drawn from Table 2 are mixed.  All three accidents resulted in 
deaths.  The risk context seems immaterial to the outcome.  In the Roskilde festival case, 
risk was low but deaths still occurred.  Similarly, incubation period, pluralistic ignorance, 
collective sensemaking, team trust and length of disaster seem immaterial as well.  The 
clearest conclusion from the three events is the growing state of panic during these life 
and death situations.  While it is obvious that panic exists among individuals when a 
disaster unfolds, it would be interesting to find measures of organizational or leadership 
panic.  Leadership panic is a characteristic not extensively covered by the crisis 
leadership research.  In my research, I was conscious of developing characteristics of 
leadership panic where appropriate. 
Later in this research review, I will discuss the characteristics of extreme 
leadership.  Some sensemaking characteristics are common among two of the disasters in 
Table 2, but not all three; nevertheless, this collection of characteristics could serve as a 
tool in quantifying sensemaking in this research study.   
In sum, I believe that sensemaking is a highly complex theory that can shed light 
on extreme event crisis management.  There are many concepts to consider regarding 
sensemaking when conducting a qualitative study.  These begin with the determination of 
whether the organization is ―enacted‖.  The measure of an enacted organization is best 
generated by reviewing a number of concepts to compare, contrast, and discover linkages 
between those potential concepts (Weick, 1995).  It starts by understanding the initial 
response to the event by determining the degree of shared understanding that occurs.  
Shared understanding is broken into three pieces: commitment, identity, and expectations 
(Weick, 1995).  As in the high reliability theory, a preoccupation with failure is an 
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essential element of sensemaking.  That preoccupation includes the normalization of 
deviance, institutional disappointment, degree of optimistic statements, and wisdom 
(doubt and updating).  Finally, understanding the types of ―felt‖ emotions and cognitions 
involved in the response could be one of the most powerful factors in sensemaking. 
Transboundary Effects 
Researchers have expanded the literature of crisis management through the review 
of a relatively new theory called ―transboundary effects‖ (Boin, 2009).  Transboundary 
effects literature considers what Perrow (1994) would call the ―coupling‖ of modern 
society.  The definition of the transboundary crisis considers the functioning of multiple, 
life-sustaining systems, functions, or infrastructures that are threatened by the crisis and 
cause uncertainty of outcomes (Boin, 2009).  Essentially, the transboundary effects are 
different from a routine crisis in that the effects involve the coupling of systems within 
and among countries.  The recent 2009 financial crisis is an example of a transboundary 
effect in that it affected not just the United States‘ economy, but the world‘s economy.   
Few crisis management researchers have delved into studying transboundary 
effects.  Given that the number of articles associated with crisis management is on the 
decline, many researchers believe that the crisis management domain is exhausted (Boin, 
2009).  Nevertheless, with the opening of the transboundary theory, there is a new 
domain of interest for researchers of crisis management.  A related stream of research lies 
in the area of the ―Black Swan Events‖ (Taleb, 2010), which are unforeseen and 
unanticipated events.  Nafday (2009) claims that unforeseen and unanticipated events are 
―unknown-unknowns‖, i.e., completely out of left field (p. 194).  Often, these events are 
non-linear and cascading in their seriousness (Nafday, 2009).  For example, as in the 
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Fukushima nuclear plant disaster (2011) a natural event cascades to an artificial (man-
made) event and then to a global social event. 
The characteristics of a transboundary crisis as documented by Boin (2009) are a 
good fit even when describing the characteristics of an extreme event.  These 
characteristics include: 
- Tightly coupled systems 
- Extends cross-functionally and cross-nationally 
- Transcends time boundaries 
- No defined beginning, end, or ground zero 
- Escalates quickly in unforeseen directions exploiting linkages 
- Causes unfathomable damage 
 
Boin (2009) describes the ―escalatory power‖ of a transboundary crisis.  Boin 
(2009) suggests that because globalization makes the world flatter (Friedman, 2006) 
small perturbations may have drastic consequences.  A coupling of systems (Perrow, 
2009) extends this issue by creating what Boin (2009, p. 370) calls the ―highways for 
failure‖.  Boin (2009) acknowledges that governments cannot keep pace with this 
challenging and changing environment; therefore, governments have little capability to 
deal with transboundary issues.  The trends exposed deal with technological growth that 
speed up transboundary effects.  International terrorism is another trend that creates 
opportunities to spread crises.  Finally, escalation caused by demographic shifts and shifts 
in global power arrangements introduces new dimensions that can contribute to an 
escalation of the crises (Boin, 2009).   
For the present research, I note the importance of Boin‘s (2009) study in the light 
of his list of executive tasks in managing a crisis.  The following five tasks are difficult 
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and fraught with complications: 1. preparing in the face of indifference; 2. making sense 
of an emerging and evolving crisis; 3. managing large response networks; 4. offering 
credible answers; and 5. learning under pressure.  These five tasks were useful in 
informing the qualitative concepts in my research by providing a categorization of tasks 
and allowed me to separate tasks from cognitive reasoning skills. 
Other authors explore further transboundary effects.  For instance, Wachtendorf 
(2009) describes an effect she refers to as ―trans-boundary social ruptures‖.  Wachtendorf 
(2009) refers to transboundary social ruptures defined by Quarentelli (1988), Lagadec 
(2009) and Boin (2009) as events that reach beyond social boundaries and disrupt 
multiple social systems.  Social ruptures could become transnational as well (especially 
in the cases of the United States, Canada and Mexico).  Transboundary effects bring 
entirely new problems to the leaders of extreme events.  With the rapidly connected 
world come new challenges for event leaders.  The challenge of a tightly connected world 
requires new readiness, mitigation, and response strategies.  I explored these new 
dimensions in my interviews.    
There are other transboundary effects, specifically the relationship between risk, 
crises, and public management (Lodge, 2009).  Public managers often seek clarity of 
response to extreme events.  Public managers seek to purify readiness and response 
thereby desire to limit uncertainty and that public crisis management employs one-way of 
responding to a crisis.  However, crises are often ―clumsy‖ and might require ―clumsy‖ 
solutions (Lodge, 2009, p. 406).  In my research, clumsy solutions were juxtapositioned 
against sensemaking to find new links of interconnectivity between transboundary effects 
and sensemaking.    
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Some authors (Santella, Steinberg, & Parks, 2009; Parks, 1971) bridge research 
and practice by creating software tools to model the crisis for policy-makers.  These tools 
often model routine crises.  Software tools provide a roadmap for leaders in approaching 
their response to a crisis.   
Another applicable article for this research is Lagadec (2009) whose focus is on 
innovative thinking in the context of transboundary crises.  Lagadec (2009) concludes 
that, ―in our cultures and in our selection (of leaders) creative thinking is punishing and 
punished‖ (p. 483).  The argument is that nonconventional thinking is needed in 
nonconventional crisis.  As discussed earlier in this dissertation, creativity in crisis 
response is antithetical to the norm of organizations that often drive for certainty through 
procedures and processes.  Nevertheless, in my research this concept of driving out 
creative thinking can be interesting.  That is, if a leader concludes that he/she was 
unprepared for an extreme event because crisis drills leave him/her unprepared for 
creative thinking, that insight itself would be interesting.    
Extreme Event Context as Related to Transboundary Crisis 
There is a similarity between a transboundary crisis and an extreme event or an 
extreme event context.  While there appears to be little, or no, literature in this area, these 
crises, events, and contexts appear to have similar characteristics.  Among the similarities 
are the international implications of an extreme context.  Farazmand (2009) discusses a 
perspective that all ―grand failures‖ by governments have global implications.  
Farazmand (2009) believes that a grand failure by a global government, e.g., the United 
States, implies that lesser governments would have little chance of success in a similar 
situation is a gap in the literature.  This is true especially for the United States in its 
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position as a global leader.  Failure to respond to a large event shakes the confidence of 
other nations regarding the United States as a global leader.  Certainly, in the Chernobyl 
case, the failure of the Soviet Union fostered a lack of confidence by Soviet citizens and 
the world.  Farazmand (2009) also suggests that smaller nations lose hope that a smaller 
nation could cope with an extreme event given that a country as developed and powerful 
as the United States failed to address Hurricane Katrina in an appropriate and timely 
fashion.   
The ability of leaders to manage crisis response is essential to leadership success.  
This is the second step in the leadership construct discovery process.  Finding the 
necessary leadership concepts needed in an extreme event is a goal of my research.  Can 
great leadership minimize the impact of extreme event?  Is it a goal of leadership can be 
to arrest the cascade from a routine crisis becoming an extreme crisis?  For instance, do 
leaders control panic and mitigate the impact of a crisis at the earliest point in the 
progression of the crisis to avoid turning a routine crisis, perhaps a hurricane, into an 
extreme crisis, for example, Katrina or moreover turning an extreme event into an 
extreme context?  The answers to these questions, among others, were essential for my 
research.   
In sum, transboundary effects are highly important considerations for this 
research.  As the world flattens, extreme events multiply, and our ability to create fear 
around the world expands, most extreme events will take on the characteristics of a 
transboundary event.  As the qualitative study progressed, I attempted to reflect upon the 
data to determine how transboundary issues comport with extreme crisis.  The applicable 
concepts for my research gleaned from transboundary effects included the six 
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characteristics of transboundary effects and the five executive tasks identified by Boin 
(2009).  Other notable effects of interest were Wachtendorf‘s (2009) transboundary 
social-ruptures and Lagadec‘s (2009) innovative thinking.   
Considering the complications entailed in a combination of the extreme crisis, 
extreme context, transboundary, and Black Swan aspects, integrating the associated 
concepts could provide fertile ground for crisis management theory research.  This 
combination can provide researchers with a significant new domain.  Few, if any, 
researchers are publishing articles in the domain of integrating these theories, but it I 
believe that these domains bring with them new leadership challenges that might call for 
new research concepts and associated leadership competencies.  As stated earlier, most 
crisis research uses routine crises as a foundation and then extrapolates the findings to 
extreme events.  Through studying extreme events explicitly in this research, there were 
interesting and valuable findings while walking through the specifics of the extreme 
events. 
Next, this review moves into the final area of theory, in fact, two administrative 
theories.  First, I cover leadership theory as it applies to routine events and discuss the 
limitations of existing theory to explain extreme event leadership.  Understanding the 
concepts behind leadership is especially crucial in extreme crisis management.  I discuss 
the decision-making theory last.  Decision theory moves leadership from the strategic 
thinking cognitive levels to the action levels.   
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 Administrative Theories 
Leadership 
 Understanding leadership theory in extreme events is a daunting challenge.  Given 
that the dimensions of an extreme event are continually changing as humankind 
advances, keeping pace with the demands of leadership under these conditions is nearly 
impossible.  A significant challenge for this part of the literature review is the lack of 
articles exploring extreme event leadership.  However, the lack of extreme event 
literature is both a challenge and an opportunity. 
 Because extreme events are rare, past research on extreme event leadership comes 
mainly from two domains: most researchers study routine crisis events, for example, 
hurricanes, and then extrapolate their conclusions to extreme events (Mikusaova, 2011; 
Kayes 2004; Maclean 1992).  Another line of scholarly inquiry studies military battles 
and then applies the conclusions to non-military extreme events (Baron & Scott, 2010; 
Campbell, Hannah & Matthews, 2010; Fisher, Hutchings & Sarros, 2010; Weeks 2007).  
Studying these domains has methodological limitations.  Due to the threshold effect 
described earlier in this literature review, routine crisis events are not likely to produce 
conditions that leaders face during extreme events; therefore, the usefulness of 
extrapolation is questionable (Yammarino, et al. 2010).  In the research on military 
applications, there seem to be even more problems.  When fighting wars, military training 
permits troops and leaders to sacrifice themselves, and troops often train for and 
experience extreme events (Weeks, 2007).  Unlike in extreme events, in these classic and 
military research domains, command structures usually remain in place.  Additionally, in 
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the military structure, people follow the established rules without question, e.g., 
displaying a respect for rank (Weeks, 2007).   
In non-military extreme events, organizations usually do not train for 
unfathomable conditions (Yammarnio, et al. 2010).  Additionally, by definition, extreme 
events usually involve the loss of governance, particularly the loss of corporate control 
and government control (Comfort, 2002).  By nature, extreme events can exceed the 
capacity of both military and non-military.  Similarly, many of the government agencies, 
unlike the military agencies, do not have directive leadership and are unfamiliar with 
failure of business continuity (Yammarnio, et al. 2010).  There are broad organizational, 
leadership, and readiness differences between the military and non-military organizations 
(Yammarnio, et al. 2010).  
Hannah, et al. (2009) discusses the tensions between leaders who are adaptive 
versus those who are ―administrative‖ during an extreme crisis.  By ―administrative‖, the 
authors mean classic authoritative or directive leadership.  There exists a general tension 
between using adaptation during an event versus following the administrative, i.e., classic 
leadership route.  Thus, using the military model for extreme leadership research is 
challenging.  I believe that this is an important consideration when conducting extreme 
event research.  Researchers usually do not control for military organizational structure 
considerations, such as self-sacrifice, training and adherence to rank, when examining 
non-military-based extreme events (Hannah, et al. 2009; Useem, et al. 2005); thus, using 
articles that use military contexts in the present research controls for administrative 
differences. 
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An insight from a seminal article (Hannah, et al. 2009) that provides a broad 
perspective of extreme leadership and addresses not only the leadership concepts but 
importantly, the methodological issues as well, frames the direction of my research.  
Hannah, et al. (2009) focuses on developing a framework of study using a typology that 
defines and distinguishes extreme context from crises and other contexts.  The Hannah, et 
al. (2009) article strongly endorses the qualitative approach to research of extreme event 
leadership.  Hannah, et al. (2009) frames the direction of continued research on 
leadership in extreme events.  One important direction that is applicable to this research 
is their recognition that extreme leadership research may not change the essence of 
leadership, or make existing leadership concepts invalid; however, the Hannah, et al. 
(2010) suggest that research could discover new relationships between concepts and 
necessitate advanced methodologies.  That discovery is one potential contribution of this 
research.  Perhaps I can make discoveries of the unique interrelationships among 
leadership concepts, and discoveries of the most important leadership concepts within the 
extreme event context.  
Sensemaking, Surprise Management and Non-linear Leadership 
Developing insights on leadership strategies used in addressing extreme events is 
an important element of this study.  A key to the necessary leadership insights comes 
from the work of Mumford (2005).  Mumford (2005) finds that underlying a leader‘s 
sensemaking activities is the formation of a prescriptive model.  Mumford (2005) 
suggests that finding a ―prescriptive model often provides the ―solution‖ to the problems 
broached by the crisis‖ (p. 522).  Weick (1988) suggests this as well in his study on 
sensemaking.  Weick (1988) and other scholars ('t Hart, 1990; Turner & Pidgeon, 1978) 
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identified ―making sense‖ as a crucial element that dictates leaders‘ success.  Mumford 
(2005) concludes that, ―the bewildering pace, ambiguity, and complexity of a crisis tends 
to overwhelm the normal modes of situation assessment‖ (p. 372).  For these reasons, my 
research included the elements of the complexity and the sensemaking theory to derive 
the sensemaking and making sense insights of extreme events and developing an 
integrated model.   
Farazmand (2009) introduces the strategic theory of ―surprise management‖.  
Surprise management, Farazmand (2009) suggests, ―Aims to read and act in an 
anticipated fashion, remove or minimize potential threats and clear obstacles to achieving 
goals and missions‖ (p. 407).  According to Farazmand (2009), surprise management has 
roots in chaos, complexity, and dynamic systems‘ theories.  For me, surprise management 
clearly has roots in Weick‘s (2001) ―management of the unexpected‖ as well because the 
dynamic elements of surprise management, e.g., understanding, framing and enacting, are 
essential in surprise management and management of the unexpected.  Finding the 
linkages or intersections among these theories may result in new and powerful leadership 
strategies. Farazmand (2009) finds some of the linkages between chaos, complexity, and 
dynamic systems theories; in my research I discovered linkages among other crisis 
theories.   
The bottom line is that managing non-linear events (extreme events are non-
linear) successfully necessitates non-linear leadership techniques like surprise 
management (Comfort, 2002).  The key is that extraordinary and emergency situations 
require leaders to reject stability and equilibrium.  Leaders must use non-linear-dynamic 
thinking, which often calls for embracing disorder and disequilibrium.  This means living 
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on the edge, at the threshold, where the situation appears stable but is on the verge of 
chaos (Farazmand, 2009).  Farazmand (2009) calls this situation ―creative breakdown‖.  
Farazmand (2009) references Schumpeter‘s (1942) quote that ―Breakdowns may be the 
―birth pangs‖ of a better future‖ (p. 405). 
Weick (1995) cautions that most managers often make a big mistake of thinking 
linearly; managers try to solve non-linear organizational problems in a linear fashion.  
Instead, mangers should get out of the causality box that has frozen their mindsets.  
Managers must think strategically and non-linearly to anticipate and manage the 
―unexpected‖ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).  Educational and training programs, formal and 
informal, periodic and continuous, can help to train and develop surprise management 
teams, leaders, and managers for crisis management in the age of rapid and non-linear 
changes that constantly produce complexities (Farazmand, 2009).  Hospitals are a good 
example of organizations that train and develop surprise management that face non-linear 
challenges from simple gunshot wounds to mass casualty events. 
Managing complexity on the ―edge of chaos‖ (Pascale, 1990), too, requires a 
different set of organizational learning, a learning to learn surprise management capacity 
(Waldrop, 1992).  Farazmand (2009) asserts that developed or advanced nations fail to 
take surprise management seriously.  Farazmand (2009) finds that the combination of 
complicity, ignorance, arrogance, leisurely habit, and dismissive attitudes results in a 
frozen mind-set of government leaders during catastrophes.  Farazmand (2009) suggest 
that when developed or advanced nations learn to address surprise management besides 
helping them respond to catastrophes, it will help the less developed nations address 
catastrophes by learning from the developed world. 
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Some authors (Farazmand, 2009; Waldrop, 1992; Weick, 1995; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007) remind us of the importance of non-linear thinking.  Leaders must release 
their rigid mindsets in order to manage surprise or unexpected events.  These authors 
generally agree that it takes education and training that is continuous and periodic, formal 
and informal, and that stresses adaptive management to help cope with crises and 
disasters.  Accordingly, Farazmand (2009) asserts that developing such a capacity of 
adaptive management requires the integration of capacity building to support surprise 
management from youth to adulthood.  Farazmand (2009) gives the examples of children 
in countries that are taught at an early age to prepare for natural disasters, e.g., floods, 
earthquakes, and droughts, as an example of capacity building.    
For me, I believe that the meta-thinking work of Crittenden and Woodside (2007) 
with regard to thinking-about-thinking could play a role in the education of crisis-leaders.  
Their thought that leaders need more than intuitive thinking seems appropriate, in that the 
classic linear crisis management tools do not work in the non-linear environment.  Meta-
thinking seems to address many of the limitations identified in linear decision-making, 
such as ignoring non-conforming information, implementing decisions based on little 
knowledge, and being over-confident in the leaders‘ initial impressions of the event.  I 
believe that challenging leaders to think about thinking as leaders respond to a crisis will 
cause the leaders to consider gaps in their knowledge and discover flaws in their 
decision-making processes.  Meta-thinking is not mentioned in the extreme event 
literature, and I believe that including meta-thinking in this research would be useful.  
Using the techniques of meta-thinking could provide crisis leaders with a new cognitive 
67 
 
tool heretofore underdeveloped by the literature.  I believe that meta-thinking in 
leadership is a relatively undeveloped concept.   
Leadership Lessons from Hurricane Katrina 
From a strategic perspective, Farazmand (2009) provides a comprehensive list of 
strategic lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina.  Farazmand (2009) advises leaders 
never to compromise the long-term strategic goals of a nation, system, or organization for 
political or economic benefits.  Farazmand‘s (2009) other advice includes building 
capacity in preparation; leadership and central command are the most important elements 
of crises management.  Farazmand (2009) suggests that traditional crisis management is 
useless in the extreme event that these events test a government‘s competency, and that 
governments avoid surprises by preparing for simultaneous and multiple crises.  My 
research considered these elements of leadership strategy, i.e., maintaining national 
strategic goals, building response capacity, competent leadership, and preparation for 
extreme events.   
A problem with Farazmand‘s (2009) thesis is that he sees the government as the 
savior that steps in to arrest chaos; however, I believe differently.  In the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill (2010) the government did play a role, especially in requiring 
compensation of victims; however, British Petroleum (BP) managed the resolution of the 
technical aspects of the event.  Similarly, with the new private spacecraft companies, the 
government expects them to plan, control, respond, and recover from the events that 
those private entities cause.  It would be helpful to identify new leadership strategies so 
that private companies can control more of these events. The world is flattening more, 
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and more naïve companies are facing extreme events and often without advanced 
governments to support them during an extreme event.   
 Others who have researched lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina have other 
thoughts about leadership in an extreme event (DeChurch, et al. 2011).  While DeChurch, 
et al. (2011) agree that a leader‘s first role in the crisis is to develop a strategy; 
DeChurch, et al. (2011) believe that the largest benefit of the strategy is when it serves as 
an accurate picture and response framework for the entire response team.  These thoughts 
are consistent with Weick‘s (1978) ideas on sensemaking because Weick (1978) suggests 
that developing a strategy framework is crucial to enactment.   
The Role of Trust in Leadership 
Hannah, et al. (2009) capture the essence of the trust in leadership literature by 
building a framework for examining extreme event leadership.  Hannah, et al. (2009) 
believes that an extreme event stretches organizations to or beyond their limits.  It is then 
that trust in the leader becomes a crucial element.  Although as discussed earlier, this is a 
different kind of trust, it is trust above the threshold, or life-or-death trust.  Some of that 
trust is idiosyncratic in that it is built-up beforehand, but in extreme events, it may break 
down on reaching the life-or-death threshold. 
Further, Hannah, et al. (2009) describes other important characteristics mentioned 
in the literature.  Hannah, et al. (2009) stresses cohesion of the followers as a crucial 
factor of trust.  According to their work, leaders achieve cohesion by using Weick‘s 
(1996; 1998) sensemaking or even ―sense-giving‖ techniques.  The authors refer to 
Weick‘s (1998) caution that leaders can be overconfident in their ability to understand a 
situation, or at least believe as leaders they understand the situation.  Therefore, by 
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having too much confidence the leader over-acts and thereby makes errors and loses 
cohesion of the group.  Hannah, et al. (2009) discuss the work of Weick (1988) and 
Shrivastava, et al. (1988) who developed the concept of triggering points, which are 
disenabling events linking back to human judgment; judgment that deteriorates under 
pressure.  I discovered triggering points in my data collection, and those triggering points 
are discussed in the Results.     
Tension of Adaptive and Administrative Leadership Styles 
When analyzing the literature on leadership in extreme events, one sees a 
fundamental tension between adaptive leadership and administrative leadership styles 
(Yukl, 2006).  Adaptive leadership consists of ―improvisational‖ and ―ambidextrous‖ 
leadership styles (Yukl, 2006), which are styles that flex between exploitation and 
exploration (exploration refers to pursuit and acquisition of new knowledge, whereas 
exploitation indicates the use of knowledge for efficiency).  While administrative 
leadership styles are those of classic leadership, for example, autocratic or directive, one 
of the keys to the success of the present research is to uncover the relationships between 
leadership styles in extreme events.  This tension is an important insight for this research.  
Understanding whether organizations need to be more improvisational or whether 
organizations need to be more ambidextrous could provide valuable insights for 
leadership.  Further examination of this tension was necessary as this research 
progressed. 
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Decision-Making 
  Extreme Event Decision-making 
It is important for this research to identify the major concepts involved in making 
decisions during moments of extreme crisis.  Ultimately, these concepts should guide the 
research but not direct it.  Within the crisis management literature, there exist classic 
decision-making articles along with articles on decision-making during crisis (Hannah, 
Campbell, & Matthews, 2010; Sweeney, 2010).  The goal for this research is to explore 
the conclusions of the literature regarding extreme event decision-making.  I focus herein 
on what the literature asserts with regard to the important potential differences between 
crisis decision-making and extreme event decision-making.   
Decision-making Accuracy 
Hadley, Pittinsky, Sommer, and Zhu (2011) study many of the complex factors 
that might predict the decision-makers‘ accuracy in cases of the extreme events.  Hadley, 
Pittinsky, Sommer, and Zhu (2011) observe that the optimal solutions that are available 
to the decision-makers under normal circumstances are usually absent during a crisis.  
The lack of time and information render decision-making based upon optimal solutions 
unlikely.  Therefore, Hadley, et al. (2011) suggests that there is a need for greater 
precision in the measures of decision-making.  Those measures should focus on 
―difficulty‖ and ―confidence‖.  Difficulty of the decision and the confidence of the leader 
influence decision-making precision.  Obviously, the strain of the situation affects 
decision-making difficulty.  For that matter, the strain of the situation affects confidence 
regarding the decision as well.  This is because the quality of the decision-making 
process affects the decision-makers‘ confidence as Hadley, et al. (2011) state.  Thus, the 
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authors suggest that a single measure that might capture all of these considerations is 
―self-efficacy‖.  Bandura (1986) defined self-efficacy as:  
 
People‘s judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of action 
 required to attain designated types of performances. It is concerned not with the 
skills one  has but with judgments of what one can do with whatever skills one 
possesses (p.  391). 
 
Hadley, et al. (2011) suggest that decision-makers‘ confidence is conditioned by 
their prior success and perhaps even vicarious experiences, which contribute to their 
belief in success.  Hadley, et al. (2011) call for ability measures, which might be valid 
predictors of decision-makers‘ accuracy; therefore, for this research, understanding a 
leader‘s self-efficacy could be an important consideration leading to a theory of extreme 
event decision-making. 
Tools for Decision-making 
Some authors (Santella, et al. 2009; von Lubitz, Beakley & Patricelli, 2008) 
devise specific tools or models used for decision-making in extreme crises.  These 
authors attempt to structure crisis management decisions by the use of decision tools.  
This process seeks to achieve decisions that are more accurate by simplifying crisis 
information.  For example, von Lubitz, et al. (2008) devised the OODA loop (Observe, 
Orient, Decide, and Act), and Santella (2009) proposed the CIPDSS (Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Decision Support System) model, while Hadley, et al. (2011) 
designed the C-Lead scale (Crisis Leader Efficacy in Assessing and Deciding scale) to 
model or guide decision-making under extreme conditions.  Research that develops 
72 
 
decision-making tools is interested in modeling whether these sophisticated models or 
tools can provide insights on the decision-makers‘ competencies, cognition, or accuracy 
under extreme conditions.   
Use of Expertise in Decision-making 
More importantly, it is critical to consider what the decision-makers should not do 
when facing a crisis.  James and Wooten (2005) discuss a phenomenon, which can occur 
during a crisis, whereby as the complexity increases, the ability to make wise and rapid 
decisions decreases.  This comes as the highest echelon of decision-makers seeks advice 
from technical experts.  Sometimes, the power of the expert slows the speed and accuracy 
of decision-making processes.  James and Wooten (2005) assert that the experts, with 
their narrow knowledge, are not in the best position to make decisions. They question 
whether experts hold the proper perspective to give advice on how best to position the 
organization.   
Escalation of Commitment 
Sometimes, a routine crisis escalates into an extreme event, and this escalation 
could bring with it new considerations for decision-making.  Parashevas (2006) 
highlights this escalation as an acute stage in the crisis where the organization reaches a 
―critical instability‖ point that might involve a ―bifurcation point‖ or ―phase transition‖.  
This transition may become important because it often decentralizes decision-making.  
Complex events change organizational boundaries (Parashevas, 2006).  As the event 
becomes complicated, more leaders of the organization become involved in the decision-
making process.  This transition may result in ―fuzzy‖ boundaries and diverse leaders, 
who might see the crisis from different perspectives. The fuzziness might affect the 
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accuracy of decision-making.  In the end, either the organization fails, survives, or 
evolves into another dimension.  That new dimension may consist of various agents of 
the old organization.  It is likely that the new leaders will lose their connection with the 
old central authority (Kauffman, 1993).  The direction an organization takes is somewhat 
dependent upon the readiness of the organization to face the complex event (Waldrop, 
1992). 
 Parashevas (2006) suggests that complexity science could provide insights to the 
agents.  Parashevas (2006) asserts that there should be early warning systems and 
feedback mechanisms to detect and monitor event escalation.  Agents should not script 
decision-making, but agents should define the interaction between them beforehand.  
Parashevas (2006) believes that decision-making should be a living and evolving system, 
where leaders, followers or others involved in the crisis must understand their roles in 
this system.  Finally, Parashevas (2006) suggests that researchers should use complexity 
science in researching the kind of leadership necessary to generate these realizations and 
behaviors.   
In the end, decision-making is a complex science (Parashevas, 2006).  The 
difference between crisis decision-making and extreme event decision-making is most 
significant when the unfathomable conditions change the parameters of the decision point 
(Parashevas, 2006).  During this research, I maintained awareness of occasions when the 
extreme event conditions change, particularly those ―game changing‖ events.  At game 
changing points, complexity is likely to increase causing new and significant leadership 
challenges.   
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Social Amplification and Its Impact on Crisis Leadership Decision-making 
Social amplification of risk framework (SARF) research is a concept that explains 
the effects of public involvement in helping to frame a risk significant event (Renn, 1992, 
1998; Kasperson, et al. 1987).  Crisis leaders often attempt to frame adverse events for 
public understanding.  Typically, crisis leaders frame the discussion in their own terms.  
Once the public better understands or is indirectly or directly affected by the adverse 
event, the public begins to frame the issue in their (social) terms.  The public‘s 
perspective might be manifested through mass media, social media, lawsuits, government 
intervention, or other social mechanisms that bring pressure on the company.  Social 
amplification causes ripple effects that may affect the company, its industry, or others 
involved both directly and indirectly.  The public itself becomes a transmitter either 
moderating or amplifying the consequences of adverse events. 
 After decades of research on the public experience of risk, no comprehensive 
theory exists to explain why an apparently minor risk or risk event, as assessed by 
technical experts, sometimes produce massive public reactions, accompanied perceptions 
of risk and risk related behaviors (Renn, 1998).  Often the reactions are a disproportionate 
response to the risk.  Renn (1992) refers to the work of Kasperson, et al. (1987) who 
approached the study of social perceptions of risk.  The concept became known as the 
social amplification of risk framework (SARF).  SARF is a conceptual perspective and 
with further research could develop into a full-fledged theory.  According to Kasperson, 
et al. (1987), ―the concept of SARF is based upon the perspective that events related to 
hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways 
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that can raise or attenuate individual and social perceptions of risk and shape risk 
behaviors‖ (p. 139).  
The social amplification phenomenon consists of two parts.  Information flow 
from the event feeds the amplification channels, and then the reaction to the information 
flow either attenuates or amplifies the risk perception.  This begins the ripple effect 
(Renn, et al. 1992).  I see as an example of ripple effects in the nuclear accident at Three 
Mile Island.  While there were no deaths or serious health effects because of the accident, 
there was extreme public interest in the accident.  Fear was rampant throughout the 
country, and the President appointed an emergency manager and visited the site himself.  
Further, the accident caused repercussions in other industries.  This ripple effect is in part 
because of the social amplification of the nuclear accident.  In this sense, social 
amplification provides a corrective mechanism by which society acts to bring the 
technical assessment of risk more in line with a fuller determination of risk (Kasperson & 
Kasperson, 2005).  According to Renn (1998), crisis managers usually focus on the 
technological justice of these events and not on social justice aspects.  Renn (1998) 
suggests that crisis managers tend to evaluate the event in their context of science, and 
crisis managers underappreciate the social justice impacts such as fear, worry, and the 
sense held by the public that adverse events are not under control.   
Why Crisis Leaders Should Consider Social Justice  
Crisis leaders often discount the public‘s view during their response to an extreme 
event (Slovic, 1991).  Nevertheless, the public reaction to actual or perceived risk should 
be a significant input into the considerations of crisis leaders.  Slovic (1991) addresses 
the issue of the calculation of actual risk and perceived risk.  Slovic (1991) concludes that 
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public perceptions are the product of intuitive biases and economic interests and reflect 
cultural values more generally.  Thus, if crisis leaders ignore the public‘s input, the public 
will voice their perceptions at the highest levels of government.  Then political 
involvement becomes a major consideration for the crisis leader.   
The Risk-Perception Link 
From a risk-perception perspective, Kasperson, et al. (1987) define social 
amplification as the mechanism by which information processes, institutional structures, 
social-group behavior, and individual responses determine the social perception of risk.  
Risk perception becomes a factor that companies must consider when an event occurs.  
This concept illustrates the issue of social justice in that risk events and their social 
impacts are a framework that the public considers in their assessments.  Risk perception 
gives meaning to how people think about risks and their relationship to the risk.  Slovic 
(1991) asserts that there is no such thing as ―true‖ (absolute) and ―distorted‖ (socially 
determined) risk.  Rather, the information system and characteristics of public response 
that compose social amplification are essential elements in determining the nature and 
magnitude of risk.  The bottom line is that from the public‘s perspective a given event is a 
risk if the public thinks that it is.  This public perspective is a key in determining the 
appropriate response to an event.  Public opinion conditions the technological response. 
Amplification 
 So how does risk perception become amplified?  Cantrell (2011) claims that the 
public information system is like a stereo receiver and it may amplify risk events in two 
ways.  Cantrell (2011) suggests that stereo receivers can intensify or weaken signals that 
are part of the information that individuals and social groups receive about the risk.  
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Further, stereo receivers could filter the multitude of signals with respect to the attributes 
of the risk and their importance.  Conversely, there may be the opposite communications 
mechanism than a stereo receiver.  Some mechanisms, e.g., the affected organization 
itself, may act as a transmitter.  Public information systems may transmit intent through 
press releases, government filings, lawsuits, and other public mechanisms.  Conversely, 
other organizations act as a stereo receiver.  Those include the news media, activists and 
social organizations, fanatics, governments, social media and other reference groups 
(Cantrell, 2011).  There are many communications channels these groups can use to 
either expand or weaken the conversation.  In the technological environment of today 
these signals are amplified greater and faster than at any time in the history of humanity.  
Those stereo receivers can become social amplification stations generating and 
transmitting information via communications channels.  Beyond that, the receivers of the 
information themselves become additional transmitters that provide information to their 
communications channels, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc.  
Consequences of Amplification 
These receivers and their echoes are multiplications of the original risk signal.  As 
such, at each level of transmission, risk signals cause resultant behaviors.  These 
secondary transmissions result in associated secondary impacts.  Secondary impacts 
include such effects as the following (Yannopaoulo, 2011): 
 
– Enduring mental perceptions, images, and attitudes (e.g., anti-technological attitudes); 
– Alienation from the physical environment;  
– Social apathy;  
– Stigmatization of the environment or risk manager; 
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– Local impacts on business sales, residential property values, and economic activity; 
– Political and social pressure (e.g., political demands, changes in political climate and 
culture); 
– Changes in the physical nature of the risk (e.g., feedback mechanisms that enlarge or 
lower the risk); 
– Changes in training, education, or required qualifications of operating and emergency 
response personnel; 
– Social disorder (e.g., protesting, rioting, sabotage, terrorism);  
– Changes in risk monitoring and regulation; 
– Increased liability and insurance costs; and 
– Repercussions on other technologies (e.g., lower levels of public acceptance) and on 
social  institutions (e.g., erosion of public trust). 
  
These secondary impacts can repeat themselves many times over and can cause 
the company to change the means by which the company responds to a crisis, and thus 
begins the ripple effect.  Clearly, in the current age of technology, social amplification is 
evermore present.  I see several examples of this in the present world culture.  For 
instance, the Arab Spring of 2011 escalated through virtual petitions and slogans.  Global 
political protest, Occupy Wall Street, Greenpeace, and others use social media to 
facilitate communications.  Societal discussion often facilitates participative decision-
making.   
Ripples 
The ripple effect essentially moderates the signals created by an event that can 
raise or lower the social significance of an event.  Usually the immediate victims of an 
event are the first to be notified of the situation.  The victims then raise or lower the 
amplification.  This amplification results in the secondary impacts particularly associated 
with the specific company involved.  As in the Three Mile Island case, indirect effects are 
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caused by secondary impacts.  This sometimes results in industry-wide effects.  
Therefore, not only are there secondary signals, but there also are resultant secondary 
impacts.  Yannopaoulo (2011) suggests that amplification can introduce substantial 
temporal and geographical extension of impacts.  The representation demonstrates the 
possibility that social amplification may increase the direct impacts quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  In this case, the inner circle changes its shape with each new round of 
ripples and can influence the actions of politicians who then can affect the decision-
making of crisis managers.  If some cases, the political impact can be counter to the 
technological need to resolve the event. 
In sum, the social amplification of risk is a framework that recognizes the role of 
the public in crisis leadership.  Crisis leaders often only consider the technological justice 
involved in ―solving‖ an event.  Crisis managers then manage the consequences.  
Meanwhile, social media transmits a signal that conditions the technological justice 
through a social justice prism.  As the amplification increases, there is more sociological 
pressure on the event leaders.  Sometimes these social pressures are counterproductive to 
the technological solution to the crisis.  For instance, in the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
the social concern of highly radioactive water reaching the ocean led the Japanese Prime 
Minister to decree that the crisis leaders prevent, at all cost, highly radioactive water from 
reaching the ocean.  As a result, the crisis leaders had to minimize the flow of water into 
the reactors thus delaying the safe shutdown of the reactors.  Social justice sometimes 
―corrects‖ for technological justice.  As stated earlier, when crisis leaders make public 
statements predicting a successful crisis outcome prematurely, accountability theory can 
cause crisis leaders to hold unnecessarily to those public pronouncements.  Politicians 
80 
 
might succumb to social pressures and impose constraints or politicians may make public 
statements that commit them to a course of action. 
Leadership in Dangerous Contexts 
Next is a brief summary of the literature on leadership in a dangerous context 
(Campbell, et al. 2010).  This context is beyond the extreme event context on the crisis 
management continuum.  Usually a dangerous context involves the life and death of the 
people involved.  As stated earlier, the concepts contained within this literature may shed 
light on the leadership concepts for extreme events.  Extreme event leadership does not 
consider all the characteristics of dangerous contexts, e.g., life and death of the leader or 
followers; however, considering the characteristics of dangerous contexts might be the 
natural progression of extreme event leadership research.  Thus, considering leadership 
beyond extreme events is analogous to considering ―routine‖ leadership concepts on the 
other end of the continuum to dangerous contexts.   
This summary begins with Yammarino, et al. (2010), Campbell, et al. (2010), and 
Hannah, et al. (2010), who conceptualize dangerous contexts leadership separately from 
other crisis leadership research.  Similarly, as my dissertation suggests that extreme event 
leadership differs from routine leadership, Yammarino, et al. (2010) asserts that there is a 
special model of dangerous context leadership.  This dangerous context leadership model 
rests on the proposition that leadership in dangerous context is best assessed on a 
multilevel basis (individual, dyadic and group), and further that the dangerous context 
leadership model is multiplexed (pragmatic, individualized, and shared leadership) rather 
than contingent.  The Yammarino, et al. (2010) dangerous context leadership model 
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allows for the consideration that leadership may be unnecessary in normal conditions if 
the group dynamic is competent and skilled. 
Baran and Scott (2010) develop leadership concepts based primarily on 
sensemaking and complexity theories.  Baran and Scott (2010) argue that leadership in 
these contexts is a collective sensemaking activity that reduces ambiguity while 
improving resilience.  Essentially, Baran and Scott (2010) are suggesting that group 
members are the choreographers of leadership; that the job of the group involves framing, 
heedful interrelating, and adjusting.  It is almost as if Baran and Scott (2010) are 
concluding that the group members will resolve the issue themselves and that the leader 
serves to guide them along, rather than the leader organizing the ambiguity through 
framing, heedful interrelating, and adjusting.   
I discuss the construct of ―trust‖ within my dissertation.  There is an interesting 
article by Sweeney (2010) that investigates whether or not followers reassess their trust in 
the leader throughout the event.  Sweeney (2010) finds that followers are constantly 
reassessing their leader‘s abilities and that trust in leadership is of paramount importance.  
Fisher, et al. (2010) reaches a similar conclusion in arguing that leader competence 
develops trust by followers.  Fisher, et al. (2010) discusses the influence that leader 
competence has on engendering trust by the followers.  In dangerous contexts, Fisher, et 
al. (2010) concludes that trust is a function of how well a leader performs in the 
dangerous contexts.  Further, both studies highlight the importance of supportive 
relationships (loyalty) between the leader and the group.  The concepts of trust and 
loyalty are interconnected and cannot exist alone.   
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Samuels, et al. (2010) and Hannah, et al. (2008) write about leaders‘ ―self-
efficacy‖.  Fundamentally, Samuels, et al. (2010) find that past success portends future 
success, i.e., experience in dangerous contexts prepares leaders for future events.  Also, 
experience builds confidence in leaders by building the leader‘s self-efficacy, self-
control, and assertiveness.  Most importantly, their research supports the idea that 
personal mastery is a key to developing self-efficacy along with loyalty.  The more 
dangerous the context, the more followers reassess their trust in the leader and the more 
the followers expect personal mastery of the leader.  This is a crucial dynamic in 
Samuels, et al.‘s work.   
Hannah and Avolio (2011), Quick and Wright (2011), and Hannah, et al. (2010) 
discuss character-based leadership in dangerous contexts.  These authors suggest that the 
character of a leader may be the most important element to the construct.  Character does 
not mean personality or even the values of the leader.  Instead, character consists of a 
leader‘s mastery and hands-on experience, and it is contextualized across multiple levels 
of the group with each level having its own concepts.   
I considered all of character-based leadership concepts in the methods section of 
the dissertation, and I used the character-based leadership concepts to develop interview 
questions.  Appendix B provides a summary of the leadership concepts for both extreme 
events and dangerous contexts.  I used character-based leadership concepts in the 
methods design to draft interview questions and formulate codes for data analysis.  Very 
interesting insights were revealed from the interrelationship between extreme events and 
dangerous contexts.   
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Areas for Research 
Before delving into specifics of my research methodology, I address a 
fundamental question regarding how inductive research addresses existing areas of 
research.  The fundamental point is how an inductive research paper addresses the 
existing research, particularly the open research threads identified in the literature.  There 
must be a clear understanding of how the existing research threads contribute to the 
methodology.   
Principally, case study inductive research can build upon theory or extend existing 
theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) state, ―sound 
empirical research begins with strong grounding in related literature, identifies a research 
gap, and proposes research questions that address the gap‖ (p. 26).  For theory driven 
research, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that the research has to frame the 
research within the context and then explain why inductive research is beneficial.  On the 
other hand, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that for phenomenon-driven 
research, the researcher has to justify the importance of the phenomena and justify why 
the inductive approach is necessary for theory building.   
Another interesting perspective on the use of existing literature and open research 
threads in inductive research comes from the work of Bryman (2004).  One important 
concept raised by (Bryman, 2004) is the concept of cumulativeness of the inductive 
research.  Because qualitative researchers tend to build theory rather than extend theory, 
there becomes a lack of cumulative research.  Cumulating theory is a major benefit of 
quantitative research methods.  Thus, Bryman (2004) concludes that without building on 
existing theory qualitative research may be idiosyncratic, duplicative, incoherent (with 
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existing literature), and lack common terminology, among other flaws.  I believe that this 
lack of cumulative research could be the basis for the earlier criticism discussed in this 
paper about the crisis leadership research resembling the Tower of Babel (Bryman, 
2004).  By strictly adhering to what the interview subjects share with researchers, those 
researchers sometimes fail to engage in theoretical reflection (Kaghan, Strauss, Barley, 
Brannen, & Thomas, 1999; Lofland, 1971).  Bryman (2004) describes three approaches 
to the use of existing literature.  First, researchers can use the existing literature as a 
―springboard‖ for their work; second, qualitative researchers can use the existing 
literature as a counterpoint to their own work; and finally, qualitative researchers can use 
the existing literature post-hoc to compare their findings with the existing literature.  
Bryman (2004) confides that the journal Leadership Quarterly expects authors to 
describe how the underlying logic of their argument applies to existing research and how 
the author‘s research will contribute to expanding the knowledge of the subject.  Bryman 
(2004) admits that qualitative researcher must ―straddle‖ the issues related to the use of 
existing research.    
In Section 2 of this dissertation, I have outlined the existing crisis leadership 
literature including the open research threads identified by each author and some open 
research threads I have identified myself.  In summary, the review of extant literature on 
extreme crisis leadership indicates several research threads in addition to those previously 
identified by other scholars (Mikusova, 2011; Lettieri, 2007).  Appendix C provides a 
compiled a list of the 27 research threads that emerged from the literature review.  I used 
these research threads to identify some general research areas; however, this dissertation 
only addresses research threads that are applicable to extreme events.  I do not consider in 
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this research threads that are applicable to other types of crises or are not concerned with 
crisis leadership.   
Appendix D identifies the disposition of each research thread.  I examined each of 
the 27 identified research thread to determine specific research areas of interest to my 
dissertation that might extend the existing literature.  Many of the identified research 
threads are duplicative or may be addressed post-hoc or the threads are addressed in the 
methods section of this research.  In Appendix D, I list all 27 research threads and 
disposition those research threads in the last column of the Table.  I evaluated the first 
three research threads in the methods section of this dissertation.  I considered a few of 
the research threads post-hoc after discovery of my results.  After evaluating all 27 of the 
research threads, I identified nine primary research areas that I considered in developing 
the interview questions and the coding methodology.   
It is important to note that while I identify these research areas in my literature 
review, the essence of inductive research as conducted in this study is to focus on issues 
that develop from the qualitative data.  I allowed for both theory development and theory 
extension in my research.  While my intent was to explore the issues as the issues 
develop from the interviews without pre-supposing those issues based on existing 
research, I used predetermined research areas as linkage to the past research to enable 
theory building.  The nine areas are merely research threads that I discovered in the 
literature review and that my research potentially would extend.  The research areas do 
not represent all of the actual research topics, nor was my study constrained by them.  
Those nine research areas were: 
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Area 1 – Is there a conflict between behavioral theory, e.g., rationality, and 
organization  theory during an extreme crisis? 
Area 2 – Which theories are the best fit for leadership during a Black Swan 
event? 
Area 3 – What is the impact of ―felt‖ emotions in extreme event leadership? 
Area 4 – Is sensemaking a crucial component of extreme crisis leadership 
decision-making? 
Area 5 - What impact, if any, does leadership panic play in extreme crisis 
management? 
Area 6 – As the transboundary effects of an extreme crisis accelerate, how do the 
executive tasks of the crisis leader change? 
Area 7 – Are there measures of decision-making precision during the event?  
Area 8 – Is there a relationship between social justice and technical justice that 
influences political accountability and influences leader decision-making in 
significantly negative ways? 
Area 9 – What are the overlaps between extreme and dangerous event leadership? 
 
In the next section of this dissertation, I describe the methodology used in this research.  
I followed the guidelines for inductive research.  Ultimately, by using an inductive 
research, i.e., grounded theory, approach, this research developed an integrated theory of 
extreme crisis leadership. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS - QUALITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Inspired by the methods for developing theory created over 40 years ago by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), this dissertation was influenced by those methods to 
investigate several cases of leadership during extreme events using qualitative methods 
and to discover new crisis leadership theory.  Conger (1998) and Bryman (2004) endorse 
qualitative methods as a valuable technique to investigate leadership.  Conger (1998) 
suggests that qualitative researchers are more sensitive to the implications of a specific 
circumstance.  Qualitative researchers are often the best to assess the style of a leader 
including during a crisis (Conger, 1998).  Conger (1998) adds that it is remarkable how a 
few qualitative studies have added so much value to the research of leadership.  
Specifically, Conger (1998) discusses the benefits of applying the qualitative approach to 
the social process of leadership.  Those benefits include: qualitative methods can help to 
reconcile differences between quantitative and qualitative results; qualitative theorists are 
quick to explore new forms of leadership, e.g., e-leadership, environmental leadership; 
qualitative researchers have questioned the status quo of leadership research; and 
qualitative researchers have brought forth new data analysis methods (Conger, 1998).   
My sampling approach acknowledged challenges described in the literature 
review.  For instance, I used theoretical sampling
6
 as a technique to guard against 
researcher bias.  With regard to the rarity of extreme events, my use of natural, artificial, 
i.e., man-made, and extreme events broadens the sampling domain to capture as much 
data as possible.  Finally, where needed, I used other triangulation methods
7
, e.g., review 
                                                          
6 In theoretical sampling, the researcher choses samples based upon their contribution to theory development and less on the case 
uniqueness (Yin, 1994 as discussed in Eisenhardt, et al. 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967).   
7
 Refer to the Roshomon Effect, Roth, et al. (2002). 
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of post-hoc event reports, to guard against retrospective bias, forgetfulness and other 
interviewee biases.  Section 3.1 ―The Qualitative Debate‖ (below) provides more 
examples of the challenges with qualitative technique along with the strategies I used to 
avoid these challenges.   
 I conducted a number of semi-structured interviews of key players in these 
extreme cases.  Each of these interviews generated rich data that was used to develop 
leadership concepts.  Then, I analyzed that data to reveal potential theories.  I used the 
appropriate controls, checks and balances to assure the academic rigor essential for 
ensuring the validity of this research including the use of theoretical sampling.  
Theoretical sampling allowed me to proceed in a methodical approach to collect data, 
then analyze and develop theoretical statements to guide the next data collection and 
further theoretical sampling.   
 My methodology used the literature review to inform the methodology.  I 
acknowledge, however, that conventional grounded theory research relies relatively little 
(or even not at all) on a literature review to start the research process (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967).  In fact, purists in this technique would reject any method beyond pure inductive 
research that relies on interviews and other methods, as these might bias the researcher‘s 
understanding of the existing research and prevent the emergence of theoretical insights 
from the data (Thomas & James, 2005).  To a purist, prior knowledge of the literature 
undermines the method (Thomas & James, 2005).  Nevertheless, since Glaser and 
Strauss‘ (1967) seminal work, much of grounded theory research has varied in its 
approach to both literature reviews and technical grounded theory methods (Thomas & 
James, 2005).   
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 Grounded theory is not without its legion of critics.  Dey (1999) gives a 
comprehensive list of claims against the method.  Fish (1989) asserts that grounded 
theory is not theory at all, but it is mere ―theory talk‖ (p. 14).  Most of these criticisms 
attack the validity of the inductive approach itself as ―interpretation before 
understanding‖.  Next, I discuss these challenges as they apply specifically to the use of 
grounded theory as a method to research the leadership domain. 
The Qualitative Debate 
 This section of this dissertation reviews the general debate surrounding the 
methodological issues in using the qualitative research method.  I intend to cover some of 
the more pertinent critiques along with counterpoints that I used in my research to 
increase the viability of my results.  Considering the issues involved in this debate was 
helpful in avoiding known pitfalls of qualitative methods. 
In a unique ―From the Editors‖ column, Gephart (2004) raises a number of issues 
related to the efficacy of qualitative research as noted by the Editors of the Academy of 
Management Journal (AMJ).  Gephart (2004) raises six problems noted in qualitative 
article submissions to AMJ.  Further, Gephart (2004) offers avoidance strategies for 
qualitative researchers.  I address these avoidance strategies in the Limitations section.    
First, Gephart (2004) suggests that there are too many ―one off‖ papers submitted.  
Many authors are not involved in ongoing research programs and therefore have little 
ability to go back out into the field when AMJ reviewers ask for more data.  Suggesting 
that researchers be a part of an ongoing research program, Gephart (2004) believes that 
researchers can avoid this problem.  While my research is not part of an ongoing research 
program, I avoided this problem by ensuring that my research is well constructed, using 
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my dissertation committee for advice, obtaining thorough reviews of this research, and 
maintaining awareness of recent qualitative leadership literature as I progressed through 
the process.   
Second, Gephart (2004) concludes that researchers fail to conduct a thorough 
literature review at the beginning of their work, conducting the literature review only 
after knowing the results of the researchers‘ study.  This seems somewhat counter to the 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) method; however, Gephart (2004) is 
addressing all methods of qualitative research.   
A third and related problem noted by Gephart (2004) is that qualitative 
researchers need goals, objectives, or research questions to guide their work.  By 
identifying the research gaps, Gephart (2004) suggests that qualitative researchers can 
state the fundamental contribution made by their paper.   
Fourth, Gephart (2004) advises that research papers provide the theoretical 
background related to the concepts covered by the researchers‘ paper including 
explaining key concepts among the theories, research questions, and methodologies of 
the domain.  Gephart (2004) expects that the reader of the research can anticipate how the 
researcher reflects the theories and concepts of the domain in the data or observations.   
Fifth, Gephart (2004) concludes that many qualitative researchers fail to describe 
thoroughly the methodology, especially in capturing meaning of data, thoroughly 
interpreting results, drawing linkages across data, and explaining the origins of 
conclusions.  Gephart (2004) advises that, where possible, qualitative researchers should 
include raw data as much as possible in the researcher‘s submission.   
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Finally, Gephart (2004) notes a problem in that qualitative researchers fail to 
revisit research questions or goals in the results section of the researcher‘s submittal.  In 
addition, qualitative researchers fail to offer the broader implications and contributions 
that the researcher is making with the submittal.   
Because grounded theory heavily influences my dissertation, I should discuss the 
challenges with using grounded theory as an influence.  Glaser and Strauss (1967) in their 
book entitled, ―The Discovery of Grounded Theory‖, discovered a method a qualitative 
research known as ―Grounded Theory‖.  Glaser and Strauss (1967) defined procedures to 
generate theory from empirical data.  Their procedures remain highly respected as a 
method to analyze sociology (Thomas & James, 2005).  Glaser and Strauss (1967) solved 
the data problem that many social researchers faced at that time.  Researchers had data 
from interviews, observations, and other methods; however, researchers lacked consistent 
procedures to mold raw data into theory.  Glaser and Strauss (1967) found the answer.  
Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed procedures and a means to generate theory.  Their 
solution enabled a generation of qualitative researchers to discover new theories.  
Motivated by their frustration with the obsessive use of hypothetic-deductive research at 
that time, Glaser and Strauss (1967) wanted to counter it and developed grounded theory 
as an alternative.  As discussed earlier in this dissertation, over the past few decades 
qualitative research has grown considerably in popularity (Thomas & James, 2005).  In 
this dissertation the methods identified by Glaser and Strauss (1967) influenced my work. 
 Despite existing for over four decades, qualitative research still has its detractors.  
The many challenges of the grounded theory approach are beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation.  For the sake of parsimony, I focused on fundamental questions about the 
method by highlighting some of the most pertinent challenges. 
 Thomas and James (2005) offer a critique of grounded theory by challenging 
three fundamental precepts of grounded theory, i.e., ground, theory, and discovery.  
Thomas and James (2005) claim first, that, 
 
Grounded theory oversimplifies complex meanings and interrelationships in data; 
second, that it constrains analysis, putting the cart (procedure) before the horse 
(interpretation); and third that it depends upon inappropriate models of induction 
and  asserts from them equally inappropriate claims to explanation and 
prediction (p. 768). 
 
Ironically, Thomas and James (2005) seem to claim that grounded theory research 
suffers from its own self-identity.  Thomas and James (2005) assert that holding to the 
terms ground, theory and discovery, limits the appreciative inquiry of researchers.  By 
over proceduralizing grounded theory research with ―epistemological and theoretical 
precepts embodied in its name‖, (p. 787) researchers confine themselves.  With the 
academic demand to develop a ground, and theory, along with all the coding and 
synthesis, researchers walk past the most important benefit of appreciative inquiry, i.e., 
understanding what is missed or dismissed through rigorous processing of information.  
Thomas and James (2005) challenge the benefit of ―interpreting interpretations‖ (p. 789) 
as taking the process a step too far.     
Thomas and James (2005) also offer some cautions that seem worthy of 
consideration when using grounded theory.  Those cautions involve the significance of 
interpretation, narrative and reflection techniques used in the process of grounding 
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theory.  Thomas and James (2005) argue that many ground theory researchers conduct 
simple interpretation, give basic narrative and use superficial reflection techniques.  In 
my analysis of the results in this dissertation, I considered these cautions when 
performing the data analysis.  I sought to find the correct balance between adequate 
interpretation and over-interpretation. 
Conversely, Suddaby (2006) answered Gephart‘s (2004) ―From the Editors‖ 
column in the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) on the problems identified by 
AMJ Editors with qualitative research, specifically grounded theory research.  Suddaby 
(2006) gives six misconceptions regarding ―what grounded theory is not‖, and the 
overuse of the term ―grounded theory‖.  Those six misconceptions are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
 First, in his ―Letter from the Editors‖ Suddaby (2006) offers that Grounded 
Theory is not an excuse to ignore the extant theory and literature in qualitative research.  
Suddaby (2006) debunks much of the advice given to grounded theorists that suggests 
grounded theorists ignore the literature by starting a proceeding with a blank slate.  
Suddaby (2006) suggests that grounded theorists should link to past literature and 
constantly remind themselves that they are human.  Suddaby (2006) encourages the 
grounded theorist to stay in the middle ground between being biased by the extant 
literature and totally ignoring the literature.  I followed that advice as I proceeded through 
the collection and analysis of my data. 
 Second, grounded theory is not theory texting, content analysis or word counts 
(Suddaby, 2006).  Suddaby (2006) refers to grounded theorists‘ tendency to slur the 
methods in that grounded theorists test what they expect to unearth.  The caution offered 
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in this regard is to avoid ―forced categories‖ in the coding process (Suddaby, 2006, p. 
637).  In my dissertation I provided examples of codings, and I did not claim those are 
the exact codings driving my data collection. 
 Third, grounded theory is not a formulaic approach (Suddaby, 2006).  Grounded 
theorists must continue the interaction between the data and the researcher. This is a 
reason that recursive cycling and saturation were important to my research.   
 Fourth, and fifth, Suddaby (2006) reminds us that the grounded theory method is 
not perfect, nor is it easy.  These misconceptions are self-explanatory.  I acknowledge 
that the method and the resultant data in this dissertation was not ―clean‖.   
 Finally, the use of grounded theory is not an excuse for the lack of a methodology 
(Suddaby, 2006).  As developed in my dissertation, the proposed methodology is 
rigorous, and thorough.  By clearly defining the methodology I followed, the results 
should reveal themselves clearly in the data.   
 Other techniques, e.g., qualitative data analysis
8
 (QDA), and methods, e.g., 
naturalistic inquiry
9
 have invaded the grounded theory approach (Glaser, 2007).  
Naturalistic inquiry divides into two research camps of positivists and constructivists 
(Cupchick, 2001).  Positivist researchers assert that truth is native in that it is real and 
comprehendible while constructivist researchers believe that truth is created by 
individuals and groups (Cupchick, 2001).  Regardless of the positivist or constructivist 
question, Glaser with Holton (2007) takes issue with the use of these naturalistic 
questions and QDA as these concepts apply to grounded theory.  Glaser with Holton 
                                                          
8
 Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) is the range of processes and procedures whereby researchers move from the qualitative data that 
have been collected into some form of explanation, understanding or interpretation of the people and situations we are investigating 
(Coffee, 1996). 
9
 "Naturalist Inquiry" deals with a fundamental problem: "the concept of truth" (Guba, et al. 1985). Guba and Lincoln (1985) 
formulate truth as a systematic set of beliefs, together with their accompanying methods, and paradigm.  
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(2007) takes strong exception to these ideals invading grounded theory.  Furthermore, 
Glaser with Holton (2007) believes the flaws of QDA are many, including:  
 
 A short list of these would include accuracy, interpretation, construction, 
meaning,  positivistic canons and naturalistic canons of data collection and 
analysis of unit samples, starting with preconceived structured interviews right 
off, sequencing frameworks,  preconceived professional problems, pet theoretical 
codes, etc, and etc. The list is long, the idea is clear (pp. 66, 67).   
  
 On the other hand, Glaser (2009) talks about the benefits of retaining grounded 
theory in the hands of the novice.  Glaser (2009) believes that the future of grounded 
theory rests in the hands of the novice.  Glaser (2009) summarizes his believe in stating,  
 
 My general point or message in this chapter is read the novice‘s situation, 
problems and actions correctly.  Do not rescue the initial confusions and data 
overwhelm with preconceived frameworks and outs.  They block GT.  Trust to 
emergence and skill development using GT methodology.  Trust to delimiting 
procedures of GT.  Encourage the novice‘s openness to emergence by 
encouraging him/her to stick to the tedium of conceptualizing constant 
comparisons and allowing GT skill development, and letting categories of latent 
patterns make sense of the confusion (p. 19).   
 
 Glaser (2009) strongly encourages the novice to use his/her enthusiasm to guide 
their research.  Finally, Glaser (2011) addresses many of the recent challenges to 
conceptualization in grounded theory.  Glaser‘s book, ―Getting out of the Data: Grounded 
Theory Conceptualization‖, identifies many blocks to the researcher‘s conceptualization 
of the information gained in the research.  Those blocks include:  
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 Authoritative blocks, preconceptions, inability to adequately conceptualize, the 
initial confusion and regression, multiversion view of GT, QDA requirement 
blocks, data collection overload, data coding overload, peer reviews, dealing with 
jargonizing GT, and being a novice both in experience and in scholarship with GT 
(Chapter 10, p. 1).  NOTE: This list is plentiful with challenges that must be 
considered in proceeding with this dissertation.   
 
Qualitative Research on Leadership  
Early in the study of leadership, many researchers (House, 1977; Berlew, 1974; 
Katz & Kahn, 1978) wrote theory articles on the study of leadership.  At that time, 
quantitative research on leadership was limited.  Little was known about the subject of 
qualitative methods, so developing models and questionnaires without a fundamental 
knowledge of leadership concepts would have yielded relatively few meaningful results.  
Thus, early research in an emerging field often starts with theoretical pieces and 
qualitative study to develop fundamental insights (Parry, 1998).  Ultimately, after 
identifying general theories, yielding initial ideas, quantitative research may develop the 
literature further through empirical testing (Parry, 1998).   
 If this research progression is applicable and we know more about leadership 
today than in the 1970‘s and before, why then is qualitative leadership research still 
worthwhile today?  Conger (1998) offers an explanation that leadership theory remains 
complex, and the enduring nature of the topic necessitates continued deep pursuit of the 
phenomenon.  Despite hundreds and maybe thousands of qualitative and quantitative 
research articles on leadership, we continue to identify new concepts and fail to identify a 
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general theory of leadership (Yukl, 1994).  Qualitative research can help with deep 
pursuit of theory (Yukl, 1994).   
 Given that researchers also continually identify multilevel aspects of leadership, 
those dimensions need further exploration.  We remain in the infancy of multilevel 
leadership theory (Hannah, et al. 2008; Yammarino, et al. 2010).  As discussed earlier, 
whenever research is in its infancy, one method is to start with qualitative methods to 
begin identifying the interactions and interrelationships among concepts (Parry 1998).  In 
this case, the multilevel leadership concepts (Hannah, et al. 2008; Yammarino, et al. 
2010) are still in relatively early phases of understanding.  For instance, a caution 
regarding the limits of quantitative research comes from Avolio and Bass (1995), who 
caution that quantitative research can be limited in drawing conclusions across levels of 
leadership.  Avolio and Bass (1995) suggest that surveys are usually mono-dimensional 
and therefore may miss the interactions among multiple levels of leadership.  Philips 
(1973) argues that quantitative leadership research focuses mainly on attitudes about 
leadership rather than actual observed leadership behavior.  Finally, quantitative research 
fails to develop the ―how‖ and ―why‖ of leadership behavior (Pettigrew, 1990).  
Nevertheless, many authors (Hiller, DeChurch, Murase, & Doty, 2011) hail the value of 
quantitative research in leadership, with over 95% of leadership research in academic 
journals from 1985 to 2009 conducted with quantitative methods.    
 Using a quantitative methods approach to extreme event leadership is particularly 
difficult given the dynamic nature of the situation.  In those dynamic situations, not only 
is leadership working at multiple levels, but the relationship between leader and follower 
is changing throughout the event response (Sweeney, 2010). Sweeney (2010) finds that in 
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dangerous contexts followers undergo constant reevaluation of their leaders.  In addition, 
the threshold effect discussed by Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) would be difficult to 
measure quantitatively.  Usually measuring shifts in attitudes through surveys is 
problematic given surveys are usually based on a snapshot in time (Conger, 1998; 
Bryman, 2004).  Surveys are usually not rich enough in explaining why attitudes change 
to be valid over time, especially if there are intervening variables.  Nevertheless, 
Sweeney, Thompson and Blanton (2009) did conduct a quantitative study of the non-
linearity of trust.  Sweeney, et al. (2009) developed a trust and interdependence model for 
combat situations.   
 Given the social nature of relationships between leaders and followers, qualitative 
research often allows the researcher to identify previously unrecognized or emerging 
factors or concepts (Conger, 1998).  While quantitative methods allow for researcher 
detachment from the observed phenomenon, which might improve validity, this very 
detachment prevents the researcher from contextualizing the findings in a particular 
setting.  Qualitative approaches allow for contextualizing more easily (Conger, 1998).  In 
fact, Conger (1998) cautions that qualitative researchers are relying too much on solely 
using interviews in their research.  Conger (1998) asserts that a mixed method allows for 
a more balanced approach and removes the biases that a knowledgeable researcher might 
bring to a familiar topic. 
 Since the conclusions of Conger (1998) that leadership research remains in its 
infancy, the amount of qualitative research on leadership increased significantly.  Bryman 
(2004) finds that there were only 10 qualitative articles on leadership prior to 1991, and 
since then each year there has been at least one substantial qualitative piece published.  
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Qualitative leadership research was slow to take hold (Bryman, 2004).  Research designs 
were mostly case studies and now have evolved to cross-sectional studies with the 
interviewing technique as the dominant research method (Bryman, 2004).  Further, 
Bryman (2004) concludes that most qualitative leadership research focuses on an ―input-
output‖ model that explores the questions of the leadership impacts, factors that influence 
how leaders behave, or the type of people who become leaders.  Finally, Bryman (2004) 
stresses that most qualitative leadership research works to investigate both the context 
surrounding the leader and the style of leadership used in that context (often researchers 
focus on the senior leader in a given context).  Bryman‘s (2004) challenge to researchers 
is not to focus on the context itself, but to find the generic insights surrounding the degree 
of task structure, leader–member relations and the leader‘s position power that are of 
interest, not the situational factors.  
Bryman (2004) offers many conclusions regarding the benefits of qualitative 
research and the insights it might generate.  Bryman (2004) calls for the qualitative 
research of leadership studies to be both contextualized and generative; while the 
situation is important, understanding the generic insights leads to grounding new theory.  
Kempster and Parry (2011) responded to Byrman‘s (2004) call for qualitative research 
with a critical realist perspective for grounded theory research.  Kempster and Parry 
(2011) see a critical realist approach to grounded leadership theory through two lenses.  
First, Kempster and Parry (2011) believe that by placing an emphasis on the lens of 
contextual understanding and explanations for the social processes of leadership and 
leadership development, rather than the identification of universal truths about leadership, 
Kempster and Parry (2011) can meet Bryman‘s (2004) challenge.  That is, the task is not 
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to focus on the context itself, but to find the generic insights surrounding the degree of 
task structure, leader–member relations and the leader‘s position power that are of 
interest, not the situational factors.  Second, Kempster and Parry (2011) believe that the 
using a lens of contextual variation across outcomes variations will allow researchers to 
amass a body of knowledge on the social processes of leadership.  This too would address 
Bryman‘s (2004) challenge not to focus on the context alone.  Kempster and Parry (2011) 
suggest that researchers should think out of the box and not worry so much about classic 
research rigor; that researchers should embrace their own experience and be creative in 
their research.  Kempster and Parry (2011) offer a number of characteristics that make up 
the critical realist approach. 
Grounded Theory and the Social Process of Leadership 
 Leadership is a process of social influence (Conger, 1989; Bryman, et al. 1988; 
Yukl, 1994).  Thus, researchers may consider the applicability of using the grounded 
theory approach to study a social process.  Many researchers have addressed the 
applicability of using grounded theory in detail (Conger, 1989; Alvesson, 1996; Bryman, 
et al. 1988).  Those researchers borrow from the disciplines of sociology and 
anthropology to complete their research, and using qualitative research methods 
identified many social influence processes.   
Grounded theory was used by Hunt (1991), Martin and Turner (1986), and others 
to theorize about the leadership process.  The descriptive nature of the grounded approach 
is useful in describing social processes.  In addition, Pettigrew (1990) suggests that the 
importance in the grounded approach comes from theory generation of secondary data, 
and interviewing, as an inductive method to integrate and explain the leadership process.  
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Bryman, et al. (1988) suggests that the qualitative and quantitative approaches are not 
competitors, but are complementary partners, and using them in combination could 
actually allow for the triangulation of leadership theories.   
There is a continued call for using the grounded theory method for leadership 
research (Avolio, 1995; Bass & Avolio, 1990; Bryman, 1992).  Grounded theory as a 
research method comes from, and is grounded in, the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  A 
key to the grounded process is finding the basic social processes in a given situation, and 
then deriving a theory about those processes based on data.  With data collection and 
analysis around a situation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) grounded theory is discovered, 
developed, and verified.  In order to ―ground‖ the theory there must be a continuous 
process of gathering more data, performing additional analyses, frequently draw 
comparisons to past analyses, and repeating the process until no new insights emerge.  
This inductive approach is a source of validity in the grounded method (Silverman, 
2001).   
Glaser and Strauss (1967) discuss two approaches to the grounded theory method: 
the full and the partial grounded theory method.  In the full-grounded theory method, the 
researcher follows the entire process of ―rinsing and repeating‖ the data and analysis 
steps, whereas in the partial method the researcher stops at the data collection stage and 
begins the process of theorizing about the data.  Obviously, there are benefits and pitfalls 
to both approaches.   
Other concerns about using the grounded theory approach to investigating a social 
process include: the researcher‘s intellectual ability to understand sociology; the 
researcher‘s personal biases; validity of the researcher‘s analysis; the sources of data; and 
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the lack of replicability of the method (Parry, 1998).  Parry (1998) makes a number of 
suggestions regarding improving the validity of grounded theory research to investigate a 
social process.  Among his suggestions is to continue using the entire method submitted 
by Glaser and Strauss (1967) in grounded theory research and to validate the emergent 
grounded theory with the extant leadership literature.  Parry (1998) argues that these 
suggestions might improve the replication of the methods and result in a more formal 
theory of leadership.  I acknowledge the point made by Parry (1998) to continue using the 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) methodology, but as discussed throughout this Section, there 
are valid alternative approaches.  
Qualitative Research in Extreme Contexts 
 Extreme contexts bring especially difficult challenges for the qualitative 
researcher (Bass & Bass, 2009).  Different extreme contexts usually require different 
leadership styles, and, as discussed earlier, different leadership styles may be required 
before, during and after the events.  The need to contextualize these phenomena would 
help to contextualize the research.  Bass and Bass (2009) suggest that this may result in 
conflicting findings because a taxonomy of extreme contexts has not yet been developed.  
Thus, Bass and Bass (2009) suggest that without a taxonomy, comparisons across cases 
are very difficult.  Hannah, et al. (2009) suggests that to resolve this difficulty, 
researchers should disentangle the relative effectiveness or proper mix of effectiveness by 
focusing on the agentic behaviors of adaptive and administrative leadership styles.  
Hannah, et al. (2009) admit that there is not a clear answer to this issue other than 
focusing on the agentic behaviors more than the event context; however, few events lend 
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themselves to that level of disaggregation particularly because extreme events usually 
require centralization of authority (refer to the discussion of readiness theory, p. 17).   
 As discussed throughout this dissertation, many of the leadership concepts have 
non-linear effects, with a wide range of variance and volatility depending upon the 
context (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).  Pursuing research on leadership in extreme 
contexts requires concomitant thinking about required methods to study these contexts.  
This limits the generalizability of qualitative research, particularly when attempting to 
define specific methodological criteria.  Because of the opportunity to hold a dialogue 
with interviewees, digging deeper into the thought processes of leaders is another reason 
that an inductive approach is useful in the research of leadership in extreme contexts.    
Qualitative researchers must also allow for the possibility that new concepts 
might appear during the study of extreme events.  Given that extreme events exceed the 
normality of leadership, unfamiliar and unknown situations may arise.  In the Fukushima 
reactor case, for instance, leaders never fathomed that the reactors would explode 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, August 16, 2012).  This unique situation may result in new or unique 
leadership concepts.  Those situations could also bring high variation in expected 
outcomes.  Several researchers (Mohr, 1982; Cabral & Cunha, 2003; Denrell, 2003) 
discuss special modeling considerations when studying non-linear concepts, unique 
concepts or variable outcomes in research.  Mohr (1982), Cabral and Cunha (2003), and 
Denrell (2003) suggest concentrating on special situations that might occur during 
extreme events that could expose these concepts.  Special situations might be situations 
of hyper-turbulence, oscillations, divergence in strategies, or chaotic conditions.  
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Researchers should concentrate on special situation situations, for special situations 
might expose non-linear concepts, unique concepts or variable outcomes. 
In sum, using the grounded theory concepts to conduct research on leadership 
during extreme events should provide a deeper understanding of the ontology involved in 
this special case of leadership.  By pursuing the uniqueness of extreme event leadership, 
this dissertation may discover unique concepts that could serve as a foundation to a 
theory of extreme event leadership.  Once such understanding is developed, then the 
linkages to other forms of leadership can be investigated and contribute to a general 
theory of leadership.   
Building Theory from Cases – Suggestions for Good Qualitative Research 
 Qualitative researchers seek to build theory from their work (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 1977).  This is not an easy task.  In their seminal article on building theory 
from case studies, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) give some useful advice to qualitative 
methods researchers.  Although the article focuses on the case-study approach, the 
authors provide useful suggestions for qualitative research, including the use of 
interviews.  Some major points include: 
 - Concentrate on the recursive cycling
10; this keeps researchers ―honest.‖ 
- Identify clear research gaps; justify why theory-building is better than theory 
testing in addressing those gaps. 
- Qualitative research rests on broad research gaps with interesting phenomena 
and lack of associated theory; this gives the researcher flexibility. 
- Random or stratified sampling is unnecessary; cases are selected on their 
suitability for  illuminating the concepts. 
                                                          
10
 Recursive cycling is a theory-building process occurring via cycling among the case data, emerging theory, and later, extant 
literature (Eisenshardt & Graebner, 2007). 
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- Multiple case studies provide a stronger base for theory building (Yin, 1994); 
they also result in more deeply grounded empirical evidence with more precise 
concepts. 
 - Use of ―extreme‖ cases that are polar opposites is beneficial. 
- Interviewer bias is controlled for by diverse perspectives of interviewees and 
using retrospective and real-time cases. 
- Stronger theory comes from ―pooling‖ the case data rather than isolating each 
case;  the challenge becomes that you lose the ―interesting‖ story, but gain 
strength in  theory. Write a good theory, not necessarily a good story. 
- Tell the theory story in many different means; use narrative, graphic models and 
tables. 
 
 Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 30) challenge the qualitative researcher to find 
fresh theory bridging well from rich qualitative data into mainstream deductive research.  
Through the strategies mentioned within this Chapter, I concentrated on ensuring that this 
research sought to comply with these major points.  Specifically, this research relied upon 
recursive cycling, the identification of research gaps, smart sampling of cases to 
illuminate interesting concepts, controlling interviewer bias, and pooling the data to 
develop a ―good‖ theory.  One area where this research has limits is in sampling routine 
crisis cases.  As discussed earlier, I studied extreme event cases.   
Data Collection - Doing the Dirty Work – Organizing Chaos 
 Conger (1998) calls it the dirty work of research, organizing the data.  After 
collecting hundreds of pages interview transcripts, observation notes, company records 
and other information, it all must be organized into something useable.  Conger (1998) 
strives to follow the guidance of Glaser and Strauss (1967) in developing a continual 
integrating process of data review, analysis, comparison and result finding to synthesize 
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the information.  Even with an efficient coding process and continual streamlining of the 
data, the work is laborsome.  Since the work of Conger (1998) computer software has 
improved the efficiency of the data (Lewins & Silver, 2007; Friese, 2012).  Yet it remains 
a strenuous process.  Conger (1998) concludes that even with the intensity of qualitative 
methods, the richness the method brings to the development of theory is worth doing the 
dirty work needed to expose new ideas and interrelationships of leadership. 
 Of course, there are benefits and challenges (Glaser, 2007, 2011; Wolfe, et al. 
1993; Kelle, 1995; Gephart & Wolfe, 1989) with the use of software to conduct 
qualitative data analysis (QDA).  In his work, Glaser (2007, 2011) strenuously opposes 
the use of software for the grounded theory method; Glaser (2007, 2011) is not opposed 
to its use in the QDA method.  Glaser (2007, 2011) opposes the mixing of QDA and 
grounded theory methods.  Glaser‘s (2007, 2011) reluctance to use software comes from 
the concern that the richness of data will be lost and that the mechanical nature of 
software coding dilutes the influence of the researcher‘s memoing.    
 Others (Wolfe, et al. 1993; Kelle, 1995) support using software for coding while 
acknowledging the challenges.  Wolfe, et al. (1993) and Kelle (1995) recognize that 
software cannot use intuition and reasoning.  Wolfe, et al. (1992) and Kelle (1995) do 
however believe that software can facilitate intuition, reasoning by offering a systematic, 
timely, and exhaustive analysis of data.  Wolfe, et al. (1993) and Kelle (1995) also see the 
benefits of presentation, manipulation and analysis offered by software including the 
potential to identify linkages not envisioned by the researcher.   
 Using microcomputer storage methods has distinct advantages.  As an advantage, 
Gephart and Wolfe (1989) offer that data storage systems allow for the collection of large 
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amounts of data without losing the natural occurring meanings.  Data storage allows for 
concepts and meanings to emerge from the data and allows for managerial management 
of the data.  In effect, Gephart & Wolfe (1989) see software as a merger between 
qualitative and quantitative research.  In addition, Gephart (1997) acknowledges that 
software allows the research to ―pool‖ the data from the context and then recombine the 
subsequent analysis back with the context to provide descriptions or examples of the 
analysis. 
 
Figure 3 - Data Gathering Flowpath 
 
Source: Casto (2013)  
 
 For this dissertation, I followed the systematic data collection techniques of 
coding and memoing.  Given that the semi-structured interviews generated significant 
data, I coded the data with the support of computer software (Atlas.ti).  Next, I classified 
the data into categories and themes (I mention some practices throughout this 
dissertation).  I continued to collect data to ―ground‖ my observations and substantiate 
the emergent themes.  This iterative process will sustain the inductive approach to 
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generating theory from data.  Figure 3 depicts the overall data gathering flowpath for this 
research.   
 
Table 3 - Key Data Collection Process Terms   
 
Source: Glaser and Holton (2007) 
 
 As a reference, definition of key process terms is appropriate.  Borrowing from 
Glaser with Holton (2007), Table 3 reflects some key process terms from the grounded 
theory approach.  These key process terms are useful to organize the process as this 
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dissertation proceeds through data collection.  I will review to these terms as appropriate 
in the next subsection of this dissertation. 
Coding and Memoing 
The goal of coding is to disaggregate the interview data then build it back in a 
different form (Glaser & Holton, 2004).  By breaking them down, the data become 
independent of the case and take on a neutral form (Glaser & Holton, 2004).  Coding 
allows the data to be put back together in a form that might allow new theories to emerge 
(Glaser & Holton, 2004).  The codes can be generated either top-down, i.e., from the 
literature to the data, or bottom-up, i.e., from the data to the literature (Edwards, 1993).  
In this research, I used both top-down and bottom-up coding as depicted in Figures 1 & 3 
(refer to Figures 1 & 3 for the comparative flowpath process used in this research).  Key 
to the grounded approach is the comparative analysis process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
The comparative process consists of three stages.  First, I compared the data from each 
event (across events) as code-to-code.  One goal was to gather as much data as possible, 
through multiple interviews.  Of course, the more interviews there are, the more 
variability will likely occur and the more time consuming and difficult the research 
becomes.  Obviously, many codes emerged from these three events.  As those codes 
emerged, I sought to find relational groupings to minimize the data scatter.  As groupings 
appear, the second step is to add in the data from the next event to validate the group.  A 
final step is to compare groups to groups to seek new insights from the data and to reduce 
duplication among the groups (Glaser & Holton, 2004).   
This constant comparative method is fundamental to grounding the research.  It 
brings out the richness of the data and allows the researcher to discover insights that 
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ground the potential theory.  In this case, I used the comparative method to validate 
existing theories, as described in the literature review, and to identify new theories. 
Throughout the process, it was useful to keep research notes regarding the 
rationale behind the groupings (coding).  This documentation process is almost as 
essential as the data themselves.  NOTE:  There is a difference between memoing and 
defining codes.  Typically, the researcher records the definition of the codes in a 
codebook.  However, typically the research uses memoing to describe ideas or insights 
discovered while looking at relationships among codes or categories.  The identification 
of the relationships between groupings is where new theory might emerge.  Locke (2001) 
calls this the ―memoing‖ process.  Researchers keep memos about the relationships or 
linkages between groups and ultimately these relationships or links become the 
foundation for the new theory.  The general areas of research are generated from the 
research gaps or threads and leadership concepts identified in the literature review.  These 
research areas serve two primary purposes.  First, research areas guide the development 
of basic/ preliminary interview questions that allow for interview flexibility.  Second, I 
used the research areas to facilitate the development of some codes based on extant 
literature that is used to analyze the data.  Essentially, the literature-based coding 
provided me with the ―book answer‖ to crisis leadership in an extreme event.  In addition, 
I generated codes from the data pool resulting from the actual interviews and other 
sources of information.  In the end, I compared the two codings, i.e., the literature-based 
coding and evidence-based coding, by using the recursive cycling technique.  From this 
comparison, conclusions were extracted that provided general insights towards an 
integrated theory of extreme crisis leadership. 
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 This dissertation involved both a top-down and bottom-up approach to data 
analysis.  Appendix E identifies the leadership concepts associated with the nine research 
areas.  Each of the research areas has associated leadership concepts.  These concepts 
helped explore the interview questions.  You can view these Research Areas as the 
opening conversation.  Research areas are the areas of interest exposed by the literature.  
The interview itself then takes a direction either consistent with these concepts or it will 
begin a dialogue in different concepts.  That is the purpose of the qualitative approach.   
 
Table 4 – Codings 
Source: Casto (2013) 
 
 Table 4 is an example of the coding process.  Table 4 provides examples of the 
codings concepts associated with the nine research areas.  As I identified new concepts 
during the interviews, I generated new codings.  Those would were listed in the Column 
―Codings from Data‖.  Ultimately, differences and similarities were explored in the last 
column, also remembering that a key to the success for the grounded approach is 
―memoing‖ by the researcher.  Describing the thought process behind both the coding 
and the analysis is crucial in the discovery of new theory.  
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Sample 
 As discussed in the literature review, because of the nature of extreme events, past 
research has primarily focused on routine crises as samples in qualitative work.  This 
includes samples in case study research as well.  Because of the rarity of extreme events, 
and the work involved in studying those events, relatively little research exists in this 
area.  This dissertation tried to expand extreme event research by exploring multiple 
extreme events.  The sample used was rich and purposeful.  As discussed by Guest, 
Bunce and Johnson (2006) a purposeful sample is a deliberately selected sample where 
the researcher believes it is representative.  In order to better assure representation, my 
research consisted of three extreme event types.  Those events were chosen based upon 
the applicability to the extreme event characteristics, the access to information, and the 
variety of events.  There are a number of extreme events that I used in this study 
including:  a natural event (e.g., Hurricane Katrina in 2005), an artificial or man-made 
event (the Three Mile Island nuclear event in 1979, or the Deepwater Horizon oil rig 
explosion in 2010), or a natural event that leads to an artificial event (the Great Japanese 
Earthquake and Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011).  These three types of events give 
the most purposeful sample that I could postulate given the resources at my disposal.  
Before selecting the specific events, I continued to generate my theoretical sampling 
process because ex-ante I was not certain of the access that I had for specific interviews, 
e.g., the Three Mile Island accident, for memories have likely faded.   
 My personal experience includes over 30 years in the nuclear power business.  
More importantly I was the lead US federal executive in Japan for the Fukushima nuclear 
event.  Therefore the potential for researcher bias does exist for the Fukushima event.  
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Thus, I included multiple cases in my sample selection and select interview targets that 
provided the best theoretical sampling for the dissertation thereby controlling for 
researcher bias.   
 In qualitative work, sample size is less a matter of quantity and more a matter of 
quality of information gained from the sample (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006; Morse, 
2000).  In addition, Morse (1995) suggests that there are not exact guidelines for reaching 
the saturation point
11
 (refer to Section 3.2.4 for further discussion on saturation).  One 
study (Guest, et al. 2006) finds that twelve interviews are likely to produce a purposeful 
and homogeneous sample.  For this research, I targeted nine specific interviews and 
expected that at least three additional interviews would be developed from the initial set 
of planned interviews.  I will allowed for a potential of many more interviews to emerge 
during the research.  In the allowing for recursive cycling and saturation techniques the 
resultant number of interviews was 19, in addition, there were secondary sources.   
 My criteria for sample determination were both the breath of applicable theories 
and the variance for the interviews.  Table 5 – Applicability of Extreme Event 
Characteristics, lists the major characteristics associated with the three major extreme 
event types (natural, artificial and natural leading to artificial).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing 
phenomena seen before (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
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Table 5 - Applicability of Extreme Event Characteristics 
 
Source: Casto (2013) 
 
 Table 5 lists each characteristic as it applies to the event (i.e., has no applicability, 
limited applicability, potential applicability or has high applicability).  This overview 
facilitates the determination of required interviews (sample size).  Generally, I initially 
propose interviews for those situations where the characteristics either have: limited, 
potential, or high applicability to the extreme event or a combination of those situations.  
In cases where the characteristics have no applicability to the extreme event there is little 
of interest; therefore, I eliminate these situations.  After consolidating the characteristics 
into four major areas of interest, i.e., Transboundary, failure theories, ground-zero events 
and cross-cases (including counterpoints of each case), Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted 
Interviews – gives the most suitable representative sample of the extreme event theories. 
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Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews 
 
Source: Casto (2014) 
 
Further, Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews and Table 7 – Interview Sample 
Matrix provide the specific level of leader targeted for the nine interviews.  I chose the 
specific leadership levels on the bases of their closeness to the event.  In addition, I chose 
them to provide the variance among the leadership levels.  Additionally, to aid in 
triangulation, cross-case interviews are helpful for theoretical sampling
12
, and I depict 
those at the bottom of Table 7.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 In theoretical sampling, the sample choices are chosen by their contribution to theory development and less on the case uniqueness 
(Yin, 1994 as discussed in Eisenhardt, et al. 2007). 
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Table 7 - Interview Sample Matrix – Variance 
 
Source: Casto (2014) 
 
 Table 7, Interview Sample Matrix, specifies the level (type) of leader who should 
be interviewed in each case.  I chose these levels to provide a wide variance of 
perspectives on extreme events.  For instance, because transboundary events may cross 
national boundaries, I targeted a national or senior government leader for an interview.  
Exactly which national leader depended on the access available, fortunately I was able to 
obtain the highest level of national response, e.g., The White House Office of Resilience.  
Similarly, on the cross-cases interviews, I sought the highest-level official available and 
first-responder e.g., state police leader.  In addition, Table 7 sought for variance in 
government, private sector, social organizations, e.g., Red Cross, and military leaders, all 
of whom offer a unique perspective on extreme events.  Access to these individuals was 
facilitated by my experience in the area of emergency management.  In addition, I have 
unique access to White House Officials, military and electric power utility executives.   
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Interviews 
 I approached the interviews in a step-wise fashion, meaning that in theoretical 
sampling, the researcher collects, codes, and analyzes the data, but he/she has to decide 
what data to collect next and where to find that data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45).  
Thus, the theory emerges as the research proceeds through the process.  A key to success 
in the interview process is to be flexible so that different insights might emerge.  
Theoretical sampling allowed me to follow the interviewers‘ suggestions for other 
interviewees and became new ground for future interviews.  Thus, as the interviews 
progress, new places, individuals or situations are exposed, and I incorporated those 
changes into the process (Goulding, 2001).   
I conducted at least the nine interviews as shown in Table 7.  In the end, I 
conducted 19 interviews and used secondary data.  I generated the preliminary/basic 
interview questions from the nine research areas.  I used the same questions for the 
leaders associated with leading the extreme event and a different set of questions for the 
social organization leaders.  I focused the questions for the social organizations in two 
areas because the social organizations do not actually lead the event.  I designed those 
areas to illuminate the impact of the extreme event on the public and reflective questions 
that assess the acumen of the leaders who were leading the extreme event. 
Use of interview transcripts and coding exposed emergent themes from the actual 
events, which were then compared to the themes derived from the literature review.  I 
correlated the research areas to specific leadership concepts.  I developed interview 
questions that would best allow me to investigate each of the nine research areas 
(Appendix E).  The goal was to ask interview questions that would unearth insights 
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around those areas.  My procedure, Figure 3, Data Gathering Flowchart, called for a 
comparison of the codings from the literature with the codings from the data.  This 
allowed me to both address the research threads and discover new areas of theory.  From 
those insights, an integrated general theory and specific insights about extreme crisis 
leadership was revealed.       
 Each interview was recorded (with permission) via personal interview, Skype, or 
telephone.  I transcribed and entered each interview into Atlas.ti for coding.  As a 
validation sample, I provided the transcripts to one interviewee.  I coded the interview 
responses to compare them with the leadership concepts.  Those correlations served as 
the analysis phase of my research.  My analysis, subsequent conclusions, and memoing 
all served to form the foundation of my integrated model of crisis leadership.   
Theoretical Saturation  
 When is enough, enough?  Understanding when the research has reached its 
―saturation point‖ or ―data adequacy‖ is essential to the reliability of the research (Morse, 
1995).  Two considerations aid in finding the saturation point.  First, ―the tighter and 
more restrictive the sample and the narrower and more clearly delineated the domain, the 
faster saturation will be achieved‖ (Morse, 1995, p.148).  Second, Morse (1995) 
highlights the importance of the richness of the data.  My thinking is that richness comes 
from quality interview questions and by allowing the data to take you where it takes you 
that is as a researcher, i.e., being flexible in following the data. 
Analysis  
 Gioia, et al. (2012) offers a method for improving the rigor of grounded research.  
Gioia, et al. (2012) submits that there is a need for further rigor in conducting grounded 
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theory work.  Gioia, et al. (2012) offers a model that seeks to move the method beyond 
merely identifying the applicable concepts.  Gioia, et al. (2012) encourage researchers to 
move into improving the means by which research conceptualizes 1st order themes, i.e., 
an analysis using informant-centric terms and codes, and 2nd order themes, i.e., one using 
researcher-centric concepts, themes, and dimensions; thus, inspire the1st- and 2nd-order 
labeling.  Gioia, et al. (2012) believes that depicting the resultant relationships into 
graphic models improves the understanding of the reader.  Further, Gioia, et al. (2012) 
ask qualitative researchers to write better stories that create excitement in the minds of 
the reader, and Gioia, et al. (2012) challenge grounded theorists to improve the writing in 
both the methods and results sections.  
   In an article on dangerous contexts, Baran and Scott (2010) address the issues of 
analyzing higher-order leadership thinking through qualitative methods.  Previously, I 
discussed their call for further study in the areas of sensemaking, particularly in 
organizing ambiguity through framing, heedful thinking, and adjusting.  Their research 
on near-miss reports from firefighters exposed the sensemaking used by firefighters to 
lead their crews.  Their technique of summarizing the classification of typical leadership 
concepts (as discussed in the literature review) to the categories of framing, heedful 
thinking, and adjusting has appeal as a technique to reflect how leaders use sensemaking 
in complex situations.  Baran and Scott‘s (2010) article is an example of a method to 
collect and categorize the data in a parallel framework of sensemaking.  It was a useful 
reference in using the grounded theory approach for the purpose of this dissertation.   
 In a highly relevant stream of research, Gephart (1997) uses the interpretive 
textual analysis of sensemaking using a computer-supported approach.  Interpretive 
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textual analysis (ITA) ―seeks to represent and understand members‘ meanings and 
discourse, two objectives which are increasingly important in organizational inquiry‖, 
(Gephart, 1997, p. 584).  Kelle (1995) describes interpretive textual analysis as applying 
QDA to understand the meaning of data and text.  This is a significant twist in QDA and 
grounded theory in that Gephart (1997) and Kelle (1995) offer that ITA differs from 
QDA by establishing the understanding and meaning of the text for social actors and then 
developing and elaborating theory.   
 According to Gephart (1997), QDA can become mathematical, while in the 
research of sensemaking in particular, the meanings behind the social actions are most 
significant.  QDA can establish the facts; however, to derive a richer meaning from social 
behavior, interpretation of those facts is needed (Gephart, 1997).  This is especially true 
in technical situations where numbers and technical jargon can get in the way of analysis 
(Gephart, 1997).  Interpretative analysis as founded by Shutlz (1973) is a methodological 
strategy for identifying valid and scientific constructs by identifying constructs of the 
social actors involved in the event which express the actors‘ actual meanings to their 
statements.   
 Specifically regarding meaning in the use of sensemaking, Weick (1995) 
discusses sensemaking as more of a plausibility process rather than an accuracy process.  
Sensemaking is about the reasonableness of the plausibility of the facts (Weick, 1995).  
Weick (1995) concludes that the plausibility, whether or not it perfectly meets the facts, 
is a key consideration for sensemaking.  A story may have factual errors, but the story is 
plausible and makes sense (Weick, 1995).  Plausible sensemaking is thus the provision of 
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acceptable and credible accounts which explain phenomena and energize action (Weick, 
1995, p. 61).  Finding these plausible accounts is the work of ITA. 
 ITA uses many of the same structure as QDA and actually expands QDA 
(Gephart, 1997).  The primary structure of ITA is analysis, theoretical sampling, 
computer software-supported textual analysis, expansion analysis, and producing textual 
statistics and meaningful linkages (Gephart, 1997, p. 587).  I discussed earlier in this 
Section, theoretical sampling and computer software.  The areas where ITA and QDA 
depart are in the textual analysis and expansion analysis.  I explain those processes 
herein.   
 Data expansion analysis is an hermeneutic approach that involves writing an 
interpretation (line-by-line) that show a contextual analysis to theoretical concepts 
operate together in a data display or representation (graphic) (Gephart, 1997).  Many of 
the software programs, e.g., Atlas.ti, perform this task easily by delinking the statements 
from the context and then allow for recontextualizing the statements.  An important 
feature of ITA is collocation statistics (Gephart, 1997) which provide a quantitative 
measure of the likelihood that the co-occurrence of selected key words in a text segment 
differs from (is more likely than) the likelihood of the words co-occurring in the overall 
text (p. 587).  I use collocation statistics to discover meaningful linkages between 
keywords, discourse and behaviors.  Thus, by using textual statistics and meaningful 
linkages the analysis (through interpretation) finds meanings behind the behavior then 
linking these meanings provides the basis for a theory.  For this dissertation, especially 
with its focus on sensemaking and other cognitive theories, ITA provided a powerful 
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process for theory expansion and creation.  As I proceeded through data collection, I 
sought to use of ITA.  
 The next section will present the data collection, coding, analysis and results.  
Another important activity for the researcher is to validate the process.  That validation 
criteria and process is also included in the following subsection.   
Data Collection – Results 
 Data collected for this study were primarily from personal interviews.  Interviews 
were then transcribed and entered into an ATLAS.ti Hermeneutic Unit
13
 for coding, 
memoing, and analysis.  Because it was difficult to obtain interviews for one of the cases 
(Deepwater Horizon), secondary data including one book, an interview of a 
knowledgeable oilrig Captain (and coauthor of a book on Deepwater Horizon), and 
transcription of legal testimony were included in the dataset and used for triangulation 
purposes.  Chapter 3.3.3 describes the interview sampling in detail. 
 For this dissertation, one case-specific Hermeneutic Unit was created for each 
case.  Having one Hermeneutic Unit for each case allowed for case-specific coding and 
analysis; however, as each case was built, existing codes were carried forward from each 
case (Hermeneutic Unit) to prevent duplication of codes and facilitate the development of 
an emergent coding structure.  Further, using separate Hermeneutic Units aided in the 
measurement of theoretical saturation, i.e., as cases built the number of new codes 
decreased indicating a decrease in new learning.  Ultimately, all of the case-based 
Hermeneutic Units were merged into one integrated Hermeneutic Unit that covered all of 
                                                          
13
Friese (2012) explains that a Hermeneutic Unit provides the data structure for each project in ATLAS.ti.  The name was chosen to 
reflect the initial approach taken when building a support tool for data interpretation.  The most basic level of a Hermeneutic Unit 
consists of the Primary Documents, followed closely by the ―quotations‖ (selections from the Primary Documents).  On the next level, 
codes refer to quotations.  A Hermeneutic Unit can become a highly connected entity, a dense web of primary data, associated memos 
and codes, and interrelations between the codes and the data. 
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the case samples.  For the integrated Hermeneutic Unit, there were 165 codes established 
to capture the essence of 1187 quotes.  Every code contained a comment either regarding 
the context of the code or the definition of the code.  A code-book was established in 
ATLAS.ti capturing all 165 codes with their respective comments and definitions.  There 
are 17 memos in the Hermeneutic Units that capture insights on the research questions 
and other theoretical issues.   
Management of Coding
14
 
 Management of coding and memoing in this dissertation was conducted using the 
insights from several references.  These included Analyzing Qualitative Data (Bernard & 
Ryan, 2010), Qualitative Data Analysis with ATLAS.ti (Friese, 2012) and Qualitative 
Research in the Study of Leadership (Klenke, 2008).  These references were used as the 
primary guidance for the establishment of codes and memos (Note: The actual coding 
comes from the data, i.e., bottom-up.  These references served to help establish a coding 
infrastructure/framework).  Content analysis was aided greatly by the Bernard & Ryan 
(2010) book which focuses on the proper methods of analyzing qualitative data to 
provide meaning.  The Friese (2012) book served as guidance on structuring codes and 
memos, providing extensive and valuable suggestions on building the ATLAS.ti 
infrastructure.  The Klenke (2008) book served as a valuable guide in content coding for 
leadership.  Its focus on narrative analysis and content analysis gave leadership meanings 
to the infrastructure created by the Friese (2012) book.  These three resources were 
instrumental in establishing meaningful codes, memos and the proper infrastructure for 
the ATLAS.ti Hermeneutic Units.   
                                                          
14
 Refer to Chapter 3.2.1 for coding definitions and processes.   
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 Also, the structure outlined in Chapter 3.2.1, Coding and Memoing, was used as a 
guide throughout the process of data collection.  As discussed, that guidance includes 
top-down and bottom-up analyses, use of the constant comparative method to bring out 
the richness of the data, and memoing.  As stated in Chapter 3.2.1, these techniques are 
crucial in the discovery of new theory.   
 Before codes and memos were established, the data was read to identify 
meaningful quotations (Friese, 2012).  Each transcript was read line-by-line to identify 
sentences or phrases that gave meaning to leadership in extreme events.  For this 
dissertation, there were 1187 quotations identified which provided some insight into the 
interviewees‘ thoughts on extreme crisis leadership.  As suggested by Friese (2012), 
every sentence that an interviewee stated, even introductions and salutations, are 
considered as potential quotations.  In some cases those opening and closing sentences 
did provide insights into the interviewee‘s demeanor or experiences associated with the 
event under discussion.  Those quotations were coded as well.  No statement by the 
interviewee was ―left off the table‖.  Furthermore, each quotation was ―renamed‖ in 
ATLAS.ti in a short title format that allowed for easy reference to the quotation.  Those 
titles became useful in the analysis phase as a bridge between the coding and the 
quotation.   
 Establishing specific codes and memos came after reading the quotation.  The 
researcher established either one or more codes that capture the essence of the quotation.  
Prior experience can help a researcher define specific codes while considering the 
interviewee‘s perspective; refer to discussion in Chapter 3.2.2 regarding my personal 
experiences (Friese, 2012).  Also, knowing individual constructs in the literature helps 
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the researcher to establish and define codes (Friese, 2012).  It is important, however, to 
keep eventual biases in check and ―let the data speak‖ instead of imposing preconceived 
notions on the emergent insights (Gioia, et al. 2012).  In the end, there is a blending of 
experience and literature that aids the definition of codes.   
    Sampling 
 As described in Chapter 3.2.2 Sampling, multiple data sources were included in 
the dataset to ensure rich and purposeful data (Guest et al., 2006).  As discussed in 
Chapter 3.2.2, this dissertation included three sample event categories; i.e., natural 
events, artificial, i.e., manmade events, and a natural event that leads to an artificial i.e., 
manmade event.  Those sample event categories were based upon the criteria set out in 
Chapter 3.2.2, which provided for an appropriate amount of variance.  In accordance with 
Chapter 3, Table 5 – Applicability of Extreme Event Characteristics, each sample was 
screened for applicability as an extreme event.  From the identified samples, specific 
interview subjects were chosen.  Chapter 3, Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews and 
Table 7 – Interview Sample Matrix provide the foundation for both theoretical sampling 
and the variance in the sample data.   
 As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, Table 6 – (replicated below) a specific set of 
interview targets was identified to provide data on specific extreme event theories.  After 
consolidating the characteristics into four major areas of interest, i.e., Transboundary, 
Failure theories, ground-zero events and cross-cases (including counterpoints of each 
case), Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews – gives a suitable representative sample of 
the extreme event theories.   
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 Table 6 – Matrix of Targeted Interviews
  
 
 Furthermore, to ensure adequate variance in perspectives and experience, a 
specific hierarchy of interviewees was envisioned as discussed in Chapter 3, subchapter 
3.2.2.  See Table 7 – Interview Sample Matrix – Variance, from Chapter 3, replicated 
below, for the specific hierarchy.  The actual dataset used adhered to this proposed 
hierarchy (refer to description below).  For the Natural Events (e.g., Hurricanes) and the 
cross-case events, i.e., non-case specific, the interviewee sample included a first 
responder at the State level (State Police Colonel for Super Storm Sandy); and several 
White House Situation Room Directors, along with an Electric Utility operator.  With 
regard to the artificial, i.e., manmade, events, Three Mile Island and Deepwater Horizon, 
the interviewees included first responders, the Governor, and White House Situation 
Room Leaders; however, as stated earlier, for triangulation purposes some secondary data 
was used for Deepwater Horizon.  This approach for the Deepwater Horizon event was 
necessary because of the lack of access to rig personnel due to ongoing Grand Jury 
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proceedings.  Regarding the natural and artificial, i.e., manmade, event, interviews in the 
dataset included first responders, military leaders, politicians, and a respected journalist.  
Additionally, for cross-case analysis, i.e., not a specific event, instead individuals with 
experience with many events, the interviewees include one senior U.S. military leader 
(Admiral) and an Executive Vice President of the Red Cross.   
 
Table 7 - Interview Sample Matrix – Variance  
 
 
 In the data collection process, this dissertation exceeded the number of interviews 
in most categories.  For natural event, there are six interviewees; for artificial event, i.e., 
manmade, there are seven interviewees; and for natural event leading to artificial, i.e., 
manmade event there are five interviewees.  In summary, the actual interviews conducted 
(Table 8) include the following individuals. 
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Table 8 – Matrix of Actual Interview Subjects 
Event Name  Natural Event Artificial Event  Natural + Artificial Event 
Super Storm 
Sandy 
Commander New Jersey State 
Police (Ref. JH) and White 
House Situation Room staff and 
electric utility executive (see 
cross-case list below) 
  
Three Mile Island   Lead Presidential Responder 
(Ref. HD) 
Governor of Pennsylvania 
(Ref. DT) 
 
Deepwater 
Horizon 
 Fleet Captain 
Secondary data – 4 
transcripts (including 
Captain, Oilman in charge, 
and two key staff members) 
and one book (Fire on the 
Horizon, Shroder, et al. 
2011) (Leaders: Ref. CK, JH  
Crew Ref. CP, AM 
Ref. Fire on Horizon JK) 
 
Fukushima   On-scene commanders (3) 
(Ref. IN, IZ, MA) 
Prime Minister’s 
representative (Ref. GH) 
Journalist (Ref. YF) 
Cross-Case  White House Situation Room leadership (2) (Ref. OD, JB) 
Executive Vice President of Red Cross (Ref. RR) 
Admiral – (Ref. RW) 
President of a Large Coastal Utility (Ref. SS) 
 
 Consistent with the proposal in Chapter 3.2.2, the interview samples are provided 
in Table 8.  For each case there is at least one first responder interview and at least one 
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senior level official interview.  This approach helps with providing variance in the 
dataset.  Furthermore, the cross-case interviews, in addition to providing many leadership 
insights, provide insights into the transboundary issues associated with extreme events.   
 Further, with regard to sample structure, throughout Chapters 4 and 5, this 
dissertation provides references for each quotation.  Those references are from the 
individual interview transcripts.  The reference, cited as ―Ref‖ refers to an individual 
interview.  In Table 8 there is a reference initial for each interview, e.g., RW.  Thus, in 
the narratives a citation of ―Ref. RW‖ refers to the interviewee RW as marked in Table 
8
15
.  
Interview Process 
 In the dataset, there are 19 interviews along with the secondary data.  Interviews 
lasted from one hour to two hours.  All interviews were transcribed and entered as 
Primary Documents into ATLAS.ti through a Hermeneutic Unit for each case.  Interview 
questions were primarily open-ended and were included in the transcripts.  All but three 
interviews (including all of the Japanese interviews) were conducted face-to-face in a 
conference room or office setting.  There were three telephone interviews.  The telephone 
interviews were: interview OD for the cross-case sample, JH for Super Storm Sandy, and 
DT for the Three Mile Island event.  For the interviews in Japan, even though there was 
an interpreter present, all interviews were transcribed from the Japanese speaker to 
English.  The interpreter‘s words were not included in the data.  
 
 
                                                          
15
 For purpose of autonomy, consistent with the interview agreement, actual names are not used in this dissertation.  This coding is 
used to autotomize the individuals.  
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Theoretical Saturation 
 As discussed in Chapter 3.2.2, Sample, theoretical saturation
16
 is about quality – 
not quantity – in qualitative research.  Guest et al. (2006) find that twelve interviews are 
likely to produce a sufficient sample for qualitative research.  As discussed in Chapter 
3.2.2, the original goal for this dissertation was nine interviews; however, allowing for 
recursive cycling and reaching the saturation point, the final sample is 19 with additional 
secondary data of four courtroom transcripts, a book (Shroder, et al. 2011), and 
interviews with an independent, knowledgeable oilrig Captain (and co-author of the book 
on Deepwater Horizon).   
 For this dissertation, the ATLAS.ti structure used separate Hermeneutic Units for 
each case, which aided in the determination of theoretical saturation.  As each case is 
built, the codes are collected and advanced to the next case; therefore, the researcher can 
assess exactly the number of codes added by successive cases.  As the interviews built, 
and the Hermeneutic Units were created, fewer and fewer new codes were created.  Other 
methods for determining the theoretical saturation point include assessing the cross-
loading of codes, use of the co-occurrence analysis tool in ATLAS.ti which depicts the 
embedded nature of similar codes and potentially through the use of the ―word cloud‖ 
feature in ATLAS.ti which shows the frequency of each word in the transcripts (Friese, 
2012).  The word cloud gives a researcher the ability to assess the most frequently 
mentioned operative words.  If certain words dominate, there is little benefit in 
continuing with more interviews (Guest et al. 2006).  Theoretical saturation is simply the 
                                                          
16
 Theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing 
phenomena seen before (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
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point at which incremental learning is minimal because the researchers are observing 
phenomena seen before (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 Interviewer Bias 
 Researcher bias is discussed in Chapters 3.1.1 and 3.1.4.  In Chapter 3.1.1 many 
authors (Perry, 1998; Conger, 1998; Bryman, 2004) discuss the challenges with 
researcher bias for those researchers using the qualitative approach.  Those 
methodological issues were addressed in Chapter 3.1.1.  In Chapter 3.1.4, the challenge 
of controlling researcher bias in the interview process was discussed.  As listed in 
Chapter 3.1.4, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest controls for researcher bias from 
interview data.  Major points that Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest with regard to 
researcher bias in the data collection and analysis process include: 
 
 Use of diverse perspectives of interviewees and using retrospective and real-time 
cases 
 Stronger theory comes from ―pooling‖ the case data rather than isolating each 
case; the challenge becomes that you lose the ―interesting‖ story, but gain strength 
in theory. Write a good theory, not necessarily a good story 
 Tell the theory story in many different means; use narrative, graphic models and 
tables 
 
Further, Eisenhardt (2007) suggests that a technique used to control for researcher bias is 
through the use of ―highly knowledgeable informants‖ and maintaining extensive ties to 
the appropriate literature also helps control for bias as well.  These suggestions were 
considered throughout the data collection process.  For each of the extreme event cases, 
except for the Three Mile Island case, data was collected from at least three interviewees.  
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All of the extreme event cases were ―pooled‖ into one data-set.  The data itself was 
analyzed using multiple analytical methods, Chapter 4.   
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 CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 This chapter presents the data analyses and results of the interviews conducted as 
described in Chapter 3: ―Methods and Qualitative Design‖.  The approach used in this 
dissertation as detailed in Chapter 3 was both, a ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down‖ process 
whereby a theoretical model and the associated insights derive from the data and were 
compared to existent, relevant literature.  This Chapter presents the results of the data 
analysis.  The discussion in Chapter 5 is intended to examine existing and associated 
theoretical models to identify the similarities, weaknesses, imperfections, and new 
territories.   
Preview of Results 
 As a preview, Chapter 4 will reveal six important crisis concepts of extreme event 
leadership that emerged from the data.  Those six crisis concepts were (1) Situational 
Context, i.e., the fathomable and unfathomable impacts associated with the event and the 
organization‘s ability to respond to those impacts; (2) Felt Emotions17, i.e., the effectual 
influence of traumatic or unfathomable events on leaders/leadership; (3) Crisis Response, 
i.e., the management of response; (4) Sense-making implications; (5) Decision-making; 
and (6) Leadership.  The data suggested that felt emotions cause significant alterations in 
normal leadership responses during an extreme event including instances of inducing 
emotions of strong defiance among leaders and followers.  Also, the data suggested: 
                                                          
17
 The role of felt emotion in extreme event leadership is discussed in Chapter 2.8.1.4.   
134 
 
 
 That the situational context is unique for each extreme event.   
 That the concept of ―crisis response‖ has a significant influence on successful 
outcomes of an extreme event.   
 That the actual event cases evoke more emotion in the first responders than in the 
senior level officials.   
 
 With regard to decision-making, this research revealed a number of insights in 
terms of the efficacy and efficiency of the decision-making process in extreme events.  
Finally, for leadership in extreme events, a number of crisis concepts were reviewed 
related to the extreme event leadership. 
Approaches to Qualitative Analysis 
 In qualitative literature, there are many potential approaches to generate theory 
from data.  While approaches to the analysis phase can vary, the literature provides a 
general process for grounding the theory in the data.  Primarily, this dissertation followed 
the approach outlined by Gioia et al. (2012).  Gioia et al. (2012) offer clear guidance on 
the approach to be adopted through a three-order analysis.  Some of the key approaches 
discussed by Gioia et al. (2012) include using an iterative approach to interviewing and 
analysis, i.e., interviews inform the coding and the coding informs the subsequent 
interviews in a recursive process.  Gioia et al. (2012) suggest that 10 interviews can 
generate as many as 50 to 100 so-called ―first-order‖ concepts.  The first-order analysis 
suggests that the researcher should adhere faithfully to the interviewee‘s phrases and 
terms; therefore, using a liberal number of first-order concepts.  In this dissertation, the 
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research proposal targeted nine interviews.  With recursive cycling and theoretical 
saturation there were 19 interviews, which generated a total of 165 first-order codes.  As 
the research progressed, the number of codes increased significantly, implying that the 
researcher kept faithful adherence to the interviewee‘s phrases and terms giving them 
unique codes. 
 Once the researcher embarks on successive interviews, Gioia et al. (2012) suggest 
that there arises the need to see the common themes and crisis concepts that emerge from 
the collated data.  Thus, the researcher can initiate the ―theoretical sampling process‖ 
(refer to Chapter 3).  In theoretical sampling, there is an overlap between the different 
orders of analysis, especially the second and third-order analyses.  As each order of 
analysis progresses, the researcher begins to recognize the start of the next order of 
analysis, i.e., theoretical sampling occurs as the interview progresses and the researcher 
asks the question, ―What‘s going on here?‖ (Gioia, 2012, p. 20).  This commences the 
―second-order‖ analysis as suggested by Gioia et al. (2012).  In the second-order analysis, 
the number of codes narrows down significantly to usually around 25 to 30.  Gioia et al. 
(2012) suggest that this narrowing is the theoretical sampling piece that leads to the third-
order analysis of ―aggregate dimensions‖.   
 Finally, in the third-order analysis, the researcher introduces the relevant literature 
and starts recursive cycling (Chapter 3, Section 1.4) between the data, themes, concepts, 
dimensions, and the relevant literature.  This cycling also serves a purpose in identifying 
the past precedents in the literature through the top-down process while the gaps in the 
literature begin to reveal new concepts.  Ultimately, the researcher hones in on the new 
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concepts in the ―findings‖ chapter to enable examination by other researchers and create 
a point from where further research can take off.  
 This dissertation followed Gioia et al.‘s (2012) approach of incorporating the 
three-orders of analyses.  In identifying those 165 first-order codes, I tried to comply with 
Gioia et al.‘s (2012) admonition to maintain close fidelity with the interviewees‘ 
comments.  Each interview identified and captured the germane concept mentioned by 
the interviewee as a code (refer to the detailed description of coding and memoing in 
Chapter 3 section 3.1).  After a peak in the number of codes, and after a reasonable 
number of interviews, the researcher found himself between the first- and second-order 
coding with each successive interview generating fewer codes.  This has been termed the 
saturation process (refer to Chapter 3, subchapter 2.2).  The challenge for the researcher 
is to remain open to new codes and refrain from immediately limiting the number of 
codes.  On the other hand, the second-order analysis starts during the course of the first-
order analysis.  If the researcher waits until all the interviews are completed to begin the 
second-order analysis, the number of interviews could be infinite much before any 
conclusion has been reached while the extra interviews would not add value to the data.  
 For this dissertation, the first attempt at a second-order analysis resulted in 23 
major second-order themes (refer to Chapter 3 subsection 3.3).  This is less than Gioia et 
al.‘s (2012) suggestion that the number of second-order codes should be between 25 and 
30.  While that deviation was true for my early attempts at second-order themes, the 
categorizations changed with continued analysis.  Specifically, Chapter 4, subsection 2.4 
details the means in which 23 second-order themes produced eight third-order concepts.  
The difference between the original number of second-order themes in this dissertation 
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and Gioia et al.‘s (2012) guideline is driven by several factors.  Those factors are 
primarily related to the continued recursive cycling with the literature and through the use 
of the ATLAS.ti co-occurrence process which was not used by Gioia et al. (2012).  
Chapter 4 subsection 4.2 (Approaches to Qualitative Analysis) elaborates this cycling 
process. 
 The subsequent subchapters discuss the validity of the coding and the correlations 
between them.  Significant results emerge when using the bottom-up methodology for 
data collection and the third-order analysis process.  These results have also been 
discussed in Chapter 3, subsection 3.3.1.   
Code Linking 
 ATLAS.ti is a powerful software tool that allows the researcher to establish codes, 
memos, comments, code networks, and use many other features to organize data.  
However, the cautions mentioned by Friese (2012) are important to ensure a clean and 
organized system to prevent what she calls the ―code swamp‖.  The researcher initially 
establishes a code in ATLAS.ti.  This code is subsequently linked to a second-order and 
perhaps, a third-order code.  Further, the researcher might add comments or memos to the 
code.  Establishing an organized Hermeneutic Unit is essential for maintaining data 
fidelity and enabling second- and third-order analyses.  An example of code linking for 
this dissertation
18
 is presented below: 
 
Code: Felt_emotions_crisis_response_Calmness {76-5}~ 
Comment: Calmness of the leader.  Opposite of panic.   
<is part of> crisis_response_(in)ffectiveness 
<is associated with> Felt Emotions 
 
                                                          
18
 See Chapter 3.3.1 for specific examples of how quotations are coded.  
138 
 
 
 The code is ―Felt_emotions_crisis_response_Calmness‖ and has been established 
by the researcher.  First, the code refers to a category of ―felt emotions‖ and is also 
associated with the crisis response.  The felt emotion is ―calmness‖.  Thus, the code string 
is created as ―Felt_Emotions_Crisis_response_Calmness‖.  Further, there was a 
―comment‖ field in this code written by the researcher as a reminder or for adding 
clarifications or comments.  Links are established to other codes and perhaps, second- 
and third-order codes.  In this case, the ―Felt_Emotions_crisis response_calmness‖ code 
was linked to five other concepts, four of which were first-order concepts and one is ―Felt 
emotions‖ which is a second-order theme.  Also, listed after the code, in parentheses, are 
the measures for code groundedness and density (76-5) where 76 indicates the number of 
quotes associated with groundedness, i. e. the number of quotations to which the code is 
applied, while 5 refers to the number of second-order codes linked to density, i.e., the 
number of links to other codes.  Also, each link has a ―relationship‖, e.g., <contradicts>, 
as defined by the researcher.  This relationship is used in the network view (see Section 
4.2.2 for a description of code networks) to describe the relationship between the codes.  
It is most useful in establishing the links between the first- and second-order codes.  Note 
that the tilde after the ―(76-5) ~‖ above, indicates that there is a comment for this code.  
This coding process is duplicated for all 1187 quotes, 165 codes and the first- to third-
order codes.  The analysis/results for the Hermeneutic Unit were derived from these 
relationships.   
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Code Network  
 In this dissertation, initially the 165 codes were organized into eight second-order 
themes (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.3).  All of the second-order themes are linked 
through a relationship editor that enables the researcher to describe the relationship 
between the code and a coded network.  The code example above: 
―Felt_emotions_crisis_response_Calmness‖ looks like this in ATLAS.ti network view: 
 
Figure 4 – Example Code Network
 
 
 Note that the code ―Felt Emotions‖ in Figure 4 is the highest order code (which is 
why it is highlighted in red) and its groundedness and density are (0-23).  This means that 
―Felt Emotions‖ is a second-order code; hence, the first number is zero and it subsumes 
23 first-order codes.  The symbol inside the rectangle means that there is a memo 
associated with this code that describes its theoretical linkages with the literature, e.g., a 
research question discussed in Chapter 2.  Ultimately, second-order codes are analyzed 
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using the analysis tools in ATLAS.ti to produce third-order codes and relationships that 
build the results.  
Code Co-occurrence
19
 
 The use of co-occurrence is critical to code integration because it enables the 
discovery of meaningful relationships and themes among the codes in that the software 
seeks instances where the codes intersect or have similar meanings.  As a starting point 
for the second-order analysis of the data, a global co-occurrence matrix was generated in 
ATLAS.ti.  As a means to understand the overall perspective of the codes, the co-
occurrence query in this first analysis included all 165 codes that were queried against all 
other codes.  Essentially, this query finds cases where codes intersect or have common 
codes.  The specific query involves 165x165 codes and seeks to combine concepts.  
ATLAS.ti generates a matrix of the results which provides the common codes, the 
associated number, and links to the quotations.  The ATLAS.ti matrix is too large to 
replicate in this dissertation; however, I generated two charts that depicted the 
information from two different perspectives.  The purpose of this analysis was to 
determine significant themes, as discussed in Chapter 4.2.  Further, according to Gioia et 
al.‘s (2012) suggestion that the first-cut at the second-order analysis should result in 25-
30 codes, this particular query resulted in 23 codes
20
.  
 Figures 5 and 6 below depict the results of the second-order analysis.  Figure 5 is 
a complex line graph.  The vertical axis shows the number of quotations; the horizontal 
                                                          
19
 ATLAS.ti has many analytical tools to aid the researcher in discovering concepts, constructs, themes or dimensions of importance 
in the data.  The Co-occurrence Explorer allows the researcher to ask different types of questions (refer to Chapter 3.2.5 for a 
description of co-occurrence).  Using this tool, the researcher can ask ATLAS.ti to show all codes that co-occur across all of the 
primary documents.  The result is a cross-tabulation of all codes.  Compared to the Query Tool, whereby the researcher has to 
determine and select codes or code families and the appropriate operator, the Co-occurrence Explorer by default looks for all codes 
that co-occur in the margin area combining the operators WITHIN, ENCLOSES, OVERLAPS, OVERLAPPED BY and AND.  
Instead of cross-tabulating all project codes, it is often more meaningful to apply filters for certain codes and documents in order to 
concentrate on a more specific set of concepts. 
20 After subjective evaluation of Figures 5 and 6, I judged significant codes as those having more than 20 associated quotations 
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axis shows the 165 codes.  In the graph are the 23 ―peaks‖ above 20 quotations.  These 
peaks represent the most significant codes from the data.  The lines also show the 
overlapping of the codes superimposed on them.  The specific codes that constitute these 
peaks will be discussed later. 
 
Figure 5 – Second-order Analysis Clusters 
 
  
 The takeaway from this graph is that there are 23 significant code clusters (peaks) 
in the data.  The same data are depicted in 3D (Figure 6) below.  Figure 6 depicts the 
165x165 matrix in 3D.  The various code clusters stand out in this Figure, indicating 
resonance around certain concepts.     
 
 
 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
# Quotes 
142 
 
Figure 6 – Second-order Coding Analysis 3D 
 
 
 This figure is merely another depiction of the 23 code clusters (peaks) in the 
coding data.  It must be noted that from the 3D image of Figure 6, one can see that the 23 
code clusters (concepts) are tightly coupled or grouped.  The researcher believes that this 
tight grouping demonstrates the validity of the second-order analysis.  Figure 6 reflects 
the fairly consistent code density and frequency, i.e., the 3D pattern is reasonably 
symmetrical.   
 Developing the co-occurrence is an initial step in the second-order analysis 
process.  So far, the analyses show that there are 23 code clusters (concepts) that have at 
least 20 associated quotations.  Next, in the second-order analysis, it is necessary to 
further consolidate those 23 code clusters into a smaller group of themes to begin the 
final stage of the second-order analysis. 
Results 
 At this point, the analysis is primarily a co-occurrence correlation of codes that 
have similar quotations (Figures 5 and 6 above).  There are also other considerations 
specifically that the analysis should be more than a mere quantitative analysis of the 
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codes.  Code density and other qualitative analyses enable the researcher to identify 
themes and concepts through memoing, density, and other more judgmental processes.  
The co-occurrence process analyses codes with regard to their relationships with each 
other.  This results in an analysis that is well integrated; however, there may be codes that 
stand alone when offering independent insights.  In the bottom-up process, this 
dissertation conducts both, a co-occurrence and a qualitative assessment to identify the 
―bottom-up‖ results. 
Bottom-up Process 
 Continuing with the bottom-up process, the results were identified by analyzing 
the 23 code clusters identified through the co-occurrence analysis.  Once those clusters 
were identified, they were examined to determine the importance of the concept 
underlying each cluster.  This approach leads to constructive results contributing to the 
research.  The process began with identifying the clusters, then, running the co-
occurrence analysis tool again to further refine the actual theme.  
 
Figure 7 – Major Code Clusters 
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 Examining the code clusters, using the actual 165x165 matrix data, indicated the 
major clusters as shown in Figure 7.  An examination of Figure 7 provides insights into 
the second-order codes that emerge from the data.  These are: 
 
 Crisis response 
 Extreme event characteristics 
 Felt emotions 
 Sensemaking 
 Situational context 
 
At this point, the second-order analysis has refined the initial 23 code clusters into five 
aggregate third-order codes; however, this analysis is not sufficient.  Further analysis is 
needed to determine if other important codes exist, or whether they are either masked or 
perhaps have less than 20 associated quotations.   
 Note that the code ―extreme event characteristics‖ was used to label quotations 
that indicate an interviewee‘s discussion of the characteristics of the actual extreme 
event.  This code was generated by the researcher to ensure that the events analyzed in 
this dissertation met the definition of an extreme crisis as described in detail in Chapters 
2 and 3.  For purposes of identifying second-order codes, this code is not applicable to the 
analysis itself.  Thus, that code was eliminated from the second-order coding analysis.  
 It must be noted that in Figure 7 (above), several codes are not just important 
concepts on their own, but they are very similar in content.  For instance, in ―Crisis 
response‖ there are two similar codes, i.e., command and executive tasks.  These codes 
stand alone as important leadership codes.  As such, the researcher elected to create a 
code entitled ―Leadership‖ to the list of second-order codes.    
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 Next, a qualitative analysis of the coding may reveal concepts beyond those 
discovered in the co-occurrence method.  A network view of the highest density codes in 
the code hierarchy provides a qualitative perspective of the coding.  Linkages are 
established between the higher order codes in the hierarchy along with their densities.  
Figure 8 – Network View for Higher-order codes, is the network view for these high 
order codes.   
 
Figure 8 – Network View for Higher-order Coding 
 
 
 In Figure 8, many of the second-order codes are identified in the co-occurrence 
analysis as important codes (including the importance of the ―Leadership‖ code).  It must 
be noted that the density for decision-making is very high, i.e., 22.  This means that 
decision-making links to 22 other codes.  One potential explanation for the second-order 
code of decision-making not revealing itself in the co-occurrence analysis is that, its 
associated quotations were amortized over 22 other codes and the threshold of the 20 
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quotes used in the co-occurrence analysis is too high to capture decision-making.  In 
summary, the results of both, the co-occurrence and qualitative analyses reveal the 
following third-order codes:  
 
 Felt emotions 
 Situational context 
 Crisis response 
 Sensemaking 
 Decision-making 
 Leadership 
  
 The remaining subsections of this Chapter describe the second-order themes that 
make-up the third-order codes (aggregate dimensions) of felt emotions, situational 
context, crisis response, sensemaking, decision-making, and leadership.  In some 
subchapters, the researcher provides a brief literature review to improve linkages with the 
results.  Then, the results will be discussed in Chapter 5 along with the theoretical 
implications.  This process of describing the second-order themes begins with an analysis 
of the role of felt emotions in extreme crisis.  
Felt Emotions 
Analysis 
 Felt emotions are a significant concept discussed by many of the interviewees.  As 
shown in Figure 9, Psychological – Felt emotions, all of the data samples include some 
discussion of felt emotions.  As depicted in Figure 9 below, from the interview data in the 
various ATLAS.ti Hermeneutic Units, felt emotions are particularly significant in the 
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Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima cases where loss of life and unfathomable conditions 
(Yammarnio, et al. 2010) existed.     
 
Figure 9 – Psychological - Felt Emotions 
 
 
 Figure 9 indicates that the Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima cases were the 
most significant with regard to the felt emotions involved.  These two cases suggest that 
there are unique insights on the role of felt emotions for extreme events.  These insights 
will be discussed further in Chapter 5.   
 Given that there were 707 quotations coded under the ―Felt Emotion‖ code, felt 
emotions are clearly a major concept in extreme events.  Many of those impacts of felt 
emotions are discussed in Chapter 5.   
 As discussed in Chapter 2 earlier, extreme events are usually unfathomable and 
unpredictable, and they have transboundary aspects.  In the Fukushima and Deepwater 
Horizon cases, the interview and transcript data reflected the impact of felt emotions on 
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the leaders involved.  Many of the interviewees discussed the deaths that occurred in 
those two cases, as well as the major explosions and fire, and the threats to further loss of 
life along with how those circumstances altered their cognitive abilities.  It is under these 
circumstances that leaders or their followers may be struck with felt emotions that are of 
interest in this research.  The types of felt emotions experienced by the interviewees 
were: panic/calmness, awareness, success, heroism, hopefulness, humor, optimism, 
outrage, skepticism, and trust.  Each of these felt emotions is reviewed in the following 
subchapter.   
Panic and Calmness 
 Several important considerations of panic emerged here.  First, during the extreme 
events, leaders revealed that they personally had to resist the urges caused by panic.  
Many interviewees talked about the need to control panic by remaining calm and 
suppressing the urge to flee.  Second, a unique phenomenon emerged from the interviews 
related to protecting oneself from external sources or ―interferences‖ due to panic 
generated by external organizations.  Finally, many of the interviewees provided specific 
insights on issues that leaders needed to consider when controlling the panic of the both 
their leaders and their subordinate workers.  Specifically, the interviewees discussed the 
need for leaders to be self-aware, to maintain situational awareness, and support and 
protect workers.   
 My data implied that the onus is on leaders to control both their own panic, and 
that of the workers during an extreme event.  Many of the interviewees in the above cases 
spoke of the need to remain calm even during fight-or-flight conditions.  When faced 
with stressful conditions, many of the leaders shared techniques that they used to control 
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panic.  After reviewing those panic control techniques, a grouping of techniques 
emerged: leader self-consciousness, situational awareness, and protecting workers.  From 
the interviews, it appeared that the leaders were successful in controlling panic by 
resorting to these techniques.  In fact, one interview clearly reflected the individual‘s 
thoughts on controlling panic: 
 
It appears to be necessary for an extreme event leader to understand that all eyes 
are on them immediately upon the disaster.  A conscious leader remains aware of 
the need to maintain calmness themselves, the staff‘s emotions, and the site 
conditions.  A conscious leader understands that the staff‘s trust in the leader 
resets to almost zero at the instant of the event and rebuilds with every decision, 
emotion and action shown by the conscious leader.  (Ref. RW.)   
 
Heroism 
 In extreme events, interviewees discussed many acts of heroism.  Throughout the 
interviews, there were nearly 72 quotes directly related to heroism.  The interviews 
highlighted a significant difference between military and non-military situations.  There 
were several quotes that highlighted the severity of the Deepwater Horizon and 
Fukushima cases, in particular.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, 11 workers died on the 
rig, while in the Fukushima case, two workers died on site due to the tsunami along with 
several workers who lost family members and houses in the tsunami.  This area of 
research, i.e., military versus non-military, is explored in detail in Chapter 5 and is an 
area for future research. 
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Hope 
 My second-order analysis, another significant emotion, ―hope‖, was revealed.  
Given the unfathomable aspects of extreme events, not only do workers sometimes need 
hope, but the Transboundary nature of extreme events calls for ―hope-giving‖ to the 
public.  Interviewees provide numerous examples of the need to infuse both the workers 
and the public with the hope that the situation will improve.  Interviewees also provide 
examples of hopelessness.  A brief summary of the points expressed by the interviewees 
is mentioned here: 
 
 Hope is the essence of information people want (Interviewee SS speaking to her 
workers during a hurricane response).  
 One interviewee explained, ―I think it becomes, in the worst time of a crisis, a 
fragile environment from a leadership standpoint that you‘ve got to hold together 
and that‘s everyone‘s mindset around you‖.  He goes on to elaborate, ―I recall 
vividly the yearning in their eyes for leadership” (emphasis added). Ref. RW 
 When operators were isolated during the Fukushima event, phone calls home 
served as more than a mechanism to communicate; those phone calls served as 
hope that at some point normality would return to their lives. 
 An interviewee gave up all hope after the last reactor exploded.  Their work 
seemed futile and continuing with their work seemed futile as well. 
 The equipment that was dispatched to the site was not only the equipment to be 
used in controlling the event, it also represented hope.  When it did not arrive, the 
leader experienced hopelessness.   
 After the final reactor exploded, this leader expressed the hopelessness he felt.   
 Even something as simple as establishing room lighting was a source of hope.  
The lighting represented more than light; it represented success and hope. 
 The leaders were offered encouragement by the emergency response center in 
Tokyo who told them that help was imminent; yet time again that help did not 
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arrive as promised.    
 The significance of ―praying to God‖.  Many of the people did not hold strong 
religious views prior to the event; however, in these circumstances, religion 
emerged.   
 At Fukushima, the younger operators wanted to leave the control room.  In 
dispensing encouragement, the leader appealed to their sense of duty.  It must be 
noted that the cultural aspect of bowing and apologizing to the workers while he 
spoke did imply that the leader was asking and begging for help. 
 The Presidential visit to the Three Mile Island accident also included the First 
Lady on the trip.  This visit was not only to inform the President, but to give 
comfort and hope to the citizens. 
 
Trust  
 As a felt emotion, trust and its impact during crisis situations are extensively 
studied across domains.  In this dissertation, it is important to provide special 
considerations of trust in crises involving extreme events.  There are 52 quotations in the 
ATLAS.ti data related to the code ―trust‖.  Some of those quotes involve life, death, or 
unfathomable circumstances.  Given below is a brief summary of the points expressed by 
the interviewees: 
 
 Despite not knowing his rescuers, a victim trusted them. 
 A Governor was new to his position – when the time of need arrived, the 
Governor leaned on people who he knew prior to his position and trusted them 
above those leaders who were in established State roles.   
 An interviewee remarked that familiarity bred trust.  As the military gained 
experience in providing humanitarian assistance, they gained trust and improved 
communication.   
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 Leader competence as a fundamental building block of trust was discussed 
extensively. 
 One interviewee mentioned that an element of trust was shown by being present 
on the ground and displaying competence.  Followers can often tell if the leader is 
competent.  Further, the leaders must be willing to do those things that they ask of 
their followers.   
 The leader was the first to volunteer for the hazardous task.  Even though he 
ultimately did not participate, his willingness to volunteer paved the way for the 
others to volunteer. 
 In one case, the corporate leadership asked for trust from the onsite leaders.  Also, 
the corporate leaders conveyed hope to their counter-parts onsite and asked for 
their trust.   
 The leader sought to know the personal issues plaguing his workers.  According 
to interviewee MA, this helped limit the trust debt during the extreme event.  
 The importance of safety culture was deeply established throughout the 
organization prior to the event.  
 The leader took responsibility for all mistakes.  He used that as a mechanism to 
build trust and motivate. 
 A prior relationship with the fire department was essential in encouraging the 
department to face this hazardous situation.  The interviewee had a weak 
relationship with the subcontractors and they did not stand by him during the 
extreme crisis. 
 
 In summary, as expected, ―trust‖ as a felt emotion appears as a crucial component 
of extreme crisis leadership.  There were other felt emotions discussed by the 
interviewees, and those emotions are discussed next.   
Other Felt Emotions 
 As discussed above, the interviewees discussed a number of felt emotions that 
occurred during the extreme event.  Besides the emotions of trust and hope, there were 
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other emotions discussed, i.e., awareness, success, humor, optimism, outrage, and 
skepticism.  These emotions were mentioned in the interviews; however, other than 
―awareness‖, none of these rose to the level of panic and heroism in the discussions. 
 Clearly, awareness, and more importantly, unawareness, was a key concept 
mentioned across the interviews.  Interviewee RW suggested that a conscious and aware 
leader was essential to the successful outcome of an extreme event.  RW suggested that 
awareness also fed sensemaking.  RW alluded that if the leader was not aware, then 
sensemaking and decision-making were not likely to occur.  That is, if the leader is not 
aware of the actual situation then the leader‘s ability to analyze, assess, and direct 
(elements of sensemaking and decision-making) are either limited or non-existent.  
Awareness and unawareness have been discussed as part of sensemaking and decision-
making in the subchapters of Chapter 4.  As for the impact of leadership celebration as a 
felt emotion, the interviews revealed that in the Fukushima case, at times the leaders 
performed celebrations after successful activities and these celebration moments were 
effective in assuring workers (Ref. MA).   
  
I was not particularly worried (about their motivation), but for the first two days, I 
tried to make myself clear to them what we were going to do.  From the third day, 
after connecting one cable, we all celebrated by clapping hands.  Also when they 
heard a motor was installed, or a test-run was completed, we clapped hands.  We 
worked on preparation for getting equipment from the Fukushima Dai-ichi, and 
when a helicopter landed with the equipment, we all celebrated.  There was a 
sense of achievement.  I don‘t remember this but it seems that I always said 
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―thank you‖ when one task was completed even though I was yelling when I was 
instructing.  I was happy to have heard of that.  I think this is something that kept 
the workers motivated for the first four days to one week. (Ref. MA.) 
   
 As with celebrating success (discussed above), the use of humor as a motivational 
tool did surface even in dire circumstances.  In fact, the leader in the next Fukushima 
example used humor effectively as a tool for sensemaking.  Through humor he 
acknowledged the desperate reality that the group faced.  It must be noted that in the 
midst of the Fukushima accident, the operators exceeded their emergency response 
training.  Normally, once the event progressed beyond a certain training point, the 
instructors would say: ―Freeze the simulator here‖.  After the actual event exceeded the 
simulator‘s ―freezing‖ point, the control room supervisor reflected in the interview:  ―To 
my surprise, under that situation, still some operators were bold enough to say that we 
stopped right around here if it had been a normal situation.  I did not have my instructor 
behind me but I wished I have had him there and heard him saying, ―Freeze.‖‖ (Ref. IZ.)    
 In Chapters 2 and 3 the researcher has included discussions on ―optimistic bias – 
escalation of commitment‖ (Joffe 2003).  The interviews include a significant example of 
this concept.  The concept of ―optimistic bias‖ was most notable in the Fukushima case 
where an incorrect response strategy seriously complicated the event.  It must be 
understood that implementing an incorrect strategy immediately and incorrectly holding 
onto the strategy despite indications to the contrary (optimistic) causes wholesale failures 
in event response.  Additionally, the Fukushima operators held onto the strategy even  
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when the speed of events exceeded the speed of their response as seen in this interview‘s 
statement: 
 
Then the leaders started shouting, really shouting, or scolding.  He told us, ―You 
know, we can never repeat this program for Unit 2 and Unit 3‖.  Our mistake was 
that we were always acting under assumption of prediction, very bad prediction.  
―From now, you must report to me exactly what you were doing and what are you 
going to do by when‖. He also scolded to headquarters through the TV monitor, 
―This request or command is to you, as well‖.  And the people said, ―Yes, very 
small, very low‖. (Ref. IN.) 
 
This dissertation has a few instances of leaders who were overly optimistic in 
their assessment of the events; however, in this one example above, the consequences of 
the blind spot caused by optimistic bias were severe and it greatly complicated the 
outcome of the event.     
 Public outrage, like the panic of the workers, was another emotion discussed by 
one interviewee (refer to the issue of social amplification of risk in Chapter 2).  As public 
concern increased, so did the political involvement in the event‘s leadership.  Quote: 
―From the White House perspective, on these domestic events, and you have public 
outrage like (hurricanes) Katrina and Sandy, you‘re really just looking for the governor, 
for the Stafford Act, how else would they get involved if there‘s a high public concern?  
If the State … you talked earlier about the White House gets involved and if the federal 
government fails‖.  (Ref. JB.) 
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 In many interviews, the feeling of skepticism while perhaps not a true felt 
emotion certainly is related to felt emotions.  Though this issue will be discussed later in 
this Chapter since it relates to defiance, here is an example from the Three Mile Island 
event: 
 
Interviewer: ―So in terms of deference to expertise, you were a bit skeptical about 
expertise? Interviewee: ―Yes I was.  I became skeptical.  Initially, I was like 
everybody else.  If you let these guys run this sophisticated reactor, anything they 
tell us must be accurate.  Well, as I recounted in the case of the Lieutenant 
Governor, that was dissipated within a couple of hours.  These guys simply lied to 
us.  Well that‘s … no, it isn‘t too strong.  They told us things that weren‘t true.  
Now, maybe they were well-intended, and maybe they were simply incompetent, 
but there was no question that we were misled badly in the early stages of the 
accident.  The worry was over whether what we were releasing was factual, but 
our skepticism was established very early on so that this carried through all of the 
events that transpired over the next week or 10 days that we were very careful to 
examine‖. (Ref. DT.) 
 
Summary of Felt Emotions 
 There were 707 quotations related to felt emotions within the interviews.  This 
number suggests that there is a major link between the felt emotions experienced by 
leaders in an extreme event along with the emotional links associated with situational 
awareness, sensemaking, decision-making, and crisis response.  Obviously there is 
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significant co-occurrence between these concepts.  As each of these concepts is analyzed, 
the role of the felt emotions is included in the analyses.  Ultimately, Chapter 5 seeks to 
integrate the results and provide some overall conclusions. 
 This subchapter highlights that the felt emotions were most prominent in the 
Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events; however, nearly all interviews contained 
some related emotions.  Those felt emotions included: panic/calmness, awareness, 
success, heroism, hopefulness, humor, optimism, outrage, skepticism, and trust.  In 
summary, the interviewees indicated that:  
 
 The unfathomable circumstances (Yammarnio, et al. 2010) involved in the 
extreme events can create panic among leaders and workers.  The interviewees 
from both the events expressed the need for the extreme event leaders to control 
panic. The interviews revealed several insights to help do so, including: 1. 
protecting the situation from external interferences; 2. being self-aware; 3. being 
aware of the situation, i.e., sharing calmness not panic; and 4. supporting the 
workers‘ welfare. 
 Throughout these interviews there were countless recollections of heroic acts, 
including 72 quotes directly related to heroism.  The interviews highlighted a 
significant difference between military and non-military situations. 
 The emotion of hope was very dominant in the interviews.  
 Another dominant emotion was the feeling of trust among the leaders and 
subordinates. 
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Situational Context
21
 
 Throughout the interview process, each interviewee discussed the situation at the 
scene of the event they were involved in.  Because each event was somewhat different, it 
was necessary for the coding process to enable the conditions for each site, yet 
acknowledge that according to the process suggested by Friese (2012), the codes would 
have to allow for the consolidation of the quotations.  Therefore, the researcher 
developed a hierarchy of codes under the general code heading ―situational context‖.  
This higher-level code was then broken down into a series of first-order codes and 
ultimately second-order and third-order codes.   
Analysis 
 A pattern emerged as the researcher reviewed the first- and second-order codes.  
Most of the codes and associated quotations fell into two major categories: the issues 
associated with the scope of the event, and those associated with the magnitude of the 
event.  This subsection covers the scope and magnitude under the overall ―situational 
context‖.  Each of the first- and second-order codes associated with situational context 
are described below.   
Scope 
 From the interviews, the scope of the situation included areas such as 
technological issues, cooperation, safety context, and support for workers.  Next is a 
discussion for each of the scope issues. 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Situational context basically refers to the situation on the ground of the event.  It is a collection of interviewee quotations that 
describe the scope and magnitude of the event. 
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Technological Issues 
 Interviews from each event reveal technological issues. Some of these 
technological issues were common among the events.  For instance, in all three technical 
events (Deepwater Horizon, Fukushima and Three Mile Island), interviewees discussed 
the technical complexities of these facilities and the complications that these complexities 
caused during the extreme events.  In each of the events, interviewees discussed the 
challenges created by pushing the boundaries of the technology.  Events were greatly 
complicated by the site conditions, including unknown information, missing information, 
lack of planning, disagreements, old equipment, lack of workers, and the expanding 
scope of the event being greater than their comprehension.  Another common issue in all 
three technical events was the social bias against technology.  That social bias manifested 
itself in public fear, which resulted in an expansion of the scope of the events to include 
public outrage.  The social bias also complicated the communication of technical issues 
to the public.   
 Interviewees discussing non-technological events, such as hurricanes, focused the 
technological discussions on urban versus suburban impacts.  They suggested that the 
urban technological impacts are greater than the suburban impacts.  In the urban context, 
hurricanes, forest fires, and other natural disasters wreak significant damage on 
technological infrastructure.  According to some interviewees, the key technological issue 
for leaders managing these events is to manage the expectations of the victims, i.e., 
provide the victims realistic recovery periods for infrastructural repair and restoration of 
services, such as the Internet, electrical power, water services, etc.  At the senior 
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government level, the Situation Room interviewees focused on more strategic technical 
issues such as:  
 
 The need for consistent decision-making  
 Gaining cooperation among organizations 
 Matching resources and capability with needs  
 Getting the right people involved and keeping the wrong people out of the 
leadership 
 Using simple language 
 Determining the level of resources for the response  
 Preventing events from cascading 
 Familiarizing leadership technically through the use of experts and technical 
interpreters 
 Encouraging community reliance/planning  
 
 Also, the Situation Room leaders discussed the evolution of these extreme events 
where events that were once considered extreme, such as hurricanes, were now seen as 
being more routinely managed; yet there were new extreme events emerging to replace 
those.  Those new extreme events included events, such as major land fires in places 
where major fires had never occurred or cyber-attacks or even potent pandemic events, 
e.g., H1N1 virus.   
Cooperation 
 For the second-order concept of ―cooperation‖, each of the events had unique 
issues related to the cooperation among entities during the response.  According to the 
interviewees, the lack of, or inadequate, cooperation often resulted from role confusion 
and consequently in miscommunication at times when close communications were 
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particularly important.  In each case, the breakdown of cooperation exacerbated the 
recovery from the event.  A summary of the breakdowns in cooperation for each event is 
explained below. 
 Deepwater Horizon interviewees and data highlighted two sources of role 
confusion (cooperation).  First, it was not clear among the crew whether legally, 
Deepwater Horizon could be considered as an oil rig or as a vessel.  This confusion 
resulted in the lack of clarity in whether the vessel‘s captain or the ―oilman‖ was in 
charge.  As a result, during the disaster, it was not clear who was giving orders about 
Mayday calls and evacuation to the crew.  Second, there were a number of entities 
responsible for operations on Deepwater Horizon.  There was an owner company, a 
drilling company, and a leasing company, all of whom had roles and responsibilities.  
These roles made it difficult to coordinate activities including operational, training, 
evacuation drills, and other day-to-day activities.  The lack of clarity regarding roles and 
responsibilities was exposed greatly during the event.  
 According to interviews, during the Fukushima disaster there were breakdowns in 
cooperation among many organizations.  Interviewees stated that there were breakdowns 
of cooperation within the government, between the government and the utility services, 
within the utility companies, and more importantly, between the emergency response 
center at the site and the control rooms within the reactors.  Strategically, organizational 
stovepipes hampered the response.  Interviewees discussed the failure of the government 
to provide adequate information to limit public panic, the frustration of a slow response 
system, the lack of accurate information, a poor communications structure, and the 
challenges of democracies in controlling harmful information, all of which compounded 
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the event.  Importantly, the interviewees were concerned that the regulator did not have 
representatives at the site to provide a safety perspective.  There was also the possibility 
that without the legal authority to compel the workers to remain at the site, all the 
workers would leave or be withdrawn by the operating company leaving the site 
unstaffed resulting in further reactor damage and radiation release.  
 Interviewees discussed several cooperation issues that occurred during the Three 
Mile Island accident.  There were communication and trust breakdowns with the 
company that owned and operated the plant.  There were distractions caused by outside 
politicians who unnecessarily wanted information merely to indicate their involvement in 
the response.  There were miscommunications that led to an unnecessary evacuation of 
100,000 residents, which then caused more infrastructure complications, and there was a 
concern that other nuclear facilities would have similar accidents.  Interviewees discussed 
the consequences of poor technical and management leadership at the facility.  All of 
these issues caused coordination challenges for the people actually responding to the 
event.  There were some examples of positive cooperation issues noted by the 
interviewees e.g., the Presidential site visit at Three Mile Island, gaining the cooperation 
of the correct experts, and the recognition that the Federal government should allow local 
responders to lead the response.  
 For the interviews discussing hurricanes as an extreme event, the interviewees 
highlighted the need for ―intelligence led management‖. (Ref. JH.)  That is the necessity 
for leadership to get in front of the event, for leaders to set expectations for everyone 
involved in the response and impacted by the hurricane, to match resources with strategy, 
and the need to be transparent with the media and public. 
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  At the White House Situation Room level, interviewees discussed a number of 
strategic cooperation issues.  Most notably, from a strategic perspective, the interviewees 
talked about the need to match the speed of response with the speed of the event, 
including matching the available resources and capabilities to the needs of the event 
response.  All of the interviewees discussed the importance of local control and local 
command including the value of domestic resilience for community-preparation.  Some 
interviewees discussed the need for leadership to have a team of people around them that 
they were comfortable with and could trust.  In one event, an interviewee discussed an 
anecdote where social justice trumped local control.  Note: This issue of social justice 
versus technical justice was discussed in Chapter 2.  The other coordination issues 
discussed by interviewees included: 
 
 Decision-making – the need to get expert advice 
 Leadership – the need to co-locate commands if necessary 
 Rumor control 
 In the cases of international response, to be conscious of ensuring the host 
country is most appreciated for their response  
 Clarity, speed, normalization, integration, prioritization of communications 
 Unity of effort through the use of consistent coordination models and adjusting 
the model to fit the specific event, using familiar and established relationships 
 Acknowledging the reality that the federal government is not in charge and the 
value of local community relationships 
 
 In summary, all of the interviewees stressed the importance of organizational and 
individual cooperation during these events.  In all cases, the interviews provided 
examples where less than adequate coordination complicated the event response.  
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Breakdowns in cooperation were generated through both organizational and individual 
weaknesses.   
Safety Context 
 The second-order code of ―safety context‖ combines a number of first-order 
codes.  Safety context include the first-order codes of: natural versus artificial (man-
made) events, training, site conditions, turnover, safety culture, safety system status, 
distraction, fatigue, and procedures made up the safety context code.  Interviewees 
provided hundreds of quotations in this area.  A summary of the discussions follows 
below. 
 Regarding the safety context on the Deepwater Horizon, data and interviews 
illustrated that there were many safety barriers that failed, and those failures contributed 
to and complicated the accident.  Those barriers included safety training, safety culture, 
site safety conditions, crew distractions, worker fatigue, turnover, and safety procedures.  
Interviewees talked about significant failures in each of those areas.   
 There were many quotations provided by the interviewees relating to the 
Fukushima disaster.  Regardless of their level of responsibility in the response, each 
interviewee provided his perspectives on the breakdowns in safety processes during the 
Fukushima disaster.  Each interviewee, even the journalist interviewed (Interviewee YF) 
expressed concerns regarding safety breakdowns, for example:   
 
 The journalist, Mr. YF focused on the fortitude of the Prime Minister and the 
worry of a proposed doomsday scenario as a possibility, and the defiance 
displayed by some leaders at the site.   
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 At the Fukushima site, interviewees passionately discussed their confusion 
regarding what was happening.  Significant concerns they mentioned included: 
the need to implore workers not to quit; the role of their leader (note: this will be 
discussed later in Chapter 4 under leadership); the lack of information; making 
decisions without information; the fatigue associated with a long response; and 
their failure to develop the correct response strategy.   
 At the senior government level, regarding Fukushima, interviewee GH focused on 
the need to immediately repair infrastructure to support the response, discussed 
the reluctance of some senior government leaders to travel to the site (note: this 
will be discussed later in Chapter 4 under leadership), and enumerated the 
challenges of disagreements between the government and the company.   
 Interviews with hurricane responders focused on the safety context areas in 
discussing the differences between natural versus artificial (man-made) events.  
Interviewee JH implied that natural events tended to have a larger impact on 
normal life and the victim‘s needs were greater.  Interviewee JH stated that key 
strategy points were related to the use of intelligence information regardless of the 
event, using the same emergency response organization, interlacing resources, and 
strategies.  Finally, JH suggested that the major difference was that artificial 
(man-made) events tended to require more analytic capability.   
 In summary, with regard to the safety context of the Situation Room interviews, 
the interviewees discussed their perspectives on the national level of safety.  They 
provided quotations that give insights into the White House priorities.  A summary of 
their perspectives is:  
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 The value of frequent involvement in disasters  
 The cautious role of the US military in international response 
 Keeping with the normal response plan as long as possible but understanding that 
these one-percent events would be novel 
 The technical limitations of government and companies 
 Resolutions of inter-agency concerns 
 Understanding the need to educate the leadership on technical issues 
 Taking the necessary steps to gain a unity of effort including repurposing 
resources 
 Having an appreciation that all events are local and having an appreciation for the 
use of local resources   
 
Support for workers  
 The second-order code of support for workers consists of all the first-order codes 
that are related to providing resources, mental and physical protection, and other issues 
related to worker needs.  In some cases, interviewees discussed support for victims.  
These discussions are included in this code as well.  Below is a summary of the 
interviews.   
 Support for the health and safety of workers was a significant source of quotes for 
Fukushima (Ref. IN, IZ, MA).  There was a significant difference in the concern for 
worker health between the military and non-military interviewees.  Discussions with 
military interviewees (Ref. RW) revealed more of a willingness to focus on immediate 
event response over the care for worker health.   
 Interviewee SS talked about supporting workers during hurricane responses.  
Clearly the interviewee placed worker well-being above all other concerns.  Further, the 
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interviewee discussed the value of engendering the company‘s full support of workers, 
for instance, the electrical line crews, in the field.  Some techniques discussed included 
providing call center representatives to answer questions and identify needs of the 
workers, involving everyone in the company to support the response workers, and 
supporting the families of the workers so that the workers‘ stress was relieved and this 
enabled them to focus on recovery activities.   
 From the Situation Room perspective, interviewees discussed the comparison 
between the victims of earthquakes versus tsunamis.  Earthquakes resulted in a 
significant need for rescue and first aid, while tsunamis resulted in either life or death of 
the victims.  Interviewees focused on the helpful role of the Red Cross and other non-
governmental bodies in assisting those affected.  Finding funding for the response was 
clearly an important task at the Situation Room level.  The topic of resilience was 
mentioned throughout the interviews.  Resilience thinking includes the realization that 
victims can also serve as a resource for recovery. It then becomes critical that the federal 
government help manage the expectations of the survivors.  
Magnitude 
 This subchapter provides a summary of the interviewee reflections on the 
magnitude or severity of the event.  The magnitude ranges from the fathomable to 
unfathomable crisis conditions.  Each event (and non-event) is discussed from this 
perspective.    
 According to the interviewees, the sights and sounds experienced during the 
Deepwater Horizon event were far beyond what the crew had anticipated through their 
training.  Some safety procedures, e.g., life raft functionality, emergency disconnect 
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switches, among other safety features, failed to function.  In fact, the interviewees 
suggested that as a result, the fires and explosions actually defeated some of the safety 
features, thereby contributing to expanding the magnitude of the disaster.  
 For the Fukushima interviews, interviewees expressed their disbelief at the 
extreme conditions at the facility.  All interviewees discussed the impact of the 
explosions, their fear and panic, their lack of understanding of the events, their personal 
doubts and fear for their lives and that for the lives of others, and they expressed an 
unbelievable sense that conditions were well beyond anything that they would expect to 
witness during a nuclear event.   
 Interestingly, there was only one quote with the first-order code of ―unfathomable 
conditions‖ for the hurricane interviews.  That quotation involved setting expectations for 
the victims of hurricanes.  This was interesting because as depicted in data for this 
dissertation, the classification of hurricanes as an extreme event was questionable.  Also, 
during JB‘s interview, during a discussion of rare events, the interviewee suggested that 
hurricane response was more normalized then than in the past.  
 In the Three Mile Island interviews (Ref. HD, DT), there were a number of 
quotations that co-occurred with other codes already covered, so those are not reiterated 
here.  However, there was one quote from interviewee HD who discussed the option of 
the federal government to take over an event from a company should the company fail in 
their event response.  The interviewee surmised that this would be a ―nuclear option‖, 
meaning an option of last resort and thus not likely to happen but that it would remain an 
option for the Federal response. 
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 For the Situation Room interviews, there was significant amount of co-occurrence 
in the discussions especially related to the characteristics of the one-percent (rare) events.  
The other area of co-occurrence was in the need for advance planning for these extreme 
events.  Given the co-occurrence for this code, there were no specific quotes in this area 
that were coded as ―unfathomable‖ conditions that had not already been addressed 
elsewhere in this Chapter. 
   Summary of Situational Context 
 In summary, the five second-level codes (technological issues, cooperation, safety 
context, support for workers and magnitude) reflected all of the quotations for the first-
order codes associated with ―situational context‖.  Essentially, situation context reflects 
the actual situation surrounding a given event.  That situational context will influence the 
response in a number of ways.  Subsequent to this, the researcher discusses the 
correlation of these second-order codes with the literature through the third-level coding. 
The purpose of this third-order coding is to allow for theoretical evaluation of the data 
thereby better enabling theory construction.  Correlation with the literature allows for the 
identification of gaps, and theoretical extensions of the theories.  This process is 
consistent with the Gioia et al.‘s (2012) process and the bottom-up, top-down process 
used in this dissertation.  First, a review of the five second-order codes as they relate to 
the existing extreme event literature is helpful for the discussions in Chapter 5.  My 
literature review reveals:   
 
 The technological issues discussed by the interviewees are consistent with the 
resilience activities discussed in the literature (Wachtendorf, 2009).  For instance, 
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ensuring a community is technically robust against the effects of a hurricane is 
consistent with the resilience philosophy ascribed in the literature.  Similarly, 
ensuring that a nuclear plant or oil rig can withstand the technical challenges that 
it may face is a resilience issue.  Thus, technological codes (second-order) 
correlate with resilience as a third-order code.  
 The second-order coding of ―cooperation‖ and ―support for people/workers, are 
consistent with the literature related to ―executive tasks‖ (Boin, 2009) which 
refers to gaining cooperation among response entities which is a role of the event 
response leader.  As such, the second-order code cooperation correlates with 
executive tasks becoming a third-order code.   
 The safety context second-order code is consistent with the literature regarding 
readiness (Smits & Ezzat-Ally, 2003; Voogd, 2004).  Activities such as 
developing an adequate safety culture, providing safety training, developing 
safety procedures are readiness tasks.  Thus, the second-order code correlates to 
readiness as a third-order code.   
 Finally, the second-order code of ―magnitude‖ does not correlate directly with the 
literature.  However, this researcher considers the conditions at the site as 
essentially a demand for resources.  That is, the severity of the conditions at the 
site will generally dictate the resources needed for a response.   
 
Crisis Response 
  In the codebook, crisis response is defined as ―quotes that refer to instances where 
leaders discuss activities, thoughts, or comments related to the actual performance of tasks 
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or conditions that contributed to the outcome of the event‖.  Essentially, this refers to 
instances when the interviewees maintain that they acted so as to bring about a crisis event 
outcome.  These actions were keys in deciding the event outcomes: either successful or 
unsuccessful outcomes.  There is one sole code related to crisis response ―outcomes‖.  This 
code is labeled as ―(in)effectiveness‖.  
Analysis  
  My analysis is intended to highlight some of the more important interviewee 
quotations for the code ―(in)effectiveness and to extract insights from the literature for 
the each quotation.  This process is consistent with the Gioia et al.‘s (2012) bottom-up 
and top-down approaches that have been used throughout this dissertation.  The summary 
subsection below provides general description of the results and the insights that are 
further developed in Chapter 5.   
  Confirmation of Existing Theory and Limitations  
 This subchapter provides a summary and an analysis of the literature associated 
with crisis response.  I reviewed existing crisis response theories and their limitations.  
The intent of this review was to determine if the data in this dissertation provides any 
evidence to support, refute, or illuminate those theories.  A summary of the analysis is 
provided here: 
 
 Adaptive Leadership theories and Sensemaking theories - Evidence provided by 
some interviewees suggested that Adaptive Leadership and Sensemaking theories are 
viable and important insights into crisis leadership.  For sensemaking, among many 
quotations discussed in the ―Sensemaking‖ subchapter, there were a number of 
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sensemaking related quotations provided during the interviewees‘ discussion of crisis 
response.  For instance, examine the quote: ―I had a mind-set that I would not say no to 
their decisions because I did not know all the parameter on the reactors.  I just remember 
asking them to wait when they wanted to stop something‖ (Ref. MA.).  Consistent with 
the thoughts of Mumford (2005), this quotation refers to the interviewee‘s establishment 
of a prescriptive model in his thinking.   
 Next, several interviews provided confirmation of the importance of adaptive 
leadership in the interviewees‘ experiences.  There were countless quotations reflecting 
the need for adaptation in responding to events.  In these quotations, the interviewees 
discussed the use of judgment, leaning forward (adapting), innovating, repurposing 
(adapting), using people as resources (adapting), and authoritative leadership.  These are 
all the principles of adaptive leadership.  One specific quote highlights the importance of 
adaptive leadership:  
 
Leaning forward by making everything available, saying hey, something bad‘s 
coming your way, money‘s no object, get things in place, right.  That‘s what a 
presidential emergency declaration does for you.  Then when it comes through 
you‘ve got everything lined up, so that you immediately can staff the Stafford Act 
and again everything pops up.  The only thing that slows you down is the 
leadership, right, it‘s not the playbook.  Playbook is in play and you‘re running.  
We‘ve got people who‘ve been incredibly trained, they have experienced crisis 
and they‘re mature, they‘re steeped in an understanding of emergency 
management.  (Ref. JB.) 
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 Readiness and Failure theories - Some interviewees provided examples that 
confirmed limitations in terms of Readiness and Failure theories.  Specifically for the 
readiness theory, many interviewees provided examples of situations where the 
responders were unprepared despite all the prior work related to preparedness.  Their 
examples implied that there were limits to their ability to predict and prepare for these 
Black Swan events.  These quotations illustrate the points made by Quarantelli (1988) 
that despite the usefulness of readiness, prior planning is not enough for extreme events.  
As one example, an interviewee talked about his complete lack of preparedness in 
responding to an unfathomable condition:  ―It was a terrible moment.  This is mainly 
about Unit 3.  For Unit 3, my colleagues tried to make a hole in the reactor building to 
avoid the explosion, but we didn‘t have suitable tools‖. (Ref. IN.) 
 Another theory where a limitation was identified is the failure theory (refer to the 
discussion of failure theory in Chapter 2).  As in the example for the readiness theory, 
given the unlimited combinations of events, neither high reliability nor normal accident 
theories can predict all of the potential events that can occur, particularly with regard to 
latent organizational weaknesses.  Many interviewees expressed situations where latent 
organizational weaknesses were greatly exposed and led to extreme complications in 
responding to the event.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, the Captain‘s lack of knowledge 
of the emergency procedures and the confusion regarding crucial authorities led to 
significant complications during the event.  Specifically, the Materials Management 
Agency‘s interview of the Captain and the ―Oilman in Charge‖ highlighted these latent 
organizational weaknesses: 
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Interview of Deepwater Horizon Captain
22
: 
 
Q. Where are the safety procedures located on the vessel?  
A.  I don‘t recall.  
Q. So you don‘t remember whether there was a paper copy, computer? 
A. Most of those small details I just don‘t recall. 
(Ref. CK.) 
 
Q. Now, you said there is a power point presentation on the safety management system?   
A. Yes.  
Q. What is in this power point presentation?  
A. I‘m sorry, I don‘t recall the details. 
(Ref. CK.) 
 
Q. Everybody on board a vessel needs to know how safety is managed on the vessel 
correct?   
A. Yes.  
Q. Would the information of the Safety Management System be in this power point 
presentation?   
A. Honestly, I don‘t recall what exact details are in there. 
(Ref. CK.) 
 
Interview of Oilman in Charge:  
 
Who has the authority to activate the system?   
A. Well, there is the drill floor and it would either be the driller or the tool pusher, myself 
and I guess at times, you know, during a real emergency, even the captain.    
(Ref. JH.) 
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 From Materials Management Hearing Transcripts (130819_001  Captain Curt Kuchta testimony) (Completed  08/27/13) 
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Q. Okay. Can you please tell me what procedures were in effect that would have avoided 
people being in the areas where they were killed? 
A......you have to have people there....we always notify our personnel when we have a 
high content level of gas and get them out of any space, shut down anything during 
drilling.  Normally you don't get...gas back there when you‘re displacing the riser....but 
when mud was coming up at a high rate somebody knew that there was well control 
problems— 
Q.  Before there was an explosion somebody knew that there was a problem with the well 
control. Maybe not you, but somebody on the rig knew that they had problems right?  
A.  That key time when there was mud coming out, have obvious flow from the well, did 
Transocean have any written policies on getting those men...out of that area that's 
anticipated there will be gas....no policy but we make sure that people get out.... 
(Ref. JH.) 
 
 Setback Management theory - Within the crisis response literature (refer to 
Chapter 2), Lettieri et al. (2009) concludes that more research is needed on Setback 
Management, including policy mapping, capacity mapping, and incident command.  A 
number of interviewee quotations reflect instances of setbacks in the events.  Specific 
research on these instances could advance this stream of literature.  For example, one 
interviewee discussed the complications of organizational infighting that is not discussed 
in the literature.  Another dilemma discussed by the interviewees expressed the need to 
implement an incorrect strategy as their only option.  They understood that the strategy 
was incorrect, but it was the only option available to them (Ref. IN).  This concept of 
implementing an incorrect strategy is not covered in setback management literature.  
Also, in the Fukushima case, interviewees expressed their disappointment regarding the 
untimely arrival of safety equipment on-site.  This disappointment reflected the setbacks 
that they had experienced.  Setback management literature does not discuss the 
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consequences of ―disappointment‖.  Thus, these interviews confirm the assertion of 
Lettieri, et al. (2009) that much more research is needed for Setback Management.  
 Surprise Management theory - The theory of surprise management is another area 
where these interviews suggest that an extension of the literature is necessary.  While 
interviews confirm Farazmand‘s (2009) assertions regarding the importance of goals and 
missions, some quotations suggest some extension of those concepts is needed and is not 
yet considered in the literature. For example, more work is needed on the downside of 
over-eagerness, the role of logistics, and the communications mechanisms used to convey 
changes in strategies to event responders.  Farazmand (2009) reflects that surprise 
management, ―Aims to read and act in an anticipated fashion, remove or minimize 
potential threats and clear obstacles to achieving goals and missions‖ (p. 407).  In these 
interviews there were a number of extensions of this concept espoused, for instance, by 
one quote: 
 
Actually, I had to change the priorities once along the way.  I later learned that the 
workers on the ground were very confused by this change of instruction; because 
for those who were connecting the cables, it was not possible to change the cable 
route all of a sudden. This is true. So I needed to be more cautious with the people 
working on the site when I changed the priorities.  I still needed to change the 
priorities.  If I had been persistent with my words, everyone would have been 
confused, so the priorities needed to be changed.  However, I needed to be more 
cautious and considerate about those who had been working on the time-
consuming task when I made a change in the priorities.  (Ref. MA.) 
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 Non-linear Leadership and Escalation of Commitment theories - These are two 
related crisis response theories that were confirmed by the interviews.  Also the 
interviews implied a necessary extension of the theories is necessary.  For example, Non-
linear Leadership is discussed by Comfort (2002); Farazmand (2009); and Schumpter 
(1942), among others (refer to Chapter 2).  Within this research are a number of 
illustrative quotations related to the need for non-linear leadership.  In these instances, 
interviewees discuss the unfathomable conditions and their difficulties of leading others 
through those conditions.  Clearly, there was a breakthrough point where the event 
became extremely complicated, beyond the interviewees‘ abilities to control the event 
(Ref. IN).  In the second case, the interviewee confirmed the thought of Weick & 
Sutcliffe (2007) that managers needed to think strategically and non-linearly to manage 
the expectations.  They did so through ―buying back decision space‖.  The specific quote 
is: 
 
Also, even though there was no water, they tried to cool them off as much as 
possible by circulating water.  They gave us extra 18 hours by doing all these.  
We started cooling off the reactors just then when the restoration team was done 
with changing motors and putting power supplies back.  We had only two more 
hours left before the pressure reached the designed pressure after all.  While the 
operation team worked really hard to save time, the restoration team collected 
necessary equipment and installed it.  (Ref. MA.) 
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 In another interview, the interviewee discussed the importance of preventing a 
cascading breakthrough.  This interview was in relationship to stopping the spread of an 
infectious disease, the specific quote is: 
 
Regarding the mitigation effort - that was to say what can the federal family and 
state, and local communities bring the mitigating and one that was closing schools 
are cancelling big events or wash or cover your cough that whole thing and stay 
home if you‘re sick also part a mitigation with was medications, antibiotics to 
treat symptoms and those sorts of things the third effort was on vaccine as we 
leverage the global vaccine market to create a vaccine and to innovative distribute 
and ship it.  (Ref. RR.) 
  
In a related theory, i.e., Escalation of Commitment, interviewee quotations highlight the 
principles espoused by Parashevas (2006) regarding the phase transition of extreme 
events:   
 
We were focusing on the scram function.  I was checking if everything was done 
as in the exercises, and receiving reports.  From time to time, I was checking the 
manual if they were not missing anything written there.  I was making sure 
everything was done by the proper procedure until we got hit by the tsunami.  
(Ref. IZ.) 
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 Enacting Organizations - This research suggests the potential for theory extension 
with regard to Enacting Organizations as discussed by Daft and Weick (2001); and 
Argyris (1977), (refer to Chapter 2).  The enacting organization theory suggests that 
single and double-loop mechanisms exist and they provide responders with feedback to 
their enacted mental models.  My dataset, includes a number of quotations where 
interviewees implied that their mental models were formed solely through instinctual 
responses.  Instinct played a significant role in the enacting feedback loop for some 
interviewees.  In this area of instinct, interviewees provided a number of examples where 
instinct was the sole basis for their enactment.  For instance, in the Deepwater Horizon 
case, the Captain suggested that not only was instinct important but that the company had 
codified instinct in the emergency procedures: ―The safety manual stresses just all of the 
stuff that we do instinctively in the event of an accident‖. (Ref. CK.)  Again in this 
research, the role of instinct seems an important concept with regard to emergency leader 
response. 
Potential Gaps in the Data Analysis 
 My analysis of the interviews indicates that there are several theoretical constructs 
(or codes) that are not explicitly discussed within this dissertation, yet they are discussed 
by the interviewees regarding crisis response.  These constructs could represent gaps in 
my data analysis.  Those constructs are:  
 
 Psychological or physical proximity  
 Be on the scene (of the event)  
 Offer credible answers  
 Self-complexity/self-concept  
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 Confidence and uncertainty in judgmental forecasting   
 Idiosyncratic theory  
 Fragmentation of control    
 
 While some of these constructs above may be related to other constructs that are 
discussed in this dissertation, there may be some uncertainty regarding how thorough the 
discussion is regarding those constructs in this list.  For instance, the construct ―offering 
credible answers‖ (in the list above) could be contained within the decision-making 
discussion in Chapters 2 and 5, but it is not discussed explicitly.  Also, the construct 
―confidence and uncertainty in judgmental forecasting‖ could be contained within the 
sensemaking discussion.  Finally, the ―fragmentation of control‖ construct could be 
contained within the leadership discussion.  Nevertheless, without re-coding all of the 
data, omission of these constructs represents a limitation in this dissertation.  Otherwise, 
all of the constructs referred to by the interviewees for the code of ―(in)effectiveness‖ 
have been discussed in this dissertation.   
 During the interviews many of the interviewees discussed concepts such as 
procedures, logistics, and the prioritization of recovery efforts.  Because these issues are 
treated in the literature as management practice issues and not theoretical issues (refer to 
Chapter 2), there is limited discussed on these concepts in the various crises theory 
literature.  Nevertheless, from the bottom-up perspective, these management issues were 
discussed in the interviews so they are considered in the bottom-up assessment despite 
not being concepts covered by the literature.  Even though they are management issues 
are not theoretical issue per se, Chapter 2 does contain a limited discussion on some of 
these management issues. 
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Summary of Crisis Response 
 A thorough analysis of the crisis response codes, quotations, and literature was 
explored in my analysis of the interviews.  This analysis resulted in several conclusions 
regarding the management aspects of crisis response theory.  Those conclusions were 
supported by interviewee quotations.  With regard to the consistency of these results to 
existing theories, the conclusions provided evidence that confirms several crisis theories.  
For some crisis response theories, limitations were confirmed, in several cases existing 
crisis response theory is confirmed and extended, and there were several crisis response 
theories that were confirmed and where gaps or the possibility for theory extensions were 
identified.  The results of the crisis response analysis will be discussed further in Chapter 
5. 
Sensemaking 
  Sensemaking literature and the elements of sensemaking are discussed in Chapter 
2.8. Sensemaking is one of the six major crisis concepts identified through the co-
occurrence review of the data.  The purpose of this subchapter is to present the results of 
an analysis of those elements of sensemaking that come from the interview data.  This 
subchapter conducts a detailed analysis of the elements of sensemaking (as described in 
Chapter 2.8) to conduct a comparison from the bottom-up review of the data compared to 
the top-down approach that comes from the literature.   
Analysis 
 There were 13 codes generated for sensemaking in ATLAS.ti with over 100 
associated quotations.  As discussed in subchapter 4.2, sensemaking is one of the six 
important concepts generated from the interviews.  Data from this subchapter confirms 
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the importance of sensemaking as an element of extreme event leadership.  These results 
generally suggest that the Fukushima and Three Mile Island events had more positive 
sensemaking interviewee reflections than the Deepwater Horizon case.   
  Sensemaking Overview  
 The results in this subchapter disaggregate the elements of sensemaking into two 
groups to improve homogeneity of the review.  One group of sensemaking elements 
(from Chapter 2) consists of: 
 
 Positive evaluations23 
 Pessimism  
 Pluralistic ignorance  
 Collective sensemaking  
 Optimistic bias  
 Institutional effects  
 Updating  
 Doubt  
 Felt emotions 
 
The second set consists of another set of elements created by Weick (1988; 1995), (also 
from Chapter 2) regarding: 
 
 Commitment  
 Identity 
 Expectations  
 
                                                          
23
 Kayes defines sensemaking characteristics as: positive evaluations, pessimism, pluralistic ignorance, collective sensemaking, 
optimistic bias, institutional effects, updating, doubt, and felt emotions. 
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 I reviewed each sensemaking code against each set of sensemaking elements to 
determine which elements of sensemaking were applicable to the interview.  First, all 
cases are reviewed as a group, then the non-event cases are reviewed, then the Fukushima 
case only is reviewed (to provide a single-case example), and finally a review of the 
interviewees reflections as ―in-crisis‖ or ―post-crisis‖ reflections are covered.   
 Sensemaking Results – All Cases 
   I reviewed all cases (actual events and situation room interviews) for 
sensemaking quotes that were related to the appropriate element of sensemaking.  From 
my review, the data suggested: 
 
 Positive sensemaking evaluations - is significant for Fukushima and Three Mile 
Island 
 Pessimism quotes - are evenly distributed across all cases 
 Pluralistic ignorance - is most significant for Deepwater Horizon 
 Collective sensemaking - is significant for Fukushima  
 Optimistic bias is - consistent among all cases 
 Institutional effect - is consistent among all cases 
 Updating - is significant for Fukushima 
 Doubt - is significant for the Deepwater Horizon case 
 Emotional – is consistent for Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events and non-
existent for the Three Mile Island event 
 
 This data are consistent for the emotional element of sensemaking as discussed in 
Chapter 4.3 that indicates a high degree of emotion for these two events.  Clearly, the 
Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events generated the most emotion among the 
interviewees.  What is most interesting among this set of data is that the more positive 
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elements of sensemaking, i.e., positive evaluations, collective sensemaking, and updating, 
were significant for the Fukushima event.  The negative elements, i.e., pessimism, 
pluralistic ignorance, doubt, and emotions, were significant for Deepwater Horizon.  
Discussions with the interviewees were consistent with this data.  In the Fukushima case, 
the interviewees generally reflected a positive attitude in responding to the event up until 
the explosion of the reactors.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, there was little discussion 
of positive sensemaking by the interviewees.  Discussions indicated an immediate 
recognition by most people that a rig evacuation was necessary and that there was little 
opportunity for successful resolution of the event after the emergency disconnect device 
failed.  Also, for the Deepwater Horizon case, the level of pluralistic ignorance was 
significant given a general lack of sensemaking during the event.  It is critical to note that 
an analysis of all the data with regard to the ―in crisis‖ and ―post crisis‖ data will be 
provided at the end of this subchapter.  
 The same data was analyzed against the sensemaking elements suggested by 
Weick (1988; 1995): commitment, identity, and expectations.  Overall, the results for 
these elements were inconclusive.  Each element was essentially evenly distributed in the 
data.  This suggested, as discussed in Chapter 2.8, that these elements of sensemaking are 
better evaluated at the individual level versus the case level.  For instance, Weick (1995) 
discusses the element of ―identity‖ in his assessment of the Mann Gulch firefighters when 
they dropped their fire implements to run from the fire (1949).  According to Weick 
(1995), at that point the firefighters lost their identity as firefighters.  It appears that 
Weick‘s (1995) single case study approach to these types of analyses is more appropriate 
than a multiple case study analysis.   
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Sensemaking results – Non-event cases 
 Some interviewees discussed non-actual event cases e.g. situation room 
interviewees.  Their interviews were analyzed against the first set of sensemaking 
elements and their interview data suggested: 
  
 Positive evaluations – all interviewees discussed the benefits of positive 
sensemaking activities 
 Pessimism – a few interviewees mentioned the value of being pessimistic in 
sensemaking, but there was not a significant emphasis on looking for the dark-
side of the situation 
 Pluralistic ignorance – a few interviewees reflected or considered that there could 
be less than adequate understanding of the event across the responding 
organizations.  There were only two quotes related to this element 
 Collective sensemaking – most interviewees talked about the value of sharing 
perspectives of the event 
 Optimistic bias – there were no quotes from the interviewees that considered 
over-optimism 
 Institutional effect – all interviewees discussed the challenges of aligning 
organizations, especially the government, into an effective response structure 
 Updating – all interviewees mentioned the value of continuous updating of 
information as a mechanism to improve sensemaking 
 Doubt – a few interviews mentioned the value of building in doubt to the 
sensemaking process.  This was not a significant element of the discussions 
 Emotional – as might be expected from interviewees who were not directly 
involved as first responders, their acknowledgment of the emotions involved in 
sensemaking was low 
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 Overall this analysis suggested that sensemaking at the senior official level is 
more positive than that observed at the first responder level.  Further, the data could 
suggest that senior level officials could benefit from better understanding the challenges 
of the first responders.  As discussed earlier in this subchapter, even the positive 
evaluations have unintended consequences in that they can create blind spots.   
Sensemaking Fukushima Only Case 
 In an attempt to determine whether a case-study approach provides a different 
perspective for this analysis, the researcher analyzed the Fukushima case against both 
sets of sensemaking elements 
The results suggest: 
 
 Positive evaluations – all of the Fukushima interviewees discussed the value of 
positive evaluations of sensemaking  
 Pessimism – the level of pessimism was consistent among interviewees 
 Pluralistic ignorance – the level of event misunderstanding was more significant 
for the first responder interviewees 
 Collective sensemaking – generally consistent among interviewees 
 Optimistic bias – this was stronger for the first responder level suggesting that the 
first responders were more hopeful than the senior officials 
 Institutional effect – this was consistent among interviewees 
 Updating – interestingly, the first responder interviewees were more likely to 
mention the need to update their understanding of the situation.  Perhaps, this was 
because they had more information about the local conditions than the senior 
officials were aware of about the local conditions 
 Doubt – again, the first responders were more likely to build doubt into their 
situational (sensemaking) analysis 
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 Emotional – as expected, emotional assessments were more likely among the first 
responder interviewees 
 
 From my analysis of the second set of sensemaking elements, i.e., commitment, 
identity, and expectations, there were inconclusive results.  There were references to each 
of the three sensemaking elements in the interviews.  Again, this analysis suggested that a 
more individualistic approach is needed to assess these elements.   
In-crisis versus Post-crisis Analysis 
 All quotations were assessed to determine if the interviewee was reflecting on his 
comment as being part of an ―in-crisis‖, situation i.e., during the crisis, or a ―post-crisis‖ 
scenario, or even making rhetorical reflections.  Also, for the national leaders, i.e., 
Situation Room leaders, an attempt was made to determine if their reflections were based 
upon actual experiences or if they were post-hoc. 
 Generally, the interviewees who were the first responders reflected their 
comments as being made with reference to ―in-crisis‖ situations rather than post-hoc 
ones.  For those interviewees who were not first responders, their reflections were 
generally post-hoc or post crisis.  These results are not surprising and therefore offer little 
value in advancing this portion of the literature.  
Summary of Sensemaking 
 The data suggested that the actual event cases reflected more emotion in terms of 
sensemaking by the first responders than the senior level officials did in the non-event 
cases.  There were inconclusive results regarding the second set of sensemaking 
elements, i.e., commitment, identity, and expectations.  Also, there were inconclusive 
results for ―in crisis‖ and ―post crisis‖ reflections by interviewees.  Similarly, the 
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Fukushima case analysis did provide some insights on multilevel sensemaking; however, 
the overall results seemed consistent with the ―all data‖ events.  The implications of these 
results on an integrated model of extreme event leadership are incorporated into Chapter 
5.   
Decision-making 
Analysis 
 An analysis of the interviewees‘ quotations associated with decision-making is 
provided in this subchapter.  The researcher discusses the individual decision-making 
concepts raised in the interviews after describing the qualitative process.  From that 
discussion comes a set of second-order codes (Gioia et al. 2012) that provide the 
foundation for the third-order (Gioia et al. 2012) codes and associated literature review as 
will be seen in Chapter 5.   
 As a preview, the data reflected nine fundamentals of decision-making which 
have been deduced from the interviews.  These nine fundamental precepts are essentially 
the bottom-up review of the data.  Regarding the literature link, i.e., the top-down 
analysis (Gioia et al., 2012), the second-order coding raised in this subchapter suggested 
that there are additional literature streams that were not covered in Chapter 2 that should 
be considered when discussing the results.  These additional literature streams include the 
literature associated with naturalistic decision-making, recognition primed decisions, and 
macrocognition.  Consistent with the process described by Gioia et al. (2012) the results 
of this analysis, which have been used in Chapter 5, were used to build upon the existing 
literature streams.   
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 Many interviewees discussed the factors associated with decision-making.  Each 
interview quotation was coded with regard to the essential factor(s) that drove the 
decision or the indecision.  Consistent with the process, these codes were linked together 
to create a network analysis of the overall decision-making structure.  Figure 10 – 
Decision-making Network depicts that coding structure.  Ultimately there were nine 
codes reflecting 89 direct quotations regarding decision-making.  Associated with those 
nine codes are a set of sub-codes. Specifically for two codes (decision_making_anchoring 
and decision_making_indecision), the researcher provided a set of sub-codes which were 
consolidated into the higher-order codes.  The sub-codes are discussed here.   
 Decision-making is one of the six crisis concepts identified in subchapter 4.2.  As 
shown in Figure 10, there are nine factors that are parts of the decision-making structure.  
In the next paragraphs, the researcher discusses each of those nine factors.  For the two 
codes that include sub-codes, the researcher discusses them as well.  There is no 
particular hierarchy for these factors; therefore, the order of discussion is not germane.   
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Figure 10 - Decision-making Network 
 
 
 
Decision-making – Indecision 
 Interviewees talked about indecision in extreme event situations.  These 
quotations were coded as ―decision_making_indecision‖.  This is one of the two codes 
which include sub-codes.  There are four sub-codes as a part of indecision.  Figure 11 – 
Indecision Code Network depicts this sub-network structure.   
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Figure 11 – Indecision Code Network  
 
 
 
 The factors that influenced indecision are depicted in Figure 11.  These included 
instances where there was a lack of leadership, a personal fear of the hazard involved, a 
general fear of the uncertainty and consequences of the decision, or a lack of information 
needed to make the decision.  Examining these sub-codes exposed an interesting concept 
around indecision based upon uncertainty and fear of the consequences of the decision.  
According to the network analysis, both sub-codes of lack of leadership and lack of the 
proper information are common root causes for indecision.  Thus, as a focus on the two 
sub-codes of fear, the researcher presents the following examples of quotations to provide 
insights into these unique root causes. 
 Some interviews discussed instances where decision-makers were fearful of the 
hazard involved in the event and that this fear resulted in indecision by that decision-
maker.  An example quotation:  ―Their fear of the radiological environment took me 
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aback in this instance and began to affect some of their decisions within the first, I'd say, 
few days‖.  (Ref. RW an on-scene leader). 
 In this instance some leaders were hesitant to lead through a radioactive event.  
This fear affected their decision-making abilities.  In another instance, a leader 
recognized this and suggested that those leaders step aside, if they could not overcome 
their fears.  Clearly, some leaders were ineffective in their command, and the leader was 
offering a safe way out of the circumstances.  For this sub-code, the interesting concept 
was that of personal fear of a particular hazard and how that could affect leadership 
abilities.  This issue is discussed in subchapter 4.8 Leadership.  In a related sub-code, 
there were interviewees who discussed occasions of indecision based upon the decision-
maker‘s fear of the subsequent consequences for instance: 
 
Mr. M. argued for expanding the evacuation zone because the radiation 
monitoring system strongly indicated that they should go beyond, even beyond 30 
kilometers radius.  At that time, the Japanese government had expanded that 
radius to 30 kilometers.  When Mr. E. chaired that meeting with Mr. K., and Mr. 
M and several other people and Chief Risk Officer, Prime Minister‘s Officer, 
former metropolitan police agency chief and the others, they simply could not 
make a decision on as to what should do, what the government should do.  (Ref. 
YF.) 
 
 In this instance, the leaders were fearful of the panic that an expanded evacuation 
might cause; therefore, they were indecisive in making the decision about expanding the 
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evacuation zone.  This concept of indecisiveness is not new; however, the interviewees 
discussed the non-linear impact of indecision during extreme events.  This refers to the 
implications of not expanding the evacuation zone that diminished the level of trust by 
the people of the government.  It caused a disagreement with the Americans on the need 
to protect citizens (the Americans did decide to expand the American evacuation zone to 
50 kilometers).  Interviewees suggested that the leaders failed to consider the 
consequences of their indecision.  These concepts, i.e., fear of consequence, failure to 
consider the consequences of indecision, are considered here in the analysis of the 
decision-making literature.  The other issues, lack of leadership and less than adequate 
information, were considered in the literature review. 
Decision-making – Anchoring 
 Anchoring of decision-making is another code that consists of sub-codes.  Figure 
12 – Decision-making Anchoring, depicts the sub-codes such as: growing fact base, 
anchoring fact based, failure due to incorrect facts, formal authority, rule-based decisions, 
more facts not always better, and some facts must be sacrificed.  These sub-codes are 
explained below.  
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Figure 12 – Decision-making Anchoring
 
  
 Many interviewees discussed the need to anchor decisions in facts.  Those 
discussions included suggestions regarding the non-linearity of extreme events, the need 
to base decisions in fact, the downsides of facts in decision-making, the authority 
structure for decisions, and the need to grow the fact base (updating and doubt as 
discussed in the subchapter on situational awareness). 
 One interviewee (RW) discussed his insight that many of the decisions made 
during the Fukushima event seemingly were rule-based decisions.  He suggested that 
with extreme events the decision-makers made conservative decisions that were within 
the rule base, but when there was an extreme event that could not be the basis for the 
decision.  He suggested that the ―whole decision set changes and you have to recognize 
that you are in that, that you‘re now the leader inside that scope of change‖.  (Ref. RW.) 
 Non-linearity of decision-making is an interesting concept that is explored in the 
crisis decision-making literature review later in Chapter 5.  In a related discussion, 
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interviewee RW discussed the need to overcome the consequences of decisions and act 
regardless of those consequences even to the point of sacrificing some people.  He stated:  
 
You likely will have to, and when you say risk, it can be life or death. It can be 
potential injury.  It can just be putting them in an extreme situation that isn't going 
to kill them, but nonetheless it's going to stress them and you're making a decision 
to do that because it has to be done.  You have to do it. (Ref. RW)  Note: 
Interviewee RW is a military commander.  Throughout the interviews, his attitude 
of sacrificing some people for the greater good permeated the differences between 
civilian leaders and military commanders.   
 
 Regarding the use of formal authority for decision-making, there were a number 
of different concepts discussed by the interviewees.  In two cases, the interviewees 
believed that they were the last decision-makers standing; therefore, they made the 
decisions regardless of their decision-making authority.  The clearest instance of this 
thinking came from a leader in the control room at Fukushima.  His thought was: 
 
When I was a young operator, I remember this shift supervisor was saying that 
when you were in that position, you were the final decision-maker. However, 
when I really had that situation, I did so not because I remembered that, but 
probably because my instinct told me to do so. At that moment on that day, 
although I had my senior supervisor next to me, I was the supervisor of the day; I 
was the last person of last resort. It is not something I learned from someone, but 
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more like Bushido (the spirit of the samurai). I have read a lot of Bushido related 
books. Basically, I had a feeling that I had to take the responsibility to be the last 
person to last resort. Therefore, in the main control room, I was the decision-
maker. I think that was the basic thought in mind. I can‘t explain what that was 
based on words.  (Ref. IZ.) 
 
 What is interesting in the quotation above is that the operator based his authority 
upon his instincts.  As noted in other subchapters, the instinctual emotion appears in a 
number of these extreme events.  Another example of authority-based decision-making 
comes from a Situation Room leader: 
 
The distance from the facility where the Japanese said 20 kilometers and we said 
50 miles. I remember that day where the president asked the chairman and others, 
he said, ‗What would we do if that happens here in the United States?‘ Everybody 
said, ‗This is the advice we would give our citizens.‘  He said, ‗That‘s the advice 
we need to give in Japan.‘ The rub was it wasn‘t the advice that the Japanese 
government was giving to their people. The politics around that was necessarily 
complicated, but I think he made the right choice by just simply saying, ‗Let‘s not 
further complicate the decision. If this is the advice we‘d give our folks here, let‘s 
give our folks there the same advice,‘ which sounds really simple. It got really 
complicated.  The leadership lesson there is: do not try new tricks in the middle of 
a dance that the processes and everything from the regulations and all of that that 
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we use here on a daily basis can apply overseas when it comes to protection of the 
American public. Once we settled in on that, it got less complicated.  (Ref. RR.) 
  
 Two powerful insights come from this quotation.  First, as discussed under the 
sub-code ―fear of consequences‖ as the Japanese were indecisive in their decision-
making for Fukushima evacuations, the Americans moved forward even in the face of 
uncertainty.  As stated, moving forward in the face of uncertainty caused major 
complications, e.g., international disagreements.  The above quotation implies that the 
Americans did resort to rule-based decision-making.  Second, is the insight from the 
interviewee that decision-makers should not ‗try new tricks in the middle of the dance.‘ 
(Ref. RW) 
 The last four sub-codes all involve fact-based decision-making.  Interviewees 
discussed the need for fact-based decision-making while speaking also about updating 
and doubt in decision-making.  Further, there was one caution raised that more facts were 
not necessarily better for decision-making.  In that context, a Situation Room leader said, 
 
My whole point to that whole thing is decision-making in the immediate 
aftermath of a bad event is difficult, and you‘re doing it oftentimes with less than 
full information. Decision-making during the recovery phase of an event and 
Fukushima is another good example is equally difficult and complicated. You 
would think that with more information comes more clarity. Sometimes more 
information comes more confusion which is counterintuitive.   It‘s like golf that 
way; the harder you swing, the less far the ball goes. It doesn‘t make sense. It is 
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an important point. I‘m not sure how to characterize it for you other than to say 
most people don‘t see it that way. You think with clarity comes precision. Not 
necessarily.  (Ref. RR.) 
 
 With regard to fact-based decision-making, one interviewee, a former Attorney 
General and Governor, stressed the importance of interrogating the facts and the source 
of facts.  He was adamant about the need to keep pace with the facts when making 
decisions.  A first responder during the Three Mile Island event characterized the leader‘s 
dedication to the facts as: 
 
I felt I was being interrogated when we started, what‘s the basis for this, because 
he was interested in just the facts.  He didn‘t want opinions.  He wanted to know 
what the facts are and I‘m willing to make the hard decisions.  You tell me the 
facts and I guess, I realized or he made it clear that under our constitution, the 
governor is the one who can declare a state emergency, not the N.R.C. can, and 
we don‘t have any troopers or anything out there.  (Ref. HD.) 
 
 In sum, the code of ―indecisions_anchoring‖, raises a number of theoretical issues 
to pursue in the literature review.  Those issues included anchoring decisions in facts, the 
non-linearity of decision-making, sacrificing some to save many (consequential 
indecision as discussed in the indecision code), decision authority (last person standing), 
and decision-making in the face of uncertainty, i.e., proceeding in the face of uncertainty.  
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These are important issues that suggest far reaching implications for the decision-making 
theories.   
Decision-making – Communications 
 A number of communications issues were raised by the interviewees.  Some of 
those issues have been discussed in other subchapters, i.e., there are some co-occurrences 
with regard to communications.  These co-occurrences include quotations involving 
communicating the reality of the situation to the public (Ref. OD), and communicating 
expectations to the public regarding their own resilience (Ref. CF & RR).  The issues not 
discussed previously include the importance of communicating expectations quickly, 
seamless communications, and the differences in communications among different 
governmental structures.  Specific examples in this regard are provided below. 
 Rapid communication is important in conveying the President‘s expectations 
throughout the response structure (Ref. RR).  This same interviewee discusses the 
imperative of matching the speed of response to the speed of the event.  The need for 
alignment of rapid policy and communications was discussed extensively by interviewee 
RR.  A specific example is derived from a Situation Room leader interview: 
  
We struggle with that as part of the AAR (after action review) around hurricane 
Sandy.  Really it‘s just improving communication mechanisms so that, for 
instance, if the President convenes all of the key cabinet secretaries around a 
response that hits the most populated area of the United States.  We have got to be 
able to communicate the decisions that are being made in those high level 
meetings quickly down through a system that allows people to understand the 
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intent at the highest level of the government, all the way down to those people 
who are out there aiding as a result of the incident.  (Ref. RR.) 
 
 Another area of concern raised in the interviews focused on the need for seamless 
communication.  As maintained by interviewee OD who worked both in the Situation 
Room and the Red Cross, there was a specific need to value prior relationships to 
improve communications: 
 
After the actual framing of the messages and the decisions that have to be made 
around what will and what won‘t be shared.  That‘s going to be very dependent 
upon the organization and agency that you‘re working for.  That is always a very 
delicate conversation, whether it‘s here at the American Red Cross, over at the 
National Security staff, or even at the FEMA level.  It‘s critically important that 
the relationship between the disaster management and the external 
communications press or communications department is seamless.  It‘s not 
establishing relationships on the day the event happens.  This is something that 
has been rehearsed, practiced, thought through, well in advance of the disaster.  
(Ref. OD.) 
 
 Finally, the differences between the State government organizational structures 
require different communications strategies.  According to the interviewee, the decision-
makers must understand the differences between their situations and those of other 
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entities, and decision-makers must understand the situation as it exists on the ground.  
The specific quote is:  
 
The dynamics of New Jersey are different than the dynamics of New York. You 
saw that play up between Bloomberg and Cuomo. In New Jersey, Christie is the 
unitary executive. He most of those people in that state that have a position of 
leadership were appointed by him. There was no question who was making the 
decisions. On the other side of the street, when you look at New York and New 
York City, you realize that there was a tension between the mayor and the 
governor. When you look deeper into New York City, you realize that it wasn‘t 
just a city; it was actually five little cities that were all big.  You had high rise 
structures with no power and elderly people that couldn‘t get up and down the 
stairs. There was this lot of disparity around the boroughs in New York. Once we 
realize that we need to all treat those as separate entities. In other words to yes, 
absolutely work with the mayor but also work with the borough presidents 
because if you don‘t, the mayor may not either have the insight or the 
appreciation of the uniqueness of the needs.  (Ref. JH.) 
 
 Thus, for communicating the decisions, these interviewees highlight the following 
concepts as important considerations to be undertaken by decision-makers. These issues 
will be reviewed in the decision-making literature review.   
 
 Sharing reality 
 Communicating expectations 
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 The importance of communicating expectations quickly 
 The importance of seamless communications    
 The differences in communications among different governmental structures 
 
Decision-making – Escalation of Commitment 
 Interviewees raised three issues regarding ―escalation of commitment‖ as 
described in the literature (Parashevas, 2006).  Interviewees illustrated what appear to be 
examples of the theory of Escalation of Commitment.  One of the examples is consistent 
with the Path-dependence Model and the Escalation of Commitment.  The specific 
interview statements include: 
  
When considering Japan‘s energy situation, we needed to distinguish the 
Hamaoka plant from the other cases. I made sure probably three times that the 
Hamaoka was an exception, and that we were shutting down the plant for a 
technical reason. Prime Minister Kan said yes. We could not shut down other 
nuclear power plants in the same way as the Hamaoka. Because of the wrong 
decision on the Genkai, we had to face the Ohi nuclear plant debate. It is still 
going on. (Ref. GH.)   
 
That‘s really the power of how do you optimize the organization‘s capacity. Most 
people will tell you, ‗We‘ll just do the mission creep thing.‘ We start off as an 
organization that does things. Now we‘re doing everything under the sun which is 
the wrong approach because you‘re going to do it poorly. It‘s not sustainable.  
(Ref. RR.)   
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In a disaster, it is easy to get to this illusion that people that are victims need 
somebody to take care of them.  They need somebody to empower them and give 
them permission to take care of themselves.  (Ref. CF.)   
 
The concept of escalation of commitment will be pursued when reviewing the decision-
making literature in Chapter 5. 
Decision-making – Incorrect Basis 
 This code was created during the interviews when interviewees discussed 
situations where decisions were made for the wrong reasons.  Those reasons included a 
political bias, a role basis, (e.g., the Red Cross does not build houses (Ref. RR)), and the 
resilience of the victims/survivors, i.e., the need to see them as a source of help, not as 
victims.  All three of these quotations co-occur with other codes.  Thus, those quotations 
are not covered here but were incorporated with the co-occurring codes.  Even though 
this code could have been deleted, it was not dropped for purposes of 
completeness/integrity of this dissertation. 
Decision-making – Instinct 
 There were two direct quotations that referenced the need to use instinct in 
decision-making.  One of those quotations was from interviewee IZ, who discussed his 
position as the last person standing and his use of instinct in making decisions.  The issue 
of instinctual decision-making was discussed earlier and will be considered in Chapter 5.  
The second quotation that discussed the last person standing or instinctual decision-
making is attributed to RW who stated: 
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You may be the last man standing and take one for the Gipper, but you can never 
relent.  So how a leader, when he‘s getting fatigued, so this has gone long, the 
crisis seems to be out of my control, it‘s still the best decisions you can make.  
You‘re still prioritizing.  You‘re still trying to asses, figure out what you don‘t 
know, empower other people to lead because you‘re falling behind, whatever it is, 
and you do it until your dying breath.  That‘s what I believe and that is, I think, 
what the military probably tends to drill into most of us because of the combat 
circumstances, and the ground forces know this, so you fight on.  The concept of 
stopping, stop leading … I‘ve been overcome so I‘m going to stop leading … that 
is a non-starter.  (Ref. RW.) 
 
Decision-making – Inflexibility 
 There was one quotation coded as inflexibility in decision-making.  It was 
generated when reflecting on the response generated for Hurricane Katrina by a Situation 
Room leader.  He reflected on a concept mentioned by interviewee RW who stated that 
inside of an extreme event, rule based decision-making could be ineffective.  This 
specific quotation from the Situation Room leader was:  ―My sense of it and I wasn‘t 
directly involved in the Katrina response.  Just from an outsider‘s perspective, my sense 
was that this strict adherence to protocols and rules absent flexibility and making decision 
at the lowest level inhibited a flexible response.‖  (Ref. RR.)  This reflection was later 
incorporated into a new decision-making protocol by the Federal Government after 
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Hurricane Katrina.  Chapter 5 will address these new thoughts about decision-making 
through a revised literature review.   
Decision-making – Political Basis 
 Interviewees related instances where political involvement impacted extreme 
crisis decision-making.  There were five mentions of political influences in the 
interviews.  Three of the instances were related to Fukushima, one was related to 
Hurricane Katrina and another had to do with Super Storm Sandy. 
 In the Fukushima case, the political decisions discussed by interview GH 
mentioned the political involvement of the Prime Minister and his cabinet with regard to 
shutting down and operating the reactor after the Fukushima accident.  There was a 
concern that if they shut one reactor down (because of seismic concerns) then all 50 of 
the other reactors would have to shut down.  That scenario did occur and all of the 
reactors in Japan were shut down.  The issue set a precedent and was the first step in the 
path-dependence chain.  The path-dependence model has been discussed in this 
dissertation in Chapter 2. 
 The second case involving Hurricane Sandy was discussed by interviewee RR, 
who questioned the decision by the Governor of Louisiana to build an earthen berm in the 
Gulf of Mexico after Hurricane Katrina.  His challenge to that decision was based upon 
the poor engineering basis for the berm.  He suggested that it was a politically motivated 
decision.  In the end, RR‘s summation was that sometimes politics trumped good 
decision-making.  This is an issue to consider in the literature review; however, that 
summation is not unusual in decision-making, i.e., that politics plays a role.  
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Nevertheless, Mr. RR made a significant point regarding the political side of the 
decision-making equation when he stated: 
 
Then there‘s a political side to events. I never gave much thought to that, really 
didn‘t appreciate it a whole lot. In fact, I would tell you that most of my career, I 
always felt like, ―Sh*@, here we go. We‘ve got a 95% solution but now we‘re 
going to polish this thing until it‘s irrelevant on the political side‖.  After almost 
seven years over at the White House, I better understand it. I understand it has a 
part to play. You can weave those two pieces together; the technical and 
operational and the political pieces can all come together. It requires some level of 
maturity.  Looking over the pandemic to Haiti to the oil spill to Japan to Sandy, 
the reason Sandy went so well is we had all of that other stuff under our balance. 
I‘ve also focused on one another.  It‘s understanding less about them 
understanding me and more about me understanding them and building and 
spacing the dialogue to, ―Okay, let‘s talk to the operational piece and now let‘s 
get to the political piece. Now let‘s get to the economic piece.  Maybe there was a 
bit of an evolution on everybody‘s part where I understand the political side of it. 
I‘m not an expert in it. I don‘t necessarily like it that much. It has a role to play. 
You‘ve got to carve out that space because if you don‘t it will just steamroll you 
and they‘ll make less better decisions.  (Ref. RR.) 
 
 The final mention of political influence in decision-making was related by 
interviewee RR who discussed the impact of the upcoming Presidential elections during 
207 
 
the country‘s recovery from Super Storm Sandy and the distraction that the elections 
caused in the State and the Federal response.  The decision to build and staff polling 
locations was made at the Presidential level.  The interviewee stated, ―That election, the 
relative timing of the election in the event to your point added a layer of complexity we 
wouldn‘t have otherwise seen. We wouldn‘t have to make those decisions‖. (Ref. RR.)  
Again, these types of political decisions are not unique; however, in terms of extreme 
event leadership, this instance appears to be an example, as discussed in Chapter 2, of 
social or political justice trumping technical justice.  That is, the social concerns (voting) 
overrode the needs for a technical response and caused a distraction from the extreme 
event‘s perspective. 
Decision-Making – Gestalt Structure 
 During the interviews, there was one reference to establishing a ―Gestalt 
structure‖ for decision-making by Mr. RR, a Situation Room leader.  Also, there were 
other interviewees who described a decision-making structure without explicitly 
discussing a ―structure‖ or method.  Mr. RR described a national government response 
structure that focused on coordination of the responsible entities.  He explained that 
during the Haiti earthquake response, the United States had to modify or adapt its 
structure to fit the Haitian circumstances.  Specifically, Mr. RR, stated in part: 
 
Haiti was a little different than the pandemic but from a leadership perspective it 
was the same it was so to get there, assess, you know, all the gestalt of everything 
you had and then figure out what is the best way to optimize and it turned on 
Haiti, given that it was a sovereign nation and given that there different 
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organizations have different relationships what I thought we can effectively was 
to say here‘s a structure which everybody can have a role to play and we help 
manage that structure until the point that it became sustaining on its own.  We 
really remain an active participant where necessarily, not leading it anymore.  
(Ref. RR.) 
 
 In relating these points Mr. RR provided another example with the response to the 
damage done by Hurricane Katrina.  His point is that a decision-making structure was 
important and it was important to assess the specific situation and adapt the decision-
making structure to that situation.  Thus, the points to consider with the literature review 
in mind relate to having a structure and adapting that structure as necessary to the 
circumstances.   
 
If you went by the book, you said, ‗Yup, we did steps one through five and yet we 
got people starving in the Super Dome‘.  How do you explain that? Flexibility is 
the key. I tell my people here all the time that, ‗Our job according to our mission 
statement is to reduce suffering in the face of disasters.‘ You do that in a variety 
of ways. It depends on who is suffering from what and how do you best fix it or at 
least address it.  (Ref. RR.) 
  
There were a few other points made during the interviews that are not included in the 
above quotations.  However, many of them co-occurred therefore they were discussed at 
least on some level.  Those isolated points may be summarized as: 
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 Do not try new tricks in the middle of the game (Ref. RR.) 
 The differences in decision-making structure between New York and New Jersey 
(Ref. RR.) 
 Like golf, swing hard does not mean better with regard to the quantity of facts 
(Ref. RR.) 
 Treating victims as survivors and having them assist in the decision structure 
(Ref. GF.) 
 The need to establish a decision-making model early on in the event (Ref. RR.) 
 Adaptation of that model where necessary, i.e., flexibility (Ref. OD) 
 Acknowledging the political realities of the situation (Ref. OD) 
 
Summary of Decision-Making  
 A number of decision-making concepts are discussed here in Chapter 4 that were 
not discussed in Chapter 2.  These concepts should be considered and pursued in another 
review of the literature.  Thus, the discussion on decision-making in Chapter 5 
incorporates these third-order decision-making concepts raised here in Chapter 4 into the 
decision-making literature.  Also, that additional decision-making literature review will 
give a focus on those concepts that are especially applicable to extreme events.  In 
summarizing the interviews from this subchapter on decision-making, the issues and 
second-order concepts include: 
  
 Fear of consequence and the failure to consider the consequences of indecision 
 Anchoring decisions in facts 
 Non-linearity of decision-making in extreme events 
 Sacrificing some to save many (consequential decision-making) 
 Decision authority (last person standing) or instinctual decision-making 
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 Decision-making in the face of uncertainty (proceeding in the face of uncertainty) 
 Communicating expectations, sharing reality, communicating seamlessly, the 
importance of communicating expectations quickly, and acknowledging the 
differences in communications among different governmental structures 
 Escalation of commitment and path dependence models 
 Establishment and flexibility of an appropriate decision-making structure 
 Acknowledgement of political realities including social justice concerns 
 
Leadership 
 Leadership was one of the most important concepts identified in this dissertation.  
During the interviews there were hundreds of quotations associated with leadership.  
Those quotations reflected good and bad leadership examples.  The goal of this 
subchapter is to analyze the leadership quotations in a bottom-up approach to identify 
those leadership concepts that are uniquely applicable to extreme events.  Interviewees 
discussed many typical leadership concepts e.g., encouragement of workers, or the 
importance of leader mastery.  In this dissertation, it is important to discover which 
leadership concepts were the most important in these extreme events and how those 
leadership concepts were influenced and how they influenced the outcome of the extreme 
event.  This subchapter is intended to provide insights that might extend the literature 
discussed in Chapter 2 or discover new territories of leadership.    
Analysis 
 With regard to leadership, I conducted a detailed analysis of the interviews.  In the 
aggregate, the perspective of all events indicates that the leader‘s level of (in)experience 
is the largest contributor to the interview codes.  After (in)experience is ranked the 
leader‘s personality and character, leader mastery and leader trust are the most significant 
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leadership codes.  Interviews indicate that the other leadership codes, e.g., age, 
perfection, etc., are much less significant.   
 An analysis of the data suggests that the leader‘s level of ―(in)experience‖ has a 
significant effect on the results.  It is interesting that the code ―sensemaking‖ does not 
appear as an associated code of ―(in)experience‖.  The absence of the sensemaking code 
could imply that without experience, sensemaking becomes more difficult.  Another 
interesting code that does appear as an associate code of ―(in)experience‖ and that is the 
code of ―(in)effectiveness‖.  This inclusion of (in)effectiveness relating to (in)experience 
could imply that (in)experience is directly related to (in)effectiveness in extreme events.  
 On the other hand, in the code association with the ―personality and character‖ 
code, the two codes of ―crisis command‖ and ―felt emotions‖ are highly associated.  This 
could imply that a leader‘s personality and character are directly coupled with his/her 
ability to command and reaction to felt emotions during an extreme event.  Also, 
(in)experience, trust and (in)effectiveness are coupled together implying a direct 
relationship between those leadership concepts.  Finally, sensemaking is reasonably un-
associated with the leader‘s personality and character.  However, it must be stated that 
interviewees did mention the concepts of leader, personality, experience, trust, and 
effectiveness more during their discussions as compared to sensemaking.   
Leadership Perspective – Events 
 As a significant insight from the interviews, it appears from the data that each 
event suggests a unique set of leadership traits.  The data indicates that for each event, 
interviewees discussed separate leadership traits that were important for that event.  I 
disaggregated the data on leadership between the events, i.e., Fukushima, Three Mile 
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Island and Deepwater Horizon, the Situation Room and other interviews.  Clearly, the 
largest number of quotations regarding leadership is derived from the Fukushima and 
Deepwater Horizon events which eclipse all the other interviews in terms of leadership 
quotations.  Further, each event and the Situation Room interviews result in unique 
models of leadership.  While similar situational influences apparently exist, each set of 
interviews resulted in differences in the significance of the leadership concepts; therefore, 
each event was reviewed separately to discover the important leadership concept for that 
unique event.   
 In the Deepwater Horizon event, the interviews indicated that (in)experience and 
mastery were the two most significant leadership traits discussed by the interviewees.  An 
analysis of the codes was completed.  That analysis found that leader (in)experience is 
the most insightful of the codes for Deepwater Horizon.  The results implied that there 
was significant impact from the felt emotions associated with the event, significant 
inexperience of the leaders, little mastery of the safety procedures, and significant 
unawareness of the conditions.  In the Fukushima event, the interviews indicated that: 
 
 As in the Deepwater Horizon event, the felt emotions dominated the leadership 
code in their influence on the leader. 
 Leaders needed to be perceptive but not overly involved in solution finding. 
 Leaders under normal conditions were not necessarily good crisis leaders – some 
high-risk organizations would perhaps not consider this factor. 
 Leaders, especially first responders, would need to be strong against interference 
– engendering respect, trust, and admiration (also possessed strong mastery and 
leadership skills). 
 Leaders would be required to be emotional – to the point of admonishing 
subordinates when required. 
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 Some leaders lost focus because of weariness and frustration. 
 Some operators expressed disappointment in their leader‘s reaction, and this 
disappointment led to a loss of confidence in the leaders. 
 Aggressiveness, skills, physical and mental fitness were deemed important 
leadership traits. 
 Strong mastery and calmness led to leader credibility. 
 First responder leaders displayed calmness and acts of humility. 
 Leaders assumed full responsibility for mistakes of everyone and expressed this 
claim. 
 Interviewee felt embarrassed for a peer leader regarding that peer leader‘s 
ineffective decision-making (the interviewee did not want to criticize his 
colleague‘s performance). 
 Leaders who were compassionate were effective. 
 Leaders who had strong personalities and character were effective. 
 Leaders may change personalities under stress. 
 
Summary of Leadership 
 A series of analyses for each of the events was completed  As diagnosed, each 
event revealed a unique modality of leadership.  This implies that extreme event 
leadership is variable and based upon the situation.  Refer to the discussion in the 
decision-making and sensemaking subchapters, which maintain that extreme events can 
involve non-linear leadership thinking.  This diagnosis was not surprising given the 
specifics provided in these subchapters.  First, the researcher diagnoses an overall 
perspective of leadership for all of the events and then, breaks down the leadership 
modality for each event.  Ultimately, the researcher diagnoses the events to determine the 
unique leadership modalities.  
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 An analysis of the interview data in suggested that the leader‘s level of 
(in)experience has a significant effect on the data concerned.  Closely ranked and 
following (in)experience are the leader‘s personality and character, leader mastery and 
leader trust.  Interviews indicate that the other leadership codes, e.g., age, perfection, etc., 
are much less significant.   
 My literature review related to leadership suggested that future researchers could 
investigate the relationships between leadership and the threshold effect, instinct, 
transboundary effects, locus of leadership, role of felt emotions, and comparisons with 
dangerous military contexts.  These constructs and the insights garnered from this 
subchapter are discussed in Chapter 5, as are all six of the crisis concepts derived through 
the process mentioned by Gioia et al. (2012).   
Integrated Summary of Results and Implications 
Integrated Results 
 There were six major (third-order) crisis concepts identified from interviews 
conducted for this dissertation.  Those six crisis concepts included: (1) felt emotions, (2) 
situational context, (3) crisis response, (4) sensemaking, (5) decision-making, and (6) 
leadership.  By far, the concept of felt emotions was discussed the most by the 
interviewees.  Some interviewees faced unfathomable conditions, and as a result, their 
interviews were dominated by discussions of their feelings and the consequences of those 
feelings on their sensemaking, crisis response, decision-making, and leadership abilities.  
Therefore, there was significant co-occurrence between these concepts throughout the 
interviews.  This was especially the case for the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon 
events; however, all interviews contained some discussion of felt emotions.  Interviews 
215 
 
indicated that the felt emotions included: panic/calmness, awareness, success, heroism, 
hopefulness, humor, optimism, outrage, skepticism, and trust.  The results indicated that 
the levels of felt emotion were related to the extremeness of the events and the situational 
contexts both of which influenced these individuals‘ abilities or inabilities to respond.  
 Interviewees related that the situational context challenged the in-situ readiness of 
the organization and its leaders immensely.  Further, the non-linearity of the 
unfathomable conditions significantly tested their resilience and their abilities to execute 
leadership tasks, e.g., sensemaking.  Data from this sub-chapter confirmed the importance 
of sensemaking as an element of extreme event leadership.  These results generally 
suggested that the Fukushima and Three Mile Island events had more positive 
interviewee-reflections regarding sensemaking than the Deepwater Horizon case; 
nevertheless, data suggested that the actual event cases reflected more emotions regarding 
sensemaking from the first responders.  There were inconclusive results regarding some 
sensemaking elements, e.g., commitment, identity, and expectations.  A deep analysis of 
the Fukushima case analysis did provide some insights on multilevel sensemaking; 
however, the overall results are consistent with the ―all data‖ events analyzed. 
 With regard to crisis response theories, the results indicated that the sub-codes 
related to procedures, logistics, and prioritization were significant factors in terms of 
event response.  The conclusions provided evidence that confirmed several crisis 
theories. For some crisis theories, the limitations were confirmed and in several cases, the 
existing crisis theory was confirmed and extended.  There were several crisis theories that 
were confirmed or where gaps or the possibility for theory extensions were identified.     
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 Interviewees discussed their abilities and the importance of decision-making 
throughout the interviews.  Some of the issues and concepts that were raised included: 
anchoring decisions in facts, causes of in-decision, the non-linearity of decision-making 
in extreme events, decision-making, authorities for decision-making, communications of 
decisions, flexibilities needed in decision-making, escalation of commitment, and the 
need to acknowledge the political realities of the decisions.  As leaders, the interviewees 
reflected that each event revealed a unique modality of leadership.  Complicating the 
leadership factor was the amount of experience a leader possessed.   
Implications 
 Chapter 5 provides a thorough discussion of the implications of these results on 
an integrated model of extreme event leadership.  Overall, the non-linearity of these 
extreme events impacts almost all aspects of the crisis response.  In events where the 
situational context exceeds the organization‘s readiness and resilience, the leaders are 
faced with unique sensemaking, decision-making, and leadership contexts.  The interview 
results suggested a continuum of responses that relates to the non-linearity of the 
situation.  That is, as the event progresses, the leaders are capable of offering an effective 
response if the situation rests between their readiness and their resilience.  For instance, 
the Hurricane Katrina and the Three Mile Island events were within the abilities of the 
organizations concerned.  As the event progressed beyond these points, the influences of 
the felt emotions (uncertainty and unfathomable conditions) began to vary.  In the case of 
the Fukushima event, leaders were moderately effective up until the point when the 
reactors exploded.  After the reactors exploded, their ability to execute a crisis response 
dropped dramatically because of the influence of the leaders‘ felt emotions.  In the 
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Deepwater Horizon case, the situational context immediately exceeded the in-situ 
abilities and resilience of the organization; therefore, leadership efficacy and crisis 
response were minimal.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, the crisis response was 
essentially limited to an immediate evacuation.  At that point, the crew and leadership 
were functioning primarily from their survival instincts; therefore, Chapter 5 will focus 
on a review of instinctual decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
Overview 
 The goal of this Chapter is to merge the crisis management theories and the 
research results from Chapter 4 into an integrated model that describes the characteristics 
of extreme crisis leadership.  Because researchers tend to use single case studies as a 
research method for these types of phenomena, those case studies have generated useful 
but disparate crisis management theories (Chapter 1).  The research presented here 
considered a number of extreme events along with cross-case interviews to integrate 
crisis leadership theories into one integrated model of extreme crisis leadership.   
 Overall, the results suggest that extreme events are unique, non-linear, and 
abound with felt emotions that heavily influence a person‘s thoughts and behaviors.  
Results demonstrated this non-linearity in the six crisis concepts of situational context, 
felt emotions, decision-making, crisis response, sensemaking, and leadership.  Table 9 
below shows a general overview of the non-linearities in the crisis concepts.  In this 
Chapter, the discussion will develop the concepts depicted by the arrows in Table 9, step-
by-step, building on each other, and describe the non-linear thresholds ultimately 
culminating in an integrated model of crisis leadership.  For example, in column one of 
Table 9, the situational context crisis concepts has a continuum that ranges from 
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―fathomable‖, through a non-linear threshold of ―extreme‖ to the far end of the 
continuum called ―dangerous or unfathomable‖ events.   
 
Table 9 – Non-linearity of Extreme Events 
Situational 
Context 
Felt 
Emotion 
Decision-
making 
Sensemaking Crisis 
Management 
Leadership 
Routine 
(fathomable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subliminal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classical 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High reliability 
and Normal 
Accident 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readiness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extreme 
 
Supraliminal 
 
Naturalistic 
 
Macrocognition 
 
Elasticity 
 
Non-linear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dangerous 
(unfatho-
mable) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mortality 
Salience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational 
& 
Warrior 
ethos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational 
         & 
Warrior ethos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational 
        & 
Warrior ethos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational 
         & 
Warrior ethos 
 
 Each step of the discussion introduces and develops the integrated model of 
extreme crisis leadership.  Discussed first are three crisis concepts, i.e., situational 
context, felt emotions and decision-making, as these concepts emerged or developed 
extensively as a result of this research.  The crisis concept of ―situational context‖ 
emerged as a new organizing crisis concept not explicitly addressed in the previous 
literature, and it is discussed first.  The crisis concepts of felt emotions and decision-
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making yielded new insights that emerged from the grounded theory process beyond 
those discussed in Chapter 2 and thus require a deeper investigation and development of 
the corresponding literature.  Finally, the crisis concepts of sensemaking, crisis 
management, and leadership are also further discussed in terms of the new theoretical 
insights discovered in this research.   
Situational Context
24
 
 During the data collection process, there were many codes that captured the 
interviewees‘ discussions of the severity (scope and magnitude) of the event as well as 
their organization‘s readiness to cope with the severity of the event.  As data collection 
and analysis progressed, the third order code of ―situational context‖ was created to 
organize the relationship between the actual event severity and the corresponding in-situ 
coping readiness of the organization.  Thus, the code of situational context reflects 
whether an event is consistent with the organization‘s readiness, or whether the condition 
exceeds the organization‘s readiness. 
 The crisis concept of situational context consists of three significant categories: 
routine, extreme and dangerous.  The first category, ―routine events‖, comprises those 
events in which the organization can predict the event and has the in-situ ability to 
successfully respond, i.e., fathomable events.  This situation is consistent with the 
concept of readiness theory (Smits & Ezzat-Ally‘s, 2003), in that routine events are 
predictable and organizations can adequately prepare for them.  Included in the categories 
of routine events are ―resilience‖ events.  Resilience events exceed the predicted severity 
of the routine events; however, these types of events are fathomable (Wachtendorf, 
                                                          
24
 Situational context refers to the situation on the ground of the event.  It is a collection of interviewee quotations that describe the 
scope and magnitude of the event along with the in-situ response capability. 
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2009).  For resilience events, the organization can expand its abilities through external 
assistance such as mutual aid agreements to match the severity of the event.  These 
situations are consistent with the discussion of resilience theory (Korac-Kakabadse, et al., 
2002). 
The second category, ―extreme events‖, describes contexts where the severity of 
the event exceeds the fathomable.  Like resilience events, extreme events exceed the 
organization‘s in-situ ability to respond or expand its crisis capabilities to match the 
situation.  Unlike resilience events, extreme events, e.g., failure, catastrophic and super-
catastrophic, exceed the organization‘s ability to expand its crisis capabilities and reach 
into unfathomable conditions.  Several existing crisis management theories apply in 
extreme events, including surprise (Farazmand, 2009) and failure (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 
1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) theories.  Surprise and failure theories generally explain 
how organizations respond to extreme events; however, the results in Chapter 4 identified 
some new insights not currently covered by surprise and failure theories (those new 
insights are discussed below). 
The last category of the situational context is ―dangerous contexts‖ (Campbell, et 
al. 2010; Yammarino, et al. 2010).  Dangerous contexts include unfathomable events that 
greatly exceed the organization‘s abilities and include conditions where the life and death 
of those involved could be in jeopardy or where several extreme events combine into one 
context (Campbell, et al. 2010; Yammarino, et al. 2010), like the Japanese tsunami 2011 
and the Fukushima nuclear event.
25
  Table 10 shows the crisis concept of situational 
context including the categories of events. 
                                                          
25
 For purposes of refinement in this discussion, the dangerous contexts were subdivided into two categories.  One category includes 
situations where the leaders begin to fear for their lives and the other where loss of life is highly probable.  The reason for this 
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Table 10 – Continuum of Situational Context 
 
Situational Context 
Routine Readiness 
Resilience  
Extreme Surprise 
Failure 
Dangerous 
Contexts 
Catastrophic 
Super-
Catastrophic  
 
 
 Next is a general discussion of how the data for the code of situational context is 
or is not consistent with the extreme crisis events theories.  Generally, the results indicate 
consistency with the literature regarding routine events.  That is, routine events in this 
study tend to proceed as described in the literature.  Nevertheless, the interviews suggest 
that in the 21
st
 Century, new extreme events appear, e.g., H1N1 virus, cyber-attacks, and 
unique environmental catastrophes, e.g., floods in places where floods rarely occur, 
among others.  In fact, the data indicate that some extreme events are becoming 
increasingly ―normalized‖ as readiness strategies improve.  For instance, one interviewee 
talked about the normalization of some extreme events: 
 
It is like when we prepared to fight battles in nuclear battlefields, we don‘t have 
that doctrine now.  We will never go through a nuclear battlefield; we‘ll go 
                                                                                                                                                                             
subdivision is to explain better the consequences of felt emotions by leaders.  As discussed in the felt emotions section in this Chapter, 
in a situation where leaders fear death, the felt emotions related to ―death anxiety‖ influence the leader‘s thoughts and actions.  
Conversely, near-death situations are consistent with the felt emotion of ―mortality salience‖.  In the integrated crisis leadership 
model, these categories of extreme events are labeled as ―catastrophic‖ events and ―super-catastrophic‖ events respectively.  
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around it.  We just will say hey, you know there are other places to fight the 
battle, so we don‘t have that doctrine anymore.  In the same way, mutually 
assured destruction as an existential threat was something you had to avoid at all 
cost, and today, as you look at nuclear terrorism, you‘re looking at a really bad 
Katrina, a really bad Fukushima, a really bad Sandy, right.  It‘s not an existential 
threat anymore, so you think about these one percent events.  I think that‘s what 
… for those we‘re only at a half percent now.  I think that the landscape shifts.  
Ref. JB. 
 
 Therefore, as organizations learn, extreme events become more ―routine‖, with 
new extreme or even dangerous events created in different forms than in the past.  This 
phenomenon suggests an opportunity for organizations to consider both fathomable and 
unfathomable events in their crisis planning scenarios.  That is, once an organization 
normalizes its predicable events, it can begin to study events that may be beyond the 
fathomable, i.e. unfathomable.  This phenomenon of normalization of events and creation 
of new events provides an opportunity to expand the extreme crisis literature as well.  
The normalization of events and appearance of new events provides fresh case studies for 
researchers.  As the uniqueness and transboundary nature of events evolve, the crisis 
leadership literature should evolve along with these unique and transboundary events 
thereby improving the relevance of the literature.   
 Another insight from my study reveals that at the dangerous context level, the 
thoughts of the leaders can be dominated by supporting their workers‘ wellbeing.  This 
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emotional domination of the leaders‘ thoughts was especially evident in the Deepwater 
Horizon and Fukushima events.  For instance, in the Fukushima case: 
 
 Mr. Y, was very, very careful about the work allowed in Unit 3.  Even when we 
have a very small change of status, like the reactor pressure, he asked us to stop 
the work and to call back to the Emergency Response Center.  We repeated a 
promise to do this. Fortunately, the explosion of the Unit 3 ... When the explosion 
in Unit 3 occurred, probably 30/40/50 people were around the reactor ... I don‘t 
know the exact number.  Fifty people, maybe about 50 people were working 
around Unit 3.  It was a terrible moment for me.  That TV conversation, or the 
conference system, the DVD shows me putting my hands on my head.  My 
feeling at that moment was that I could be a martyr.  So many people were 
working. Mr. Y immediately started asking us to ask them to come back.  And 
people who came back had really the pale ... Some of them were bleeding.  Ref. 
IN.  
 
 Thus, it appears from my study that there is an opportunity to expand the surprise 
(Farazmand, 2009) and failure (Reason, 1997; Sagan, 1994; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
theories by including the significant felt emotional impacts revealed in this study.  In 
particular, at the dangerous context category of extreme events, where life and death 
situations influence the leaders‘ thoughts and emotions, surprise and failure theories that 
focus on creating predictable leadership outcomes can benefit from considering the felt 
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emotions of the leaders.  This life and death phenomenon is discussed in detail in the felt 
emotions subchapter below.   
 In sum, I created the concept of situational context as an organizing code to 
capture the severity of the event and the capability of the organization to respond.  For 
routine events, the results indicate that the factors involved in each situational context 
studied here were consistent with the literature.  At the extreme event categories, 
interviewees discussed the ―normalization‖ of extreme events into routine events, and the 
creation of new forms of extreme and dangerous context events.  Finally, my study 
reveals that at the dangerous context end of the situational context continuum, felt 
emotions often dominate the leaders‘ thoughts and actions.   
 Next is a discussion of the first of two expanded crisis concepts (felt emotions and 
decision-making) that emerged from the data analysis and that require further review of 
the literature.  This literature expansion was necessary to better understand the 
implications of the data.  First is a discussion of felt emotions.  The data indicated that for 
extreme and dangerous contexts, felt emotions heavily influenced the other concepts, e.g., 
decision-making, crisis management, sensemaking and leadership.  The literature review 
in Chapter 2 discussed felt emotions; however, the data in my study, especially those 
interviewee quotations related to death anxiety and mortality salience, indicated that a 
deeper understanding of these concepts is needed in order to more fully explain the 
results.   
 Also, as each extreme crisis concept is developed, I begin to build the integrated 
model of extreme crisis leadership.  For each extreme crisis concept, I explain its 
associated continuum, including any non-linearities and describe various other 
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characteristics of the continuum.  For each crisis concept Table 10 is updated to show this 
continuum and is carried forward to the next extreme crisis concept to step-by-step build 
the integrated extreme crisis leadership model.   
Felt Emotions 
 The results of this study show that there were many quotations that reflected the 
interviewees‘ discussions of their felt emotions26 and the effect of felt emotions on the 
interviewees‘ leadership abilities.  As this research progressed, the concept of felt 
emotions expanded considerably from that considered in my initial literature review.  For 
instance, in the extreme and dangerous context events that I studied, there were 707 
quotations related to felt emotions.  Thus, for those contexts, felt emotions dominated all 
of the other crisis concepts, particularly decision-making, leadership, crisis management, 
and sensemaking.  
 The continuum of felt emotions (see Table 11
27
) ranged from thoughts of success 
to worries about impending death i.e., mortality salience.  Organizations generally plan 
for routine events; therefore, the leaders‘ felt emotions are subliminal thoughts of 
impending success during routine events.  As a result, leaders‘ thoughts remain mostly 
positive.  If an event exceeds the routine or the fathomable, then subliminal feelings of 
skepticism emerge.  For example, in the Three Mile Island case, one interviewee stated, 
―Our skepticism was established very early on so that this carried through all of the 
events that transpired over the next week or 10 days that we were very careful to examine 
everything‖. Ref. DT.  In the resilience category of events, feelings of skepticism are 
                                                          
26
 Extant research discusses how emotions, especially ―felt‖ emotions, can be detrimental to cognitive thought, especially in 
sensemaking (Shrivastava, et al. 1988).  Weick (1995) argues that felt emotion, which comes from arousal, influences cognitive 
ability. 
27
 Throughout the discussion of the six crisis concepts, the continuums from the previous crisis concepts are included and shaded in 
the Tables to facilitate the development of an integrated model.   
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generally subliminal.  As the event severity progresses beyond the organization‘s ability 
to respond or expand their response, felt emotions, e.g., failure, death anxiety or mortality 
salience, often transition from subliminal to supraliminal (Table 11).    
 As a result of interviews from this research, it is clear that for some events, the 
threat of impending death was a significant factor in the extreme events considered.  
Thus, death-related anxiety is worthy of study for extreme crisis leadership.  From the 
associated literature, it is concluded that the level of a person‘s cognition changes 
depending on their awareness of a threat (Yanagisawa, et al. 2013).  When thoughts of 
threats are subliminal, the subconscious mind seeks out positive emotions and thoughts to 
offset these subliminal thoughts.  When subliminal, slightly positive emotions become 
more positive and the individual gathers positive thoughts as an ―antidote‖ to fear (Beck, 
1985).  In reality, the mind attempts to block out negative thoughts (Yanagisawa, et al. 
2013).  Research shows that through this collection of positive thoughts, the mind 
broadens its cognition (Beck 1985).   
 Once the thoughts about threats reach supraliminal awareness, the mind narrows 
its focus, although the amount of cognitive narrowing varies by individual (Fredrickson, 
2003).  Even the mere thought of death has a significant impact on cognition (Hayes et 
al., 2010).  These impacts are studied extensively in research associated with mortality 
salience, death association, anxiety-buffer threat, and dispositional effects.   
  
Table 11 - Continuum of Felt Emotions 
Situational 
Context 
Felt Emotion 
Routine Success 
(Subliminal) 
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Resilience  Skepticism 
(Subliminal) 
Surprise Unawareness 
(Supraliminal)  
Failure Failure  
(Supraliminal) 
Catastrophic  Death anxiety  
(Supraliminal) 
Super-
Catastrophic  
Mortality 
salience  
(Supraliminal) 
 
For example, in the Fukushima case, when the situation exceeded the organization‘s 
ability to cool the reactors, the interviews reflected indications of unawareness or failure.  
At that point, the felt emotions (failure) of the leaders became supraliminal: 
 
When the explosion occurred at Unit 1, we hadn‘t established sea-water injection; 
because fresh water was very limited.  So the explosion occurred.  We were very 
surprised.  We could not find out what happened.  Because we felt only one very 
significant jolt, radical jolt, and nothing more, normally, when we have an 
aftershock, one big jolt and then a series of jolts; but this time, only one single 
jolt.  So we start to say, ―What happened?‖  Someone started saying it was an 
explosion of main generator, because main generator contains hydrogen.  Another 
person started saying it was an explosion of hydrogen cylinders, to make up the 
hydrogen to the generator.  Then we watched NHK, national TV program 
monitor, and we found the reactor building, was a kind of skeleton.  Still, I said, 
―What is that?‖ Still, I didn‘t believe, or I could not believe ...Then the TV 
monitor showed the moment of explosion, so we were forced to believe. The full 
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or entire Emergency Center suddenly became very silent, and people were 
looking at their feet. 
 
 This is the point where the surprise and failure theories can benefit by considering 
the felt emotions of leaders during events, which begin to exceed the in-situ capability of 
the organization.  For example, surprise management theory research suggests 
(Farazmand, 2009) that ‗surprise management‘ requires: ―extensive, specialized and 
rigorous training in various techniques with harshest conditions, strategies, tactics, and 
scenarios; decision-making under stress and system breakdown conditions; practices that 
signal the need for dealing with ‗impossibilities‘; and surprises that would only surprise 
the non-experts‖ (p. 408).  My research suggests that surprise management also requires 
the abilities of leaders to face and to control their felt emotions during extreme events.  
Expanding these theories to include the effects of felt emotions might allow for earlier 
termination of extreme event if leaders are prepared in advance to accommodate their felt 
emotions.  As example, in the Super Storm Sandy case, a State Police Colonel (JH) 
expressed the need to consider all the factors of intelligence in leading emergency 
response: 
 
I find that in some cases the communications is not fluid, the intelligence is not 
favorable, the delivery of information is not timely and that culminates in one‘s 
inability to then manage and control, not only information but in some cases, the 
operation, i.e., to get out in front of it all and a source for concern.  It‘s 
intelligence-led management at its finest and the ability to articulate that concisely 
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and efficiently to all members that would ultimately be impacted, albeit a member 
of first response community or a member that could become a victim or survivor 
of the event. 
 
 In the ―dangerous context‖ category of events, i.e., catastrophic or super-
catastrophic, the results demonstrate significant felt emotions related to the realization of 
life or death.  This was particularly relevant for the Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima 
events.  In the Deepwater Horizon event, one leader described his fear (Shroder, et al. 
2011), ―People were screaming, why don‘t we leave, I don‘t want to die. Doug tried to 
remain calm, but he was scared. The rig was coming apart‖.  In each of the life or death 
circumstances discussed by the interviewees, their felt emotions were extremely strong.  
Even after more than two years past the event, while interviewing the Fukushima 
operators, they were overcome with their felt emotions.  At times we had to stop the 
interview so that the interviewees could collect their emotions.  Clearly the events of 
Fukushima impacted these seasoned operators very dramatically.  One described his fear 
during the event, ―It was a real nightmare. I have to say, I thought, at least three times, ‗I 
will die soon.‘‖ Ref. IN.       
 As I reviewed the interview results, it emerged that once the 
subliminal/supraliminal threshold was reached, codes related to felt emotion dominated 
the data; therefore, a better understanding of the role of felt emotions in extreme crisis 
leadership was necessary to complete a coherent analysis of the results.  The discussion 
of felt emotions in Chapter 2 was limited in the discussion of supraliminal awareness of 
death as well as the pervasiveness of the related emotions throughout all interviews 
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where participants encountered extreme events.  Thus, once these insights emerged, I 
conducted a review of the literature associated with death anxiety and mortality salience 
(Table 11).  These literature streams are quite encompassing, so I limited the literature 
review that follows to research that directly discusses both phenomena.   
Linkage to Literature 
Subliminal v. Supraliminal Death Anxiety 
 As a result of interviews from my research, it is clear that for the dangerous 
categories of extreme events, the threat of impending death was a significant emotional 
factor for the interviewees.  Thus, the literature associated with the effects of near death 
or impending death on a person‘s thought processes and awareness is worthy of study to 
better understand extreme events.  This literature falls generally into two streams.  One 
stream is related to simple negative thoughts, such as fear, skepticism, doubt and near 
death (near-death emotions are recognized in the literature as death-related anxiety).  My 
literature review in Chapter 2 did not explore death-related anxiety; therefore, a deeper 
literature review was conducted and is presented in this subchapter.  Another literature 
stream is related to a person‘s thoughts of impending death.  This emotion is recognized 
in the literature as morality salience.  Additionally, it is important in the study of death-
related anxiety and mortality salience whether the emotions are subliminal or 
supraliminal (Greenberg, et al. 1997).  Once negative thoughts, e.g., death-related anxiety 
or mortality salience, are supraliminal, a person‘s ability to think (cognition) is 
significantly impacted (Greenberg, et al. 1997).  These concepts are discussed next.  
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 Research shows that the level of a person‘s cognitive28 ability changes depending 
on the person‘s awareness of impending threats, i.e., subliminal or supraliminal 
(Yanagisawa, et al. 2013).  When thoughts of negative emotions, e.g., death, are 
subliminal, the subconscious mind seeks out positive emotions and thoughts to offset any 
subliminal negative thoughts (Yanagisawa, et al. 2013).  When subliminal, slightly 
positive emotions become more positive and the person gathers positive thoughts as an 
―antidote‖ to fear (Beck, 1985).  In reality, the mind attempts to block out negative 
thoughts (Yanagisawa, et al. 2013).  Research shows that through this collection of 
positive thoughts, the mind attempts to broaden its level of cognition when under 
personal threat (Beck, 1985).  The mind‘s attempt to block out death-related anxiety is a 
subconscious instinct (Beck, 1985).  However, once the thoughts about negative emotions 
(e.g., impending death) reach supraliminal awareness, the mind narrows its thinking and 
awareness; this process is called cognitive narrowing (Fredrickson, 2003).  Even a mere 
supraliminal thought of significant personal threat, e.g., impending death, can have a 
significant impact on a person‘s level of cognition (Hayes et al., 2010).   
 A person‘s thought of impending death, i.e., mortality salience, correlates with 
that person‘s cognitive ability.  As mortality salience increases, a person‘s cognition 
decreases (Tremoliere et al., 2012).  Even if a person has high cognitive abilities, the 
person is not likely to suppress mortality salience; as a result, people experiencing high 
mortality salience continue to think about death (Tremoliere et al., 2012) despite the 
presence of supraliminal positive emotions or thoughts, under conditions of mortality 
salience, those positive emotions are likely suppressed.  Further, the likelihood of 
                                                          
28
 ―Cognition‖ is a word that dates back to the 15th century meaning, ―thinking and awareness‖ (Revlin, 2013). 
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utilitarian
29
 responses to moral conflicts decreases; therefore, under conditions of 
mortality salience people are more likely to respond to moral conflicts in a manner that 
protects their self-interest (Tremoliere et al., 2012).  That is, when faced with imminent 
death, moral judgments become clouded because of the natural fight or flight instinct.  
Also, when consumed by thoughts of death, people tend to lose focus on even the 
smallest of tasks, and this cognitive narrowing may prevent people from giving full 
cognitive attention to moral conflicts (Tremoliere et al., 2012).   
 Simon et al. (1997) found that mortality salience has a motivational effect that 
facilitates a mental shift from an analytic to an intuitive mindset.  This mental shift 
explains the examples in my research data (Chapter 4) where people act on instinct rather 
than following proper procedures, authority, and use of morality.   
 
We could not find the water level for a long time (in the reactors).  We started 
talking, Why, why, why?‖ Suddenly, another leader of the administration group, 
the experienced guy, shouted that he got the information from his subordinate that 
the fire engine was stopping due to the fuel because in the field, the radiation level 
near the fire engines was very high, and they were afraid to add fuel.  Mr. Y. 
scolded to the person who was the general manager of the Emergency 
Preparedness Department.  He was in charge of this, to manage the fire engines.  
Mr. Y. really scolded him: ―You are killing the people, allowing them to die.‖ 
This voice still ringing in my ears.  (Ref. IN) 
 
                                                          
29 Utilitarianism is a theory in normative ethics holding that the proper course of action is the one that maximizes utility, usually 
defined as maximizing happiness and reducing suffering (Tremoliere et al., 2012). 
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 This quote illustrates that self-preservation and instinct guided the worker‘s 
response rather than the greater good of the organization (this illustration becomes 
important later during the discussion of leadership).  In these impending death events, 
mortality salience limits individuals‘ cognitive thinking and awareness and results in a 
tendency for people to act out of intuition.  My study finds that this intuition sometimes 
not only includes a self-preservation mentality, but also a constructive defiance attitude 
as discussed in the next section.  Further my results also include a description of 
cognitive narrowing effects on an individual‘s moral judgments; those judgments may 
lead to individuals acting in a manner inconsistent with their leader‘s wishes.  Interview 
data, especially in the Fukushima case, identified a self-preservation mentality of 
defiance set into the responder‘s emotions.  This felt emotion of ―constructive defiance‖ 
is discussed next.   
Constructive Defiance 
 A key finding emerged from the results considers the cognitive reaction to 
extreme and dangerous context categories of extreme events.  As discussed earlier, when 
(felt) emotional thoughts remain subliminal, people use positive thoughts to offset 
negative thoughts.  Once felt emotions, e.g., fright or fear for one‘s life, become 
supraliminal, cognitive narrowing begins to influence a person‘s thoughts.  This cognitive 
narrowing impacts a person‘s ability to make moral judgments.  In the Fukushima case, it 
appeared that as cognitive narrowing occurred, the operators became more defiant.  This 
phenomenon also occurred in the Deepwater Horizon event.  That is, when faced with 
impending death, in some cases, the responders resorted to their intuition, i.e., acts of 
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self-preservation including defying their leaders.  For example, from the Deepwater 
Horizon event: 
 
Chris [subsea supervisor] turned up the stairs taking two at a time to get to the 
main deck and the drill floor.  Then he saw the fire.  He turned around and headed 
straight for the bridge, and his BOP (blowout preventer) control panel.  As subsea 
supervisor on duty, he was the person responsible for executing the EDS 
(emergency disconnect switch), which is what he damn sure intended to do right 
now.  Curt [Captain] stepped in front of him.  ―I‘m EDSing‖ Chris said.  (Ref. 
Shroder, et al. 2011) 
 
  Specifically, the operators in the control room at Fukushima defied orders from 
their leaders in the emergency control center.  As mentioned by a commander in the 
Fukushima control room: 
 
We should not evacuate from this room for that reason (loss of power).  Once 
again, I assured that I would evacuate them safely based on my own judgment 
when we really needed to.  It might be very Japanese, but I bowed and apologized 
to the operators. It was probably not so much about leadership, but what I was 
doing there was asking, or begging for help.  After we lost all the power because 
of the tsunami, we injected water into the reactor by using a diesel fire pump (fire 
extinguishing water system) as part of the accident management procedure. That 
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was not the instruction from the ERC, but we did it by our own judgment.  Ref. 
IZ. 
 
 Similarly, leaders in the emergency control center defied orders from their leaders 
in Tokyo, including defying both the President of the company and the Prime Minister.  
Some specific examples of their behavior included: a leader in the emergency command 
center actually lied to the Prime Minister and President of the company, and continued to 
inject water into the reactors after being told to stop the injection.  From interviews: 
 
Then Mr. Y. started shouting, really shouting, or scolding. He told us, "You 
know, we can never repeat this program for Unit 2 and Unit 3‖.  Our mistake was, 
we were always acting under assumption of prediction, very bad prediction. 
―From now, you must report to me exactly what you were doing and what are you 
going to do by when‖.  He also scolded to headquarters through the TV monitor, 
―This request or command is to you, as well‖.  And the people said, ―Yes‖, very 
small, very low.  This is the moment that Mr. Y. became a kind of God. Because 
after this, there was a very famous exhort that he ignored the request from the 
headquarters to stop the injection.   
 
From an interview with a Japanese journalist:  Interviewer: ―Mr. Y. did not stop 
the injection water when ordered to by the Prime Minister; what did you write in 
your book about that?‖ Interviewee: ―Mr. Y. was right.  I wrote it that way in my 
book.  It‘s also troublesome.  If you see that the leader on the ground, 
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disrespecting that … all the problems above at the most critical junction.  In pre-
war days in Japan, the army was so notorious for always disrespecting, 
sabotaging, ignoring, defying that authority.  That doomed Japan to be such a 
disaster.  It‘s total lack of governance, total lack of command structure.  If you 
praise that on the ground, defying the authority, that‘s very much popular, 
particularly populist culture. That‘s dangerous.  
 
 In the Fukushima case, the young operators in the control room felt vulnerable 
and hopeless and wanted to evacuate the control room.  Only after their leader assured 
them he would protect them against ―outside interferences‖ and begged and apologized to 
them did they decide to stay.  In some cases, the leader tried to offset constructive 
defiance with positive emotions. For instance, at Fukushima, the control room leader 
apologized and begged the young operators to stay.  He appealed to their sense of duty.  
He acknowledged the hazard and he committed to defying his leadership in the event they 
asked him to participate in acts that might lead to unsafe conditions for the operators.  
Also, at Fukushima, the top leader defied the Prime Minister and the company President 
by lying regarding the cessation of water into the reactor, yet he showed respect and 
dignity to the leaders.  In another case, the leader withheld disturbing information from 
the operators, fearful that they would panic.  Others prayed to God as inspiration to have 
the strength to brave out the adversity.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, rescuers simply 
asked the victims to have faith in them despite having no preexisting trust relationship.  
 While defiance was most pronounced in the Fukushima data, there were some less 
serious examples in some other cases.  For example, in the Deepwater Horizon case, fear 
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and instinct motivated young staff members to take unilateral action to disconnect the rig 
from the well and broadcast a ―mayday‖ signal without the permission of and despite 
receiving a scolding from the Captain not to issue the mayday call.   Specifically, the 
instance recalled was: 
 
Now Andrea [mate] jumped up and hit the general alarm.  She grabbed the radio 
and began calling over an open channel, yelling, ―Mayday, mayday.  This is 
Deepwater Horizon‖.  Curt [Captain] heard Andrea repeating the mayday.  It was 
a direct violation of chain of command.  Regulations permitted only the captain to 
give the order to call mayday.  He came up behind her: ―I didn‘t give you 
authority to do that‖.  (Ref. Shroder, et al. 2011). 
 
 As discussed by Simon et al. (1997), mortality salience has a motivational effect 
that facilitates a shift from an analytic to an intuitive, experimental mindset.  Interviewees 
reported finding motivation in defiance, skepticism, and protection from outside 
influences and other negative thoughts.  In one sense, these negative thoughts resulted in 
what I describe as constructive defiance.  I define constructive defiance as intuitive 
actions taken by individuals or leaders under dangerous conditions that are contrary to the 
desires of their leader, yet are perceived as consistent (or in the best interest of) with the 
individuals or leaders directly faced with the dangerous conditions own well-being.  That 
is, the results of this dissertation suggest that in the dangerous context category of 
extreme events, negative thoughts can serve as a more powerful emotion than positive 
emotions.  That is especially true because constructive defiance implies that the affected 
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individuals who face a dangerous condition might ignore all the encouragement or 
directions offered by the leader and succumb to their own thoughts of self-interest.  This 
occurred in the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon cases because the responders viewed 
the underlying action as more correct than the action proposed by their leaders.   
 In sum, consistent with Fisher et al.‘s (2010) work on ―shadow influences‖, i.e., 
subliminal influences on thinking, one can imply that constructive defiance is another 
shadow influence and is motivated by emotions of self-preservation, protection, or risk 
for the individual or group.  The concept of overwhelming negative thoughts in extreme 
events, specifically constructive defiance, is an important phenomenon that expands the 
existing crisis literature.  Once a crisis event becomes an extreme crisis event or beyond, 
felt emotions dominate an individual‘s thoughts and behaviors.  This is especially 
pertinent once the threshold of supraliminal emotions is reached.  When individuals begin 
to recognize their felt emotions, those emotions dramatically affect their cognition, crisis 
management, decision-making, sensemaking, and leadership abilities.  Ultimately, in the 
most consequential events, i.e., in dangerous contexts, an individual‘s emotions of 
intuition, defiance, death anxiety, mortality salience and constructive defiance dominate 
their thoughts and behaviors.   
Additional Perspectives on Decision-making 
 Decision-making is also one of the six crisis concepts in an extreme event and the 
literature associated with decision-making was reviewed in Chapter 2.  Once the data 
were collected and analyzed, new implications with regard to decision-making were 
discovered; therefore, an additional, more focused review of the decision-making 
literature was warranted to help understand and integrate with the results.  I begin by 
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reviewing three major areas of decision making research not considered in Chapter 2.  
They are naturalistic decision making, recognition primed decision-making and 
macrocognition.  Also, as in the other subchapters, I develop a continuum of decision-
making to support my integrated crisis leadership model.  The continuum will include 
routine to super catastrophic events and will depict how these three general decision-
making areas change as the severity of the event increases.   
Naturalistic decision-making 
 Some researchers (Klein, 1993, 2003; Lipshitz, 2001) assert that classical decision 
theories are not flexible enough for extreme events in that classical decision processes 
primarily use the past to predict the future, and that classical decision theories are about 
decision processes not decisions themselves.  Literature based on naturalistic decision-
making (Klein, 1993, 2003) extends the formal, classical, decision-making approach.  
The naturalistic decision-making framework studies the methods that leaders adopt to 
make decisions and the ways in which leaders respond to the demands of extreme events 
(Klein et al., 1993).  These demands are characterized by limited time, uncertainty, high 
stakes, team and organizational constraints, unstable conditions, and varying amounts of 
experience.  In assessing my results, the characteristics of the extreme events support the 
naturalistic decision-making process.  The process of naturalistic decision-making 
involves the use of options, experience, workable solutions, and naturalistic decisions are 
focus less on the use of formality in decision-making processes.  These concepts of using 
experience and making decisions with workable solutions and lack of clarity was noted 
by a leader in the Situation Room (RR) when talking about the Hurricane Katrina 
response, and the Super Storm Sandy response.   
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You saw in Katrina, there were multiple disasters.  One of them was the mother-
nature event.  The other one was slipshod approach to the response.  Following 
rigid structures without any flexibility became the undoing.  Everybody intended 
to do the right thing in Katrina.  We‘re following the rules the way they 
understood them.  My whole point to that whole thing is decision making in the 
immediate aftermath of a bad event is difficult, and you‘re doing it oftentimes 
with less than full information. Decision making during the recovery phase of an 
event and Fukushima is another good example is equally difficult and 
complicated.  You would think that with more information comes more clarity.  
Sometimes with more information comes more confusion, which is 
counterintuitive.  It‘s like golf that way; the harder you swing, the less far the ball 
goes.  It doesn‘t make sense.  It is an important point.  I‘m not sure how to 
characterize it for you other than to say most people don‘t see it that way.  You 
think with clarity comes precision.  Not necessarily.  
 
 These quotations illustrate that leaders in extreme events may use more situational 
decision-making, particularly, those leaders closest to danger.  In extreme events, it is 
more than likely that much of the information needed for decision-making will not be 
available.  At that point, leaders must use the most reliable source of facts (Ref. DT) at 
their disposal and make decisions based up situational considerations.  
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Data-framing theory 
 Another literature stream related to naturalistic decision-making comes from 
Klein (1993) who discusses the decision ―data-framing‖ theory as a subset of 
sensemaking.  In Data-framing theory, Klein (1993) asserts that the situational context is 
explained when it is fitted into a structure that links observations together into a mental 
―frame‖.  Mental frames are a means of organizing data to link to other data.  A frame 
might be a story, a map, a script, a chronology, or landmark to account for observed data.  
Creating such known frames facilitates a search for more data.  Data-framing is primarily 
based upon the person‘s experience.  Basically, a person pieces the data gathered based 
upon the familiar.  Once a framing piece is created, the person seeks hidden data to 
expand the frame.  Much as in a three-dimensional picture where a person seeks 
something familiar and then after studying the 3D picture further or having someone 
point out a shape, then the person frames or links that new data with the known data.  
Data-framing is a process of framing and reframing, or linking the data into a frame to 
allow for interpretation.  Conversely, data-framing can start out with a map, and then the 
person seeks data to match the map by finding data that fills-in the map.  Once the data 
and frame are in congruence, sensemaking stops.  Sensemaking can continue if new data 
or frames are added to the environment; however, Data-framing is not an endless search 
for data and frames (Klein, 1993) because there is an endless source of data.  Also, 
people with more experience usually are faster at data-framing before less experienced 
people; however, both novices and experts employ the same reasoning processes 
(Barrows, et al., 1978).   
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Recognition-primed Decision-making 
 One of the characteristics of extreme event decision-making is the speed of 
decision-making that is typically required of the leaders (data from Chapter 4 highlights 
the need to match decision-making speed with the speed of the event).  The naturalistic 
decision-making theory of recognition primed decision-making (Klein, 1998) is 
consistent with this premise.  Recognition primed decision-making essentially suggests 
that the decision-making process is heavily influenced by the leaders‘ levels of 
experience, as these leaders identify parts of the situation and then use their experience 
and imagination as the foundation to arrive at decisions.  In recognition primed decision-
making, much of the leaders‘ decision-making stems from intuition and instinct (Klein, 
1998).  Recognition primed decision-making is particularly useful in conditions of time 
pressure, and in which data is partial and goals and outcomes are poorly defined.  
Recognition primed decision-making is a form of naturalistic decision-making that is 
based on the use of intuition which can be described as understanding without rationale.  
It can be considered a ‗gut reaction‘ and can include stages of reasoning, 
representativeness, feature matching (data framing), situational assessment, and use of 
experience (Bond, et al. 2005).   
Macrocognition 
 Macrocognition decision-making is consistent with the naturalistic processes 
including the recognition primed and framing theories.  Much of macrocogition is 
underpinned by Piaget‘s notion (Piaget, 1967, 1971) of the constructivist understanding 
of learning.  Piaget recognizes that people learn by linking data and framing their initial 
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learning.  Then people build on their learning by using updating, doubt, rejection and 
replacement thoughts to continue building a frame.  
 In sum, decision-making in an extreme event is a highly cognitive process under 
demanding conditions.  The non-linear environments found in extreme events require 
non-linear decision-making processes.  Thus, leaders must rely upon decision-making 
processes that depend primarily on the leaders‘ experience, instinct, and intuition.  The 
models of naturalistic decision-making theory, including data-framing and recognition 
primed decision-making are more aligned with the dynamic characteristics at the extreme 
category of events. 
 In Table 12, I have developed a continuum of decision-making consistent with the 
expanded literature review.  The decision-making continuum starts with the routine 
events and culminates, as do the other continuums, in super-catastrophic events.  My 
study results for routine events are consistent with the classical decision-making 
literature.  My results indicate that for the hurricane events and Three Mile Island, which 
based on my data, are the least severe emotional events, interviewee quotations regarding 
decision-making were consistent with formal decision-making process.  That is, in each 
of these events, there were interview quotations consistent with anchoring decisions in 
facts, and with formal rule-based authorities which are elements of classical decision-
making.  Similarly, the results indicate that with resilience events, that is, event where felt 
emotions are subliminal, yet some skepticism and expansion of the crisis response occurs, 
the data-framing is a typical decision-making model used by leaders.    
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Table 12 - Continuum of Decision-making 
Situational 
Context 
Felt Emotion Decision-making 
Routine Subliminal 
(success) 
Classical 
Resilience  Subliminal 
(skepticism) 
Framing 
Surprise Supraliminal 
(unawareness) 
Recognition 
Primed or 
Naturalistic  
Failure Supraliminal 
(failure) 
Macrocognition 
Catastrophic  Supraliminal 
(death anxiety) 
Situational 
Super-
Catastrophic  
Supraliminal 
(mortality 
salience) 
Warrior ethos
30
  
 
 
 As the event severity expands, in the surprise situational context when leaders 
recognize that the organization is not responding adequately to the severity of the event, 
supraliminal thoughts of surprise can significantly change the leaders‘ decision-making 
processes.  Once the situational context exceeds the leaders‘ ability to keep aware of 
changing conditions, the cognitive challenges expand greatly (surprise theory) and the 
leaders begin to react with decision-making models such as recognition primed or 
naturalistic models.  As such, the recognition primed decision-making and naturalistic 
                                                          
30
 Warrior ethos is a United States Army statement that is sacred to warriors, i.e., ―I will always place the mission first; I will never 
accept defeat; I will never quit; and I will never leave a fallen comrade‖ (Kolditz, 2007).  Warrior ethos discussed in detail in the 
leadership subchapter of Chapter 5.  
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models are reactionary models consistent with the demands of these events.  An example 
of this decision-making model can be found in an interview with RW (military 
commander/cross-case) who stated: 
 
Take one for the Gipper, but you can never relent.  So how a leader, when he‘s 
getting fatigued, so this has gone long, the crisis seems to be out of my control, 
it‘s still the best decisions you can make.  You‘re still prioritizing.  You‘re still 
trying to get essay, figure out what you don‘t know, empower other people to lead 
because you‘re falling behind, whatever it is, and you do it until your dying 
breath.  That‘s what I believe and that is, I think, what the military probably tends 
to drill into most of us because of the combat circumstances, and the ground 
forces know this, so you fight on.  The concept of stopping, stop leading … I‘ve 
been overcome so I‘m going to stop leading … that is a non-starter. 
 
 Thus, this leader is focused on good decision-making with prioritization 
techniques, not purely instinct or intuition based decision-making.  Note this this is 
interview was from the military domain.  Later in the discussion of the concept of 
leadership in the non-military domain there will be some differences in the leader‘s 
attitude towards decision-making.   
 In the failure realm of events, the results are consistent with macrocognition 
decision-making especially in the use of updating and doubt processes used by the 
leaders facing these events.  An example of the use of macrocognition decision-making 
came in the cross-case interview of RR who stated: 
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In the immediate response phase of any event, you are making decisions based on 
less than accurate and full information.  You are making decisions, potentially 
consequential decisions, based on the best advice you can get.  We‘ve seen the 
President and his leadership team do that.  By and large, done it well. As you get 
more clarity around the situation and around what decisions need to be made, if 
the algorithm changes, it‘s less about making decisions based on limited 
information.  It‘s more about making decisions based on all of the things that you 
didn‘t have previously.  Now you‘re looking at decision making in the context of 
geopolitical issues, national issues, election-related issues, economic-related 
issues. 
 
 Specifically, in this quote the interviewee discusses a changing algorithm with 
limited information causing the leader to think about issues other than the immediate 
event.  That is, using the best advice given the situation.  A similar example occurred in 
the Three Mile Island event when the Governor was faced with disagreements among 
experts on the potential for a hydrogen explosion, and the need to evacuate citizens from 
around the area.  Also, the President of the United States was arriving on the scene in just 
hours.  Given that the evacuations plans were inadequate, the Governor chose not to order 
an evacuation based on limited information, inadequate evacuation plans and the 
disagreement among experts.  This decision-making was premised more on the holistic 
perspective rather than on the technical merits.  Thus, this decision-making focused on 
the macro versus the micro issues, i.e., macrocognition.   
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 Catastrophic events that involve impending death often result in leaders and 
workers using their instinct and intuition for decision-making.  Thus decision-making 
becomes highly situational.  There were many examples of the use of intuition, instinct, 
and constructive defiance, by leaders in the interview data.  One of the significant quotes 
came from a control room operator at Fukushima (Ref. IZ): 
 
When I was a young operator, I remember this shift supervisor was saying that 
when you were in that position, you were the final decision maker.  However, 
when I really had that situation, I did so not because I remembered that, but 
probably because my instinct told me to do so. At that moment on that day, 
although I had my senior supervisor next to me, I was the supervisor of the day; I 
was the last person of last resort. It is not something I learned from someone, but 
more like Bushido (the spirit of the samurai). I have read a lot of Bushido related 
books. Basically, I had a feeling that I had to take the responsibility to be the last 
person to last resort. Therefore, in the main control room, I was the decision 
maker. I think that was the basic thought in mind. I can‘t explain what that was 
based on in words. 
 
 For super catastrophic events with conditions of high mortality salience, decision-
making reflects a warrior ethos that the literature (Kolditz, 2007) discovered in dangerous 
contexts.  The concept of warrior ethos is explored in more detail in my upcoming 
discussion of the crisis concept of leadership.  Nevertheless, in dangerous conditions, 
most notably military domains, (there is little or no literature in this area for non-military 
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domains) the environment becomes more like wartime in which decision-making and 
leadership are heavily dependent on the trust and confidence of the leader.  Thus, as will 
be explained later, decision-making will vary in the military versus non-military domains.  
In the military domain, leaders focus decision-making first upon completion of the 
mission and second on the survival of the troops.  In the non-military domain the 
priorities switch.  My results indicate that in the non-military domain, survival of workers 
becomes the important consideration for decision-making over resolution of the event.   
 In sum, the non-linearity of an extreme crisis means that felt emotions – 
particularly negative, supraliminal, emotions – make decision-making more challenging.  
The integration of additional literature beyond classical models of decision making helps 
to develop a more complete picture of the continuum for decision-making in extreme 
crisis conditions.   The results of this study suggest that there is an opportunity to link the 
existing crisis response theories, e.g., failure and surprise theories, with decision-making 
theories of recognition-primed and macrocognition theories in a way that provides an 
integrated description of the sensemaking cosmology (Lagadec, 2007) for extreme 
events, especially for the categories of catastrophic and super-catastrophic events. 
 At this point I have discussed three crisis concepts including a concept introduced 
from this study, situational awareness, and two previously existing concepts, felt 
emotions and decision-making.  The results from these three crisis concepts imply a 
significant nexus among them.  That is, situational context sets the stage for the other two 
concepts by describing the event and the organization‘s ability to cope with the event.  
The non-linearity of the situational context results in significant felt emotions particularly 
at the most extreme end of catastrophic and super-catastrophic events.  At that end of the 
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continuum, felt emotions significantly impact the decision-making process of those 
involved in the extreme event and at that breakthrough point or transition, the ability of a 
leader to use decision-making techniques, e.g., naturalistic decision-making or 
macrocognition becomes extremely limited due to cognitive narrowing.  As the situation 
worsens, and when those involved face imminent death, then felt emotions dominate the 
thoughts of those involved and they tend to use instinct and intuition in their decision-
making processes.  This dynamic can lead to constructive defiance and a breakdown in 
macrocognition and naturalistic decision-making.  The next section provides a discussion 
of the other three crisis concepts, i.e., sensemaking crisis response, and leadership.  I 
continue to develop an integrated model that links all six crisis concepts together to 
explain the cosmology of extreme event leadership.  
Crisis Response 
 In my ATLAS.ti codebook, I defined crisis response as ―quotes that refer to 
instances where leaders discuss activities, thoughts, or comments related to the actual 
performance of tasks or conditions that contributed to the outcome of the event‖.  
Essentially, the code of crisis response refers to instances when the interviewees 
described acts or performances that they believed directly contributed to the outcome of 
the crisis, either successful or unsuccessful.   
 Before building the continuum for crisis response, there is a discussion of three 
areas that provide insights to the existing literature regarding crisis response.  Afterwards 
the continuum of crisis response is discussed, including how the usefulness of crisis 
response concepts, e.g. logistics, diminished significantly for the most consequential 
events.   
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 The results identified three areas that expand the existing crisis response 
literature.  First, the results show that latent organizational weaknesses, such as the role 
confusion on the Deepwater Horizon, have serious negative consequences on crisis 
response.  That is, with the non-linear characteristics of extreme events, even small latent 
organizational weaknesses become hugely impactful.  For instance, in the Deepwater 
Horizon case, the legal status of an oil rig with regard to whether the rig is also a ship is 
not clear.  The regulations state that if the ship is ―attached‖ it becomes an oil rig.  The 
question becomes, ―Does the pipe connecting the ship to the well mean that the ship is 
attached?‖  This situation leads to a source of confusion over command of the vessel, that 
is, whether the ship captain is in charge of the vessel, or conversely if it is an oil rig, then 
whether the ―oilman in charge‖ is in charge.  This lack of clarity in the definition of ship 
versus oil rig led to leadership confusion regarding actions such as issuing a Mayday call, 
disconnecting the well from the rig and evacuating the oil rig, among other leadership 
issues.  Ultimately, this latent organizational weakness, i.e., definition of a ship, became a 
significant complication in crisis response for the Deepwater Horizon event.     
 Second, the results confirm Lettieri, et al.‘s (2009) conclusion that more research 
is needed on setback management.  Throughout the extreme events in this dissertation, 
there were instances of setbacks.  Given the number and severity of setbacks that 
occurred during these events, it is evident that setback management has an important 
impact on crisis response and should be studied further.  There was a conclusion in 
Chapter 2, which suggested there are fuzzy boundaries, transition points, or instability 
points where crisis response becomes unmanageable.  The results suggest these points did 
exist in the events reviewed for this dissertation.  As an example, when crisis response 
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activities were unsuccessful in the Fukushima case, the severity of the event cascaded and 
that became an instability point.  For instance, when the leaders were attempting to adapt 
and expand their resilience, the event conditions exceeded their capacity to respond.  The 
event worsened and became a ―surprise event‖.  As the event progressed, operators called 
for supplemental equipment that did not arrive (Ref. IN).  Thus, the event became 
exceedingly complex:   
 
There was a phone call from headquarters.  Some electrical engineers from 
headquarters called them and they are now sending power support trucks, ―So 
please don‘t give up‖.  Maybe after one or two hours, finally I got the information 
that the truck was too heavy for the helicopter.  The disappointment at that time 
was so large for me.  Anyway, we had to wait for the trucks coming on the 
surface.  But, of course, there was traffic jams and road damage.  The problem 
was reactor pressure.  Of course, it would stay high.  So the problem was, we 
don‘t have any measure to depressurize the reactor.  So our thought was, ―We 
need at least ten new batteries or sixteen new batteries of 22 volt‖.  Because 
normal batteries: One battery has about 22 volt, and one battery has more than 
100 kilogram weight.  So I could not imagine how to connect the power supply.  
We tried to establish a plan to recover some electric power source using the power 
supply truck and start the pumps.  At the hindsight, it was not so appropriate a 
strategy, but at that time, it was the only option for us.   
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 Thus, the operators at Fukushima attempted to expand their resilience by adding 
additional power supplies.  When that attempt failed, the reactor conditions worsened, 
and the power supply arrangement forced adaptations and resulted in an inappropriate 
response strategy.  At this point, the crisis response category of resilience was exceeded, 
i.e., the event cascaded and resulted in a surprise event.  At this point, the crisis response 
became extremely uncoordinated and complex.  This situation matched the definition of 
complexity theory
31
.  That is, the event situation bordered on chaos. 
 Third, the results of this dissertation highlight the importance of communicating 
changes in crisis response strategies.  The downside of over-eagerness, the role of 
logistics, and the leadership as mechanisms used to convey changes in strategies to 
workers were most evident in the Three Mile Island and Fukushima cases.  For instance, 
in the Fukushima case, one leader noted the importance of using proper leadership 
techniques during changes in response strategy.  In the Fukushima operator‘s words (Ref. 
MA): 
 
I still needed to change the priorities.  If I had been persistent with my words, 
everyone would have been confused, so the priorities needed to be changed. 
However, I needed to be more cautious and considerate about those who had been 
working on the time-consuming task when I made a change in the priorities. 
 
                                                          
31
 For complexity theory, Abel (2011) explains that complexity  is not chaos; it is near chaos, because chaos involves the study of 
simple patterns leading (linearly) into repeated patterns, while complexity involves simple patterns leading to higher-level patterns, 
which are multiple unique interactions, and usually non-linear. Therefore, complexity theory precedes chaos theory.  The reader can 
reference Chapter 2 for more details on complexity theory. 
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 In the end, the results indicate that failures in executing crisis response can lead to 
events cascading into something more severe.  The three areas discussed here, i.e. latent 
organizational weaknesses, setback management, and communicating changes in 
strategy, were significant contributors to the complexity of the events and resulting crisis 
response failures.  Next I build a continuum for the crisis response concept.    
 
Table 13 – Continuum of Crisis Response  
Situational 
Context 
Felt Emotion Decision-making Crisis Response 
Routine Subliminal 
(success) 
Classical Readiness 
Resilience  Subliminal 
(skepticism) 
Framing and 
Cognitive 
Continuum 
Model 
Resilience 
Surprise Supraliminal 
(unawareness) 
Recognition 
Primed and 
Naturalistic  
Complexity 
Failure Supraliminal 
(failure) 
Macrocognition Failure 
Catastrophic  Supraliminal 
(death anxiety) 
Situational  Situational 
Super-
Catastrophic  
Supraliminal 
(mortality 
salience) 
Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos  
  
 Crisis response theories reviewed in Chapter 2 include: readiness (routine event) 
theory, resilience theory, complexity theory, and failure theory.  Refer to Table 13 for the 
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Continuum of Crisis Response.  Overall, for routine and resilience events, the results 
were consistent with the readiness and resilience theories; however, once events reach the 
situational context of surprise, failure, and beyond, the results indicate that, in reality, the 
concept of crisis response becomes increasingly less important in determining the 
outcome of an event.  This phenomena happens because as the event worsens, felt 
emotions begin to influence leadership and decision-making greatly; therefore, the 
leaders‘ focus on issues such as logistics, formal decisions, and other general crisis 
management techniques becomes a lower priority. 
 Specifically, in the surprise realm of events, conditions are usually unfathomable.  
Complexity theory suggests that leaders in this realm of events should step back so that 
they can see unforeseen connections (Muffet-Willett & Kruse, 2009).  The crisis response 
in this realm can be described as a rubric of complex responsive processes (Muffet-
Willett & Kruse, 2009).  Abel (2011) describes it as dissipative structure that moves into 
the edge of chaos and is usually non-linear. 
 Beyond the surprise realm, the situation worsens as the organization has failed to 
execute sufficient crisis response tactics.  At this stage of events, failure theories, e.g., 
normal accident theory, would suggest that latent organizational weaknesses exist and 
that those weaknesses result in crisis response failures, as evidenced in the Deepwater 
Horizon case discussed above.   
 In the catastrophic and super catastrophic events, crisis response becomes highly 
situational because of the effects of felt emotions on the leaders.  This situation occurs 
because the felt emotions of leaders become supraliminal (after the failure category of 
events) and they begin to dominate the data for the other six crisis concepts (we will see 
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this later under the leadership discussion as well).  The results suggest that at the extreme 
end of the crisis response continuum, felt emotions dominate the thoughts and actions of 
the responders.  Specifically, at these non-linear or breakthrough points, leaders typically 
resort to intuition and instinct in performing their crisis response duties, rather than 
organized approaches to crisis response.  
 In sum, crisis response relates to the outcome of an extreme event in that 
successful crisis response can mitigate or resolve events.  However, there are significant 
organizational and tactical factors that influence an organizations crisis response, e.g., 
latent organizational weaknesses.  In the continuum of extreme event crisis response, as 
event conditions worsen, the efficacy of crisis response declined for the events studied.  
When leaders begin to experience death anxiety or mortality salience as in catastrophic 
and super catastrophic events, then leaders resort to intuition, instinct and a warrior ethos 
in executing their crisis response duties.  
 Next is a discussion of sensemaking as a crisis concept.  As one of the six crisis 
concepts, sensemaking also parallels the non-linearity of extreme crisis events.  As in 
with the other crisis concepts, the next section will develop a continuum for sensemaking 
that fits into the integrated model of crisis leadership.  
Sensemaking 
 Although the results indicated that researching the crisis concept of sensemaking 
across multiple cases is extremely difficult, there were a number of insights discovered in 
analyzing the results.  Specifically, the results show that some of the concepts of 
sensemaking are more appropriately researched through the case study method than 
through cross-case studies.  I compared my data to the sensemaking elements suggested 
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by Weick (1988; 1995).  As a refresher, Weick (1995) discusses three types of 
understandings: commitment, identity, and expectations – meaning commitment to 
understanding, understanding one‘s identity; and expectations connect with cues to create 
understandings (Weick, 1995).   
 Overall, the results for these elements were inconclusive.  Each element was 
essentially evenly distributed in the data.  This suggested, as discussed in Chapter 2.8, 
that these elements of sensemaking are better evaluated at the individual level versus the 
case level.  For instance, Weick (1995) discusses the element of ―identity‖ in his 
assessment of the Mann Gulch firefighters when they dropped their fire implements to 
run from the fire (1949).  According to Weick (1995), at that point the firefighters lost 
their identity as firefighters.  Therefore, it appears from my analysis of the sensemaking 
elements of commitment, identity, and expectations, that Weick‘s single case study 
approach to these elements is more appropriate than a multiple case study analysis used 
in my research.  Thus, my research has no conclusions on the efficacy of Weick‘s (1995) 
three elements of sensemaking.   
 Other elements of sensemaking were conclusive.  Those elements included:  the 
use of positive thoughts; pessimism; pluralistic ignorance; collective sensemaking; 
optimistic bias; institutional effect; updating; doubt; and felt emotions.  The results are 
discussed next.   
 In the early stages of the Fukushima event and during the Three Mile Island 
accident, the use of positive thoughts was at least partially significant in the formulation 
of sensemaking for those leaders.  The leaders in those two cases made positive 
evaluations of the situation and used those evaluations in guiding the organization 
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through the event.  In all of the cases studied in the dissertation, there were pessimistic 
quotes noted by the interviewees.  Because all of the cases in this research were extreme 
events with significant consequences, this observation regarding the significance of 
pessimism in the data is not surprising.  In the Deepwater Horizon case, sensemaking was 
dominated by pluralistic ignorance and felt emotions.  Hardly anyone on board the rig 
attempted to respond to the fire, e.g. firefighting, or had an understanding of the events as 
they unfolded.  Further, in the Deepwater Horizon event, there was a significant amount 
doubt in the abilities of leadership by the workers.  However, in the Fukushima case, 
despite the severity of that event, the interviewees all had a significant understanding of 
the event, that is, collective sensemaking.  Although they were surprised by the amount 
of devastation and severity, they did understand the causes and conditions leading to the 
event, specifically an earthquake, loss of electrical power, and tsunami.  Also, the 
Fukushima interviewees expressed that they continuously used updating in their 
sensemaking as conditions changed.  Nevertheless, in the later stages of the Fukushima 
event, felt emotions dominated the leaders‘ sensemaking abilities.  As the Fukushima 
leaders‘ mortality salience increased, there were more significant impacts on the leaders‘ 
sensemaking abilities.   
 The level of optimistic bias, which might influence sensemaking, was consistent 
in the data among all of the cases.  This result suggests that over-optimism did not play a 
huge role in sensemaking for any of the interviewees.  Conversely, the degree of 
institutional effect, i.e., organizational failure, was significant and consistent among all of 
the cases.  During these extreme circumstances, there were institutional barriers to 
effective sensemaking.  From hurricanes to the Fukushima case, the interviewees 
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discussed the flaws in organizational decision-making, leadership, and crisis response, 
which impaired their sensemaking ability.   
 Finally, the effect of felt emotion on the leaders‘ sensemaking abilities was most 
significant in the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon cases.  According to the 
interviewees, felt emotions were not significant for the Three Mile Island case, in that, 
there was little fear of death for the leaders.  Certainly the workers in the plant held 
significant felt emotions.    
For example, the use of positive thoughts for sensemaking (Kayes, 2004) was 
partially significant for the Fukushima case as follows:  In the Fukushima case, 
interviewees expressed positive emotions up until the reactor buildings exploded.  
Afterward, their emotions and consequently their sensemaking turned negative or non-
existent.  From the Fukushima interviews (Ref. IN): 
  
Very, very fortunately, the status wasn‘t growing worse. We were gradually 
feeling safe  because now we are stable condition status, and certainly safe.  
Already some people came back to the plant.  They are very ... How do you say?  
Fortitude and the brave.  The explosion of the Unit 4, actually, a jolt was caused 
by the explosion of Unit 4.  So this is very confusing.  We had only single jolt in 
the early morning on the 15th, but our imagination was it was due to some 
problem of Unit 2.  That‘s why some people outside still misunderstand.  Unit 4, 
actually, Mr. Y
32
 asked all operators to evacuate to the ERC (Emergency 
Response Centre), and one shift supervisor reported the reactor building of Unit 4 
                                                          
32 Throughout this dissertation, the reference to ―Mr. Y‖ refers to a senior leader at Fukushima.  As in the other interviews, his full 
name is redacted for purpose of autonomy. 
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was seriously damaged.  So then we started being confused: ―Oh, is it Unit 4? Or 
is it ...Unit 3 or 2, why Unit 4 exploded?‖   
 
 Prior to the explosions, the interviewee expressed confidence about the situation 
and the strategic direction that the operators were implementing.  Once the explosion 
occurred, the operators were confused and surprised that such an event could occur.  This 
indicates a significant disparity between sensemaking in events when they are in the early 
stages when consequences are much less severe versus later in the continuum when 
circumstances are severe.  
  In sum, sensemaking was particularly effective for the lesser events, e.g., 
hurricanes and the Three Mile Island accident.  As severity of an extreme event increases, 
the level of sensemaking generally decreases.  Ultimately, in the most extreme cases, e.g., 
life and death, sensemaking is almost non-existent, and the individuals resort to a 
situational sensemaking that is primarily based upon self-preservation.  
 Next, I continue the process of developing the integrated model of crisis 
leadership by explaining the results related to sensemaking.  The continuum of 
sensemaking ranges from useful sensemaking, that is, leaders understand the event and 
apply enacted sensemaking to reach a successful outcome.  As the event severity 
progresses, then sensemaking changes forms to adapt to the situation; however, in the 
most extreme events, as with other concepts, if conditions are life threatening, 
sensemaking stops as an effective tool.  Then those individuals affected resort to 
situational sensemaking, which is founded in their self-preservation and other strong felt 
emotions, e.g., instinct and intuition.  
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Table 14 - Continuum of Sensemaking 
Situational 
Context 
Felt Emotion Decision-making Crisis Response Sensemaking 
Routine Subliminal 
(success) 
Classical Readiness Positive evaluation 
Resilience  Subliminal 
(skepticism) 
Framing and Cognitive 
Continuum Model 
Resilience Collective 
sensemaking 
Surprise Supraliminal 
(unawareness) 
Recognition Primed and 
Naturalistic  
Complexity Updating, 
Optimistic bias, & 
Institutional effect 
Failure Supraliminal 
(failure) 
Macrocognition Failure Doubt & 
Pessimism 
Catastrophic  Supraliminal 
(death anxiety) 
Situational Situational Situational 
Super-
Catastrophic  
Supraliminal 
(mortality 
salience) 
Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos 
 
 In developing the sensemaking continuum, the results indicate that positive 
evaluations, also known in the literature as positive felt emotions, will dominate in the 
less serious events, while felt emotions dominate in the extreme events.  The threshold or 
point at which the continuum deviates is at the point where the surprise realm of (Table 
14) situational context is reached, e.g., in the Fukushima case, when the reactor building 
exploded.  At that point, felt emotions became supraliminal and began to dominate 
sensemaking.   
 Another finding was that interviewees who were closest to the event were affected 
most by felt emotions.  This insight is not a surprise; however, it suggests that as an event 
progresses into the extreme categories of events, sensemaking may be more effective for 
those leaders further away from the event that are less impacted by felt emotions.  This 
insight should be considered when managing an extreme crisis event.  Normally, first 
responders are relied upon to provide leaders the picture of the event; however, in the 
most severe events, this picture could be clouded by felt emotions of the responders.   
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 Interestingly, the research by Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) concluded that 
negative emotions may be more helpful earlier in an event as a countermeasure to 
optimistic bias. Negative emotions can offset the optimistic bias and positive thoughts 
that often occur earlier in an event.  In fact, Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) suggest that 
negative emotions should be built into crisis response.  This research confirms the value 
of their suggestion. 
 In sum, the continuum of sensemaking follows the non-linear progression noted 
throughout this research.  There exists a threshold where emotions turn from positive 
subliminal thoughts of success into supraliminal negative emotions of failure.  
Ultimately, as in the other crisis concepts, felt emotions dominate sensemaking.  Next is a 
discussion of the crisis concept of leadership.  My research finds that leadership is a non-
linear concept with new insights identified for leadership in the catastrophic and super 
catastrophic events.   
Leadership 
 This subchapter discusses the results for the crisis concept of leadership.  
Generally, my results can be divided into two categories, i.e., general leadership theories 
and situational leadership concepts.  First, I discuss the contextualization of situational 
leadership concepts.  Second, I discuss the general leadership theories as they are 
applicable to these results.  Finally, a continuum of the crisis concept of leadership is 
developed.   
 There were a number of situational leadership concepts investigated in the 
analysis of the interviews.  Most importantly, the results show that extreme events are 
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highly contextualized with regard to leadership
33
.  Because of this, they become a maze 
of situational leadership concepts that is difficult to categorize, summarize, and explain.  
With the highly contextualized nature of the crisis concept of leadership, my conclusion 
is that the continuum of leadership is best built with a mix of situational leadership 
concepts and leadership theories.  Discussing leadership with this mix of situational and 
theoretical allows for case-specific contextualization and integrated discussion of 
leadership theoretical concepts.  
 Next, I discuss the results regarding the crisis concept of leadership and build 
towards a continuum of the crisis concept of leadership.  Table 15 depicts the continuum 
of crisis concepts of leadership.      
 
Table 15 – Continuum of Crisis Leadership 
 Starting the discussion with routine events, the results for leadership imply that 
classical concepts of collaborative leadership are used in responding to routine events, in 
that leaders, workers and event responders collaborate to address the challenges of a 
                                                          
33 An assertion that extreme event leadership is highly contextualized was also made by Hannah, et al. (2010).   
Situational 
Context 
Felt Emotion Decision-making Crisis 
Response 
Sensemaking Leadership 
Routine Subliminal (success) Classical Readiness Positive evaluation Collaborative 
Resilience  Subliminal 
(skepticism) 
Framing and Cognitive 
Continuum Model 
Resilience Collective 
sensemaking 
Authoritarian 
and setback 
Surprise Supraliminal 
(unawareness) 
Recognition Primed and 
Naturalistic  
Complexity Updating,  
Optimistic bias, & 
Institutional effect 
Adaptive 
Failure Supraliminal 
(failure) 
Macrocognition Failure Doubt & 
Pessimism 
Non-linear 
Catastrophic  Supraliminal 
(death anxiety) 
Situational Situational Situational Situational 
Super-
Catastrophic  
Supraliminal 
(mortality salience) 
Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos Warrior ethos  
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routine event.  Whether the event is an office fire or a worker slipping and falling, 
typically the organizational response is collaborative.  That is, the organization works 
together in solving the situation (Voogd, 2004; Quarantelli, 1988).  This dissertation does 
not dispute this dynamic.  In fact, there were no results that dispute these conclusions. 
 When events exceed the routine, organizational stress can set in, especially when 
the event conditions (situational context) exceed the organization‘s resilience.  As event 
conditions worsen, organizations typically seek external assistance.  Classically, the need 
for leadership and coordination with external assistance organizations increases, and at 
this point incident management structures are characterized by more authoritarian or 
setback leadership models (Lettieri, et al., 2009).     
  As extreme events progress to a situational context category of ―surprise‖, 
organizations discover that their crisis response mechanisms are failing to arrest the 
progression of the event.  They become surprised that their efforts fail.  Farazmand 
(2009) suggests that surprise leadership has its roots in chaos, complexity, and dynamic 
systems theory.  Under these conditions, interviewees (Ref. JB, RR, OD) suggested that 
leaders must use their judgment, lean forward (adapt), innovate, repurpose (adapt), use 
people as resources (adapt), and use an adaptive approach to leadership.  These specific 
leadership concepts are consistent with the theory of Adaptive Leadership (Yukl, 2006).  
 Once the situational context reaches the failure stage event context, and with 
supraliminal felt emotions gaining in importance, leadership acumen must be flexible.  
Farazmand (2009) calls this situation ‗living on the edge of chaos.‘  Other researchers 
caution that most managers often make a big mistake of thinking linearly; managers try to 
solve non-linear organizational problems in a linear fashion.  Managers must think 
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strategically and non-linearly to anticipate and manage the ―unexpected‖ (Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2007).  
 In the case of the catastrophic and super-catastrophic events, felt emotions are at 
their peak and dominate a leader‘s thoughts.  Under these dangerous contexts, situational 
leadership concepts begin to influence the leader‘s decision-making.  Situational 
leadership concepts in the dangerous categories of extreme events can include: instinct, 
intuition, hopelessness, defiance and at the far end of the leadership continuum, warrior 
ethos.  Next, I provide a deeper discussion of the specific leadership concepts applicable 
to the dangerous categories of extreme events.    
 Situational leadership concepts in the dangerous contexts, specifically super-
catastrophic events, are best studied by observing organizations that face life-and-death 
conditions frequently, e.g., warriors.  Generally, the military domain is studied for 
dangerous context leadership more than the non-military domain (Kolditz, 2007).  The 
major differences between the two domains include the military leader‘s familiarity level 
with experiencing dangerous contexts and cohabitation of the military leaders and their 
soldiers, which leads to development of a ―warrior ethos‖ mentality (Kolditz, 2007).  
There are other differences as well.  Specifically, Kolditz (2007) defines dangerous 
contexts as those where leaders: (a) embrace continuous learning because dangerous 
situations demand it, (b) share risks with followers, (c) maintain a common lifestyle with 
followers (cohabitation) and emphasize shared values rather than material possessions, 
(d) possess technical competence (i.e., proficiency in domain-specific skills as opposed to 
traditional leader competencies) that allows them to make rapid and effective decisions, 
(e) create feelings of trust among team members, and (f) exhibit and create loyalty.    
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 Samuels, et al. (2007) discuss the uniqueness of dangerous contexts including the 
ability of leaders in dangerous contexts to build leader trust that overcomes the natural 
intuitions and instincts of the followers, e.g., as noted by Weick‘s (1988) study of the 
Mann Gulch event in 1949 where firefighters dropped their tools and ran away, 
disobeying their leaders‘ instructions.  This issue of overcoming natural instincts 
becomes important as situations move from routine to super catastrophic.    
 Trust between group members is created through training under adverse 
conditions and by cohabitating responders as in the case of firefighters and the military.  
This condition rarely exists in a non-military domain.  Also, in dangerous contexts, the 
fear of imminent death, i.e., mortality salience is expected.  In the non-military domain, 
the fear of imminent death is not explicitly considered in both training and daily 
operations (Samuels et al., 2007).   
 In the military domain where dangerous contexts and felt emotions are often 
experienced, a ―warrior ethos‖ is developed among leaders and followers; however, in 
both the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon events, examples of a warrior ethos did 
emerge.  Specifically, the leaders and responders stated their immense ―concern for 
workers‖.  For instance, in the Deepwater Horizon event (Shroder, et al. 2011):  
 
Dave Young [chief mate] was torn between staying on the bridge and going back 
on deck.  The bridge was still in chaos, Curt seemed overwhelmed, but as chief 
mate his responsibility was to direct the emergency response and firefighting.  He 
had to go.  When Dave got to the emergency gear locker, the muster point for the 
emergency team, only one person was there, a roustabout named Christopher Coy.  
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Apparently, everyone else on the fire team had ignored their training and already 
gone to the lifeboats.  The fire was spreading.  Dave knew that he had to hurry.  
He just grabbed the coat and ran toward the column of flame.  Chad Murray 
[Chief Electrician] came running the other way and said ―Dale Burkeen is down‖.  
Dave started toward the crane.  Another blast knocked him off his feet and drove 
him back twenty feet.  He picked himself up and checked for Dale‘s pulse.  He 
couldn‘t find one, but knew he had to stay there trying.   
 
 As noted in this quote, the leader valued support for his worker over his fire-
fighting duty.  This is an interesting conundrum.  Had the individual continued on with 
his fire-fighting duties he may have been able to reduce the fire and save lives.  That 
assumption is counterfactual; however, if it is considered for purposes of example, we 
can compare and contrast the non-military domain to the military domain.  During the 
interview with a military commander (Ref. RW), he discussed the concept of Total Ship 
Survivability.  The concept of Total Ship Survivability implies that some lives might be 
lost to save many.  In many of the interviews with the Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon 
leaders, the interviewees emphasized their concern for workers over the crisis 
management response to the event.  The non-military leaders leaned heavily in favor of 
concern for workers, while the military leader balanced concern for workers with 
successful crisis response.  Thus, the two domains, military and non-military, have 
significant differences with regard to the warrior ethos.  In the military domain, the 
priorities are (1) mission first, then (2) protection of workers (troops); in the non-military 
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domain those priorities are reversed.  This is a significant area for future research in crisis 
leadership. 
 Next I suggest that this integrated model of extreme crisis leadership provides a 
useful framework for future research in extreme crisis leadership.  My integrated model is 
an attempt to show how disparate theories actually work together in continuums that 
illustrate the leadership concepts from routine through extreme to dangerous contexts.  I 
incorporated the leadership characteristics from the major crisis theories (discussed in 
Chapter 3) into six extreme crisis concepts and then demonstrate how those extreme 
crisis concepts change as events proceed from routine to dangerous.  Further the model 
shows the underlying dynamics of how those extreme crisis theories from Chapter 3 work 
in concert to explain extreme event leadership.   
Integrated Model of Extreme Crisis Leadership 
 In sum, the integrated model of extreme crisis concepts (Table 16) provides a 
framework for the future study of crisis management leadership.  This framework focuses 
on the crisis management literature as analyzed with the results of this dissertation.  I 
believe that this integrated model helps to reduce the ―Tower of Babel‖ (Chapter 2) 
criticism of the crisis management literature.  Further, that this integrated model offers a 
continuum of context, underlying dynamics and a model to explain leadership under 
extreme event circumstances.  
 As developed for each of the six extreme crisis concepts, Tables 10-15 represent 
the integrated extreme crisis model shown as Table 16.  Therefore, with the integrated 
model, the situational context represents the categories/severities of the events, and as the 
situational context continuum progresses from routine events to super-catastrophic, the 
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other five extreme crisis concepts reflect their associated continuums.  For example, for 
catastrophic events, one could expect to experience supraliminal felt emotions of death, 
situational decision-making and crisis responses (as stated earlier, these concepts become 
dominated by felt emotions), situational sensemaking and leadership that is situational 
and dominated by felt emotions of instinct and intuition. 
 
Table 16 – Integrated Model of Extreme Crisis Leadership 
Situational 
Context 
Felt Emotion Decision-making Crisis 
Response 
Sensemaking Leadership 
Routine Subliminal 
(success) 
Classical Readiness Positive evaluation 
 
Collaborative 
Resilience  Subliminal 
(skepticism) 
Framing and 
Cognitive 
Continuum Model 
 
Resilience Collective 
sensemaking 
Authoritarian 
and setback 
Surprise Supraliminal 
(unawareness) 
Recognition 
Primed and 
Naturalistic  
Complexity Updating,  
Optimistic bias, & 
Institutional effect 
 
Adaptive 
Failure Supraliminal 
(failure) 
Macrocognition Failure Doubt & 
Pessimism 
 
Non-linear 
Catastrophic  Supraliminal 
(death anxiety) 
 
Situational Situational Situational Situational 
Super-
Catastrophic  
Supraliminal 
(mortality 
salience) 
Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos  Warrior ethos Warrior ethos  
  
Noteworthy for this model is that events can proceed along different continuums.  
For instance, events may be catastrophic (situational context), yet the leader‘s decision-
making process remains classical, or at the routine category of events.  If decision-
making remains classical, this progression would likely be insufficient in creating a 
successful outcome for the event.  This integrated model was developed with 
progressions through the extreme crisis concept continuums as experienced from the 
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events studied (including the recognition that the Deepwater Horizon event proceeded 
immediately as a super-catastrophic event).   
 In the end, it is possible that the reason there are so many crisis theories is 
because each event is unique and presents data that create new streams of literature and 
different theories for each crisis concept and each portion of the continuum.  I believe 
that this uniqueness (primarily driven by case study research which builds unique 
theories) has created an array of seemingly disparate theories and concepts that lack 
integration.  This integrated extreme event crisis leadership model presented here (Table 
16) harmonizes those theories by demonstrating the applicability that each theory has 
within the continuum of routine to super-catastrophic events.  Rather than disparate 
theories, this integrated model shows how these crisis theories may be more useful at 
certain points during a crisis and how those theories apply as the severity increases.  This 
integrated model can be used to organize future extreme crisis research so that theories 
can build upon each other without exacerbating the ―Tower of Babel.‖ 
 Further, this integrated model of extreme crisis leadership finds the outer reaches 
of existing theories by discovering the significant impact of felt emotions on extreme 
crisis leadership.  The conclusions herein explore the dynamics that exist at the 
boundaries of extreme and dangerous events and the associated non-linearities.  As such, 
the felt emotions of leaders result in a warrior ethos of leadership.  For non-military 
domains the warrior ethos focuses on support for workers whereas in the military domain, 
mission often comes first before the focus on ―workers‖.   
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Limitations and Areas for Future Research 
 The limitations of qualitative research are covered in detail in Chapter 3.  
Especially in Chapter 3.8.1, I reference specific limitation from the research.  I offer two 
additional areas where I was limited in my pursuit of issues raised in the interviews.  
Those were in the areas of organizational adaptation and even more exploration of 
sensemaking in these events.  Next is a brief summary of those limitations and my 
response to them. 
 There is a potential limitation in this dissertation for interviewer bias given my 
extensive background in crisis leadership, and specifically, due to my personal 
involvement in the Fukushima event.  Regarding limitations for qualitative research, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007, p. 30) challenge the qualitative 
researcher to find fresh theory bridging well from rich qualitative data into mainstream 
deductive research.  Through the strategies mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, I concentrated 
on ensuring that this research seeks to comply with these major points.  Specifically, this 
research relies upon recursive cycling, the identification of research gaps, smart sampling 
of cases to illuminate interesting concepts, controlling interviewer bias, and pooling the 
data to develop a ―good‖ theory.  One area where this research has limits is in sampling 
routine crisis cases.  As discussed earlier, I intend to study extreme event cases.  There 
are many ―routine‖ crisis studies, which I can use as parallel data during my data 
analysis.   
 Gephart (2004) raises six problems noted in qualitative research.  First, Gephart 
(2004) suggests that there are too many ―one off‖ papers, i.e. one-of-a-kind, submitted.  
Agreed, this dissertation is a one-off paper.  Second, Gephart (2004) concludes that 
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researchers fail to conduct a thorough literature review at the beginning of their work.  
My literature review was extensive, and I added two additional literature reviews, i.e. felt 
emotions and decision-making.  A third and related problem noted by Gephart (2004) is 
that qualitative researchers need goals, objectives, or research questions to guide their 
work.  In my research, I identified nine ―research threads‖ that I use to guide my research 
and avoid this pitfall.  Fourth, Gephart (2004) advises that research papers provide the 
theoretical background related to the concepts covered by the researchers‘ paper 
including explaining key concepts among the theories, research questions, and 
methodologies of the domain.  In my research, I exhaustively explain the applicable 
leadership theories, concepts, and methodologies contained in the leadership literature.  
Fifth, Gephart (2004) concludes that many qualitative researchers fail to describe 
thoroughly the methodology, especially in capturing meaning of data, thoroughly 
interpreting results, drawing linkages across data, and explaining the origins of 
conclusions.  I believe that this dissertation accomplished these goals through the use of 
ATLAS.ti, and the qualitative reference books cited in Chapter 4.   Finally, Gephart 
(2004) notes a problem in that qualitative researchers fail to revisit research questions or 
goals in the results section of the researcher‘s submittal.  This dissertation revisited the 
past research prior to the conduct of this study as well as again to better frame some of 
the findings of this study not considered in the original literature review.  Also, the 
broader implications of the topic were addressed through the linkage of the crisis 
leadership theories to build an integrated model of crisis leadership. 
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 In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, Thomas and James (2005) offer a critique 
of grounded theory by challenging three fundamental precepts of grounded theory, i.e., 
ground, theory, and discovery.  Thomas and James (2005) claim first, that, 
 
Grounded theory oversimplifies complex meanings and interrelationships in data; 
second, that it constrains analysis, putting the cart (procedure) before the horse 
(interpretation); and third that it depends upon inappropriate models of induction 
and  asserts from them equally inappropriate claims to explanation and 
prediction (p. 768). 
 
 Thomas and James (2005) assert that holding to the terms ground, theory and 
discovery, limits the appreciative inquiry of researchers.  Thomas and James (2005) 
challenge the benefit of ―interpreting interpretations‖ (p. 789) as taking the process a step 
too far.  In this dissertation, I made liberal use of direct quotations.  Using direct quotes 
as a reference for conclusions should strengthen my research arguments.       
Conversely, Suddaby (2006) answered Gephart‘s (2004) ―From the Editors‖ column in 
the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) on the problems identified by AMJ Editors 
with qualitative research, specifically grounded theory research.  Suddaby (2006) gives 
six misconceptions regarding ―what grounded theory is not,‖ refer to Chapter 2.  I 
addressed those misconceptions by: 
 
   Following their advice as I proceeded through the collection and analysis 
of my data. 
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 In my dissertation I provided definitions for my codings and examples of 
codings.  
 I address theoretical saturation in Chapter 4.  
 Grounded theory method is not perfect, nor is it easy.  (Researcher 
comment: Noted!!!) 
   As developed in my dissertation, my methodology was rigorous, and 
thorough.   
 
 Glaser with Holton (2007) takes strong exception to naturalistic approaches to 
grounded theory research.  They believe that quantitative approaches (QDA) are invading 
grounded theory.  Furthermore, Glaser with Holton (2007) believes the flaws of QDA are 
many.  
  On the other hand, Glaser (2009) talks about the benefits of retaining grounded 
theory in the hands of the novice and believes that the future of grounded theory rests in 
the hands of these novices.  Thus, in this dissertation, I used a modified grounded theory 
approach which was more inductive research from a literature review and I used a fairly 
rigorous quantitative process with plenty of actual interview data included.   
 With regard to the validity of the interviews, I have discussed theoretical 
saturation earlier.  I also address retrospective bias of interviewees including conducting 
a sample analysis of ―in-case‖ versus ―past-case‖ test for validity.  The results showed no 
bias for the sample taken.  Also, forgetfulness is a flaw for some historical research.  In 
my interviews, I observed no instances where people could not remember details.  It 
could be that these cases are so dramatic; it is hard for people to forget the details.  I did 
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use secondary data for the Deepwater Horizon case for which there was the potential for 
retrospective bias or forgetfulness.   
 Further, there are a number of areas where this dissertation could expand into 
deeper research.  Specifically, this research was limited in the area of organizational 
structure as it relates to crisis management, and there is additional work that could 
provide further insights on sensemaking at the case level for the events covered in this 
dissertation.  This subchapter illustrates some of those limitations and offers suggestions 
for future research.  
 In the areas of organizational structure, research into the adaptive culture of 
organizations might provide more insights on the relationships between leadership and 
organizational structure for extreme events.  In several cases, interviewees discussed how 
a non-adaptive organizational structure and fragmented control have actually complicated 
the resolution of the event.  Specifically, in Super Storm Sandy, the differences between 
the leadership response in New York and New Jersey were mirror images.  In New York, 
the non-adaptive nature of multiple jurisdictions caused difficulties in establishing a 
unified command and developing a picture of the consequences of the storm unlike the 
adaptive and unified command in New Jersey.  With multiple jurisdictions in New York, 
it was difficult for the federal government to work with New York as opposed to the 
unified command in New Jersey.  Also, interviewees claim the response was more 
effective and efficient in New Jersey.  Given that the New Jersey Governor had hired his 
entire command structure, it was a significant advantage over the situation in New York 
with multiple leaders and staff tenure.  Similarly, in the Three Mile Island event, the 
Governor, because he was a new and did not have his team in place at the time of the 
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accident, adapted his organizational structure by bringing in people that he could trust 
from the outside, into his leadership circle.  
 In the Fukushima case, interviewees (YF, IN) suggested that early in the event, 
the organizational structure was non-adaptive.  The Prime Minister and the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company were separated from the operators at Fukushima.  This led to a 
major focus on the consequences in Tokyo (psycho-physical distance).  Some 
interviewees (YF, IN, MA) discussed their view that this non-adaptive, stovepipe 
organizational structure and how it contributed to elite panic.  For instance, not until 10 
days into the event did the government establish a unified command with Tokyo Electric 
Power Company and the Fukushima operators.  A similar organizational phenomenon 
occurred during the Three Mile Island event (Ref. HD).  
 Many interviewees (YF, GH, SS, RR, OD, and RW) discussed the role of 
leadership in sensemaking.  Chapter 4 provided some pertinent examples of leadership 
influences on sensemaking.  These examples included a case where the leader(s) was not 
aware of the actual physical condition of the facility because the leaders were sequestered 
in a bunker, while a leader in a similar situation did leave the bunker and he better 
understood the physical conditions and consequently was more successful in 
sensemaking.  Also, emotional intelligence was mentioned as a significant factor in 
leadership‘s capacity for sensemaking.  For example, interviewee (RW) was more 
appreciative of the role of emotional intelligence in an extreme event than some non-
military leaders.  Another example of leader capacity noted by interviewees as being 
significant to sensemaking and crisis outcome was the construct of ―optimistic bias‖.   
The concept of ―optimistic bias‖ was most notable in the Fukushima case where an 
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incorrect response strategy seriously complicated the event.  The response strategy could 
not keep pace with the event.  This insight of the ―response speed keeping pace with the 
event speed‖ is discussed by a number of interviewees (RW, RR, and OD) in this 
dissertation.  
 These are a few areas that are important future research topics.  A better 
understanding of the role of adaptive organizational structures would enhance the 
abilities of organizations responding to extreme events. The associated leadership, 
decision-making, and external influences constructs can only illuminate the elements of 
sensemaking thereby, enabling clearer insights on the roles of leadership in extreme 
events.   
Conclusions 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to explore the leadership constructs that 
apply uniquely to extreme event crises.  A qualitative, grounded theory-influenced 
approach was used to discover insights regarding extreme events despite their rarity.  An 
inductive and qualitative approach allowed the researcher to explore and gain theoretical 
knowledge of a phenomenon without biasing the data and results with preconceived ideas 
or hypotheses (Glaser, 1992), and instead, enabling the gathering of unique theoretical 
knowledge grounded in real events.  Nineteen interviews, one book (Shroder, et al. 2011), 
and five court transcripts were used as data that ranged from the White House Situation 
Room, the Red Cross, senior level responders, and first responders of three extreme 
events.  Stories from the interviewees were vivid and highly informative.  This 
dissertation benefitted from their sometimes tragic experiences.  The resultant insights 
regarding the six major crisis concepts, the uniqueness of each event, the role of felt 
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emotions, and the integrated extreme event crisis leadership model came from those 
experiences.  In particular, the role of felt emotions cannot be underestimated during 
Black Swan (Taleb, 2010) events.  In those events, felt emotions changed the dynamics 
of each of the five other constructs dramatically and, more likely, determined the success 
or failure of the extreme crisis responders.   
 I hope that this dissertation inspires researchers to reach beyond the results 
discovered herein.  In the events researched for this dissertation, and many others, there 
were heroes who responded effectively to the extreme events and prevented them from 
cascading into more dangerous events.  Those responders are considered heroes for their 
actions under unfathomable conditions.  The goal of this research was to discover new 
leadership models that would aid future extreme crisis leaders and eliminate or reduce the 
need for more heroics.  Those who toil in this area of research hope that their research 
means that there will be less need for heroes in the future.  
  
279 
 
REFERENCES 
  
Abel, J. E. (2011). Can cool Japan save post-disaster Japan? On the Possibilities and 
Impossibilities of a Cool Japanology. International Journal of Japanese 
Sociology, 20(1), 59–72.  
Aini, M. S., & Fakhru‘l-Razi, A. (2013). Latent errors of socio-technical disasters: A 
Malaysian case study.  Safety Science, 51(1), 284–292.  
Alvesson, M. (1996). Leadership studies: From procedure and abstraction to reflexivity 
and situation.  The Leadership Quarterly, 7(4), 455-485 
 Argyris, C. (1977). Double loop learning in organizations. Harvard Business 
 Review, 55(5), 115-125. 
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997).  Suppression, 
accessibility of death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense: Exploring 
the psychodynamics of terror management. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 73(1), 5–18. 
Ashmos, D. P., Duchon, D., & McDaniel, R. R. (2000). Organizational responses to 
complexity: The effect on organizational performance. Journal of Organizational 
Change Management, 13(6), 577. 
Avolio, B. J., & Bass, B. M. (1995). Individual consideration viewed at multiple levels of 
analysis: A multi-level framework for examining the diffusion of transformational 
leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 6(2), 199-218. 
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations of thought & action: A social cognitive theory. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Baran, B. E., & Scott, C. W. (2010). Organizing ambiguity: A grounded theory of 
leadership and sensemaking within dangerous contexts. Military Psychology, 22, 
42-69.  
Barrows, H., Feightner, J.W., Neufeld, V.R., & Norman, G.R. (1978). Analysis of the 
clinical methods of medical students and physicians.  Hamilton, Ontario, Canada: 
McMaster University. 
Bartone, P. T. (1999). Hardiness protects against war-related stress in army reserve 
 forces. Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 51(2), 72. 
Bass, B. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1990). Manual for the multifactor leadership questionnaire. 
Palo  Alto: Consulting Psychologist Press. 
Bass, B. M., & Bass, R. (2009). The bass handbook of leadership: Theory, research, and 
 managerial applications. Free Press. 
280 
 
Beach, L.R. (1990). Image theory: Decision making in personal and organizational 
 contexts. London: Wiley. 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. (1985).  Beck Anxiety Checklist. Unpublished 
 manuscript, University of Pennsylvania. 
Bernard, W., & Kite, M. (2010). The psychology of prejudice and discrimination. (2 ed., 
 pp. 251-254). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 
Berlew, D. E. (1974). Leadership and organizational excitement. California Management 
 Review, 17(2), 21-30. 
Boin, A. (2009). The new world of crises and crisis management: Implications for 
policymaking and research. Review of Policy Research, 26(4), 367–377.  
Bond, S., & Cooper, S. (2006). Modelling emergency decisions: recognition‐primed 
decision making. The literature in relation to an ophthalmic critical 
incident. Journal of clinical nursing, 15(8). 
Brown, A. D., & Jones, M. (2000). Honorable members and dishonorable deeds: 
Sensemaking, impression management and legitimization in the arms to Iraq 
affair.  Human Relations, 53, 655–689. 
Bryman, A. S. (2004). Qualitative research on leadership: A critical but appreciative 
review. The Leadership Quarterly, 15(6), 729−769. 
Bryman, A., Bresnen, M., Beardworth, A., & Keil, T. (1988). Qualitative research and 
the study of leadership. Human Relations, 39, 65−79. 
Bryman, A. (1992). Charisma and leadership in organizations. London: Sage. 
Cabral-Cardoso, C., & Cunha, M. P. E. (2003). The business lunch: Toward a research 
agenda. Leadership & Organization Development Journal, 24(7), 371-379. 
Campbell, D. J., Hannah, S. T., & Matthews, M. D. (2010). Leadership in military and 
other dangerous contexts: Introduction to the special topic issue. Military 
Psychology, 22, S1-S14.  
Cantrell, J. (2011).  Human Dimensions of Wildlife, the Role of a Sense of Self-in-Place 
and Risk Amplification in Promoting the Conservation of Wildlife. Taylor & 
Francis Group, LLC. 
Casto, C. (2014).  Crisis Management: A Qualitative Study of Extreme Event Leadership, 
Kennesaw State Dissertation. 
Chatterjee, A., & Hambrick, D. C. (2007). It‘s all about me: Narcissistic Chief Executive 
Officers and their effects on company strategy and performance. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 52(3), 351–386.  
281 
 
Cialdini, R. B., Trost, M. R., & Newsom, J. T. (1995). Preference for consistency: The 
development of a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral 
implications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(2), 318.  
Coffey, A., B. Holbrook and P. Atkinson (1996) Qualitative Data Analysis: Technologies 
and representations, Sociological Research Online, vol. 1, no. 1. 
Comfort, L. K. (2002). Rethinking security: Organizational fragility in extreme events. 
Public Administration Review, 62(s1), 98-107. 
Conger, J. A. (1998). Qualitative research as the cornerstone methodology for 
understanding leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 9, 107−121. 
Crittenden, V., & Woodside, A. G. (2007). Building skills in thinking: Toward a 
pedagogy in metathinking. Journal of Education for Business, 83(1), 37–44.  
Crouch, M., & McKenzie, H. (2006). The logic of small samples in interview-based 
 qualitative research. Social Science Information, 45(4), 483-499. 
 
Cupchik, G. (2001). Constructivist Realism: An ontology that encompasses positivist and 
constructivist approaches to the social sciences. Forum Qualitative Social / 
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 2(1). 
Daft, R. L., & Weick, K. E. (2001). Toward a model of organizations as interpretation 
systems. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.  
DeChurch, L. A., Shawn Burke, C., Shuffler, M. L., Lyons, R., Doty, D., & Salas, E.A. 
(2011). Historiometric analysis of leadership in mission critical multi-team 
environments. The Leadership Quarterly, 22, 152–169.    
Denrell, J. (2003). Vicarious learning, undersampling of failure, and the myths of 
management. Organization Science: 227–243. 
Dey, I. (1999) Grounding grounded theory—guidelines for qualitative inquiry.  London, 
Academic Press. 
Dunbar, R. L. M., & Garud, R. (2009).  Distributed knowledge and indeterminate 
meaning: The case of the Columbia shuttle flight. Organization Studies, 30(4), 
397–421.  
Dynes, R. (1974). Organizational behavior in disaster. Book, Columbus: Ohio State 
University Disaster Research. 
Dynes, R. R., Quarantelli, E. L., & Kreps, G. A. (1981). A perspective on disaster 
planning Disaster Research Center, Ohio State University. 
Edwards, J. A. (1993). Talking data: Transcription and coding in discourse research. 
282 
 
 Hillsdale, NJ [u.a.]: Erlbaum. 
Egan, M. J. (2011).  The normative dimensions of institutional stewardship: High 
reliability, institutional constancy, public trust and confidence. Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management, 19(1), 51–58.    
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities 
and challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25-32. 
Farazmand, A. (2009). Learning from the Katrina crisis: A global and international 
perspective with implications for future crisis management.  Public 
Administration Review, 67, 149–159.  
Fish, S. (1989) Doing what comes naturally.  Oxford, Clarendon Press. 
Fisher, K., Hutchings, K., & Sarros, J. C. (2010). The "bright" and "shadow" aspects of In 
Extremis leadership. Military Psychology, 22, S89-116.  
Foldy, E. G., Goldman, L., & Ospina, S. (2008).  Sensegiving and the role of cognitive 
shifts in the work of leadership. The Leadership Quarterly, 19, 514−529. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2003). The value of positive emotions: The emerging science of 
positive psychology is coming to understand why it's good to feel good. American 
Scientist, 91(4), 330-335. 
Friedman, T. L. (2006). The world is flat [updated and expanded]: A brief history of the 
twenty-first century.  Farrar, Straus and Giroux.  
Friese, S. (2012).  Qualitative Data Analysis with ATLAS.ti.  Thousand Oaks CA: Sage 
Gabarro, J. J. (1978).  The development of trust, influence, and expectations. 
 Interpersonal Behavior: Communication and Understanding in 
Relationships, 290, 303. 
Gephart, R. P., & Wolfe, R. A. (1989). Qualitative data analysis: Three microcomputer-
supported approaches.  Academy of Management, p. 382-386. 
Gephart Jr., R. P. (2004). Qualitative research and the academy of management journal. 
Academy of Management Journal, 47, 454-462. 
Gephart, R. (1997). Hazardous measures: An interpretive textual analysis of quantitative 
sensemaking during crises. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 583-622. 
Gill, D. A. (2007).  Secondary trauma or secondary disaster? Insights from Hurricane 
Katrina. Sociological Spectrum, 27(6), 613–632.   
283 
 
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2012). Seeking qualitative rigor in 
inductive research: Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research 
Methods. 
Glaser, B. G. (with Holton). (2007). Naturalist inquiry and grounded theory. Historical 
Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung. Supplement, 114-132. 
Glaser, B. G. (2009).  The novice GT researcher. Grounded Theory Review, 8(2), 1-21. 
Glaser, B. G. (2010).  The future of grounded theory. Grounded Theory Review, 9(2), 1-
14. 
Glaser, B. G. (2011).  Blocking conceptualization. Grounded Theory Review, 10(1), 1-15. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for 
qualitative research. Chicago: Adeline Press. 
Goud, N. H. (2005). Courage: Its nature and development. The Journal of Humanistic 
Counseling, Education and Development, 44(1), 102-116. 
Goulding, C. (2001). Grounded theory: A magical formula or a potential nightmare. 
 [Article]. Marketing Review, 2(1), 21. 
 
Guba, Egon & Lincoln, Yvonna (1985). Naturalist Inquiry: London: Sage, 
Guest, G., Bunce, A., & Johnson, L. (2006). How many interviews are enough? Field 
 Methods, 18(1), 59-82. 
 
Hadley, C. N., Pittinsky, T. L., Sommer, S. A., & Zhu, W. (2011). Measuring the efficacy 
of leaders to assess information and make decisions in a crisis: The C-LEAD 
scale. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(4), 633–648.    
Hannah, S. T., & Avolio, B. J. (2011). The locus of leader character. The Leadership 
Quarterly, 22(5), 979-983.  
Hannah, S. T., Campbell, D. J., & Matthews, M. D. (2010). Advancing a research agenda 
for leadership in dangerous contexts. Military Psychology, 22, S157-S189.  
Hannah, S. T., Uhl-Bien, M., Avolio, B. J., & Cavarretta, F. L. (2009).  A framework for 
examining leadership in extreme contexts. The Leadership Quarterly, 20(6), 897–
919.   
Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., Luthans, F., & P.D. Harms. (2008).  Leadership efficacy: 
Review and future directions. The Leadership Quarterly, 19, 669-692. 
Hayes, J. P., Morey, R. A., Petty, C. M., Seth, S., Smoski, M. J., McCarthy, G., & LaBar, 
K. S. (2010).  Staying cool when things get hot:  Emotion regulation modulates 
neural mechanisms of memory encoding.  Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4. 
284 
 
Hernes, T., Maitlis, S., Tsoukas, H., Pearson, K. A., Gergen, K. J., & Sutcliffe, K. (2008).  
First international symposium on process organization studies.  Studies, 29(11), 
1487.  
Hiller, N. J., DeChurch, L. A., Murase, T., & Doty, D. (2011). Searching for outcomes of 
 leadership: A 25-year review. Journal of Management, 37: 1137–1177. 
 
House, R. J. (1977). A 1976 theory of charismatic leadership. In J. G. Hunt & L. L. 
Larson (Eds.), Leadership: The cutting edge (pp. 189-207). Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press. 
Hunt, J. G. (1991). Leadership: A new synthesis. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
James, E. H., & Wooten, L. P. (2005). Leadership as (un)usual: How to display 
competence in times of crisis. Organizational Dynamics, 34(2), 141–152.    
Jennings, P. D., & Greenwood, R. (2003). Constructing the iron cage: Institutional theory 
and enactment.  Debating Organization: Point-Counterpoint in: Organization 
Studies, 195. 
Joffe, H. (2003). Risk: From perception to social representation.  British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 42(1), 55–73.   
Kaghan, W. N., Strauss, A. L., Barley, S. R., Brannen, M. Y., & Thomas, R. J. (1999). 
The practice and uses of field research in the 21st century organization. Journal of 
Management Inquiry, 8, 67 – 81. 
Kasperson, R. (1992).  The social amplification of risk: progress in developing an 
integrative framework - Social theories of risk.  Praeger: Westport, CT 
Kasperson, R. & Kasperson, X. (1996).  Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management, Risk 
Analysis, p. 95-105. 
Kasperson, X., & Kasperson, R. (2005).  The Social Contours of Risk, Volume I: Publics, 
Risk Communication & the Social Amplification of Risk.  Earthscan, Virginia.  
Kasperson, R. Renn, O., Slovic, P., Brown, J., Goble, E., Kasperson, X. & Ratick, S., 
(1987).  The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, Risk
 Analysis, 8, p177-187.   
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1978) The social psychology of organizations. New York: 
Wiley. 
Kaufman, B. (1993). Kennedy, John, F. as world leader - a perspective on the literature. 
Diplomatic History 17.3 (1993): 447–470. 
285 
 
Kayes, D. C. (2004). The 1996 Mt. Everest climbing disaster: The breakdown of learning 
in teams. Human Relations, 57(10), 1236–1284.  
Kelle, U. (1995). Introduction: an overview of computer-aided methods in qualitative 
research. In: Kelle, U. (Ed.) Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis.  Sage, 
Newbury Park, CA, pp. 1-17. 
Kempster, S., & Parry, K. W. (2011). Grounded theory and leadership research: A critical 
realist perspective. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(1), 106-120. 
Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., Zsambok, C. (1993) Decision making in action: 
Models and methods. Westport, CT, US: Ablex Publishing. 
Klein, G. (1998) Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Mass, pp. 1-30. 
Klenke, K. (Ed.). (2008). Qualitative research in the study of leadership.  Emerald group 
publishing. 
Lagadec, P. (2009). A new cosmology of risks and crises: Time for a radical shift in 
paradigm and practice. Review of Policy Research, 26(4), 473–486.   
Landau, M., & Chisholm, D. (1995). The arrogance of optimism: Notes on failure-
avoidance management. Management Science, 3(2)  
Lapidot, Y., Kark, R., & Shamir, B. (2007).  The impact of situational vulnerability on 
the development and erosion of followers' trust in their leader.  The Leadership 
Quarterly, 18(1), 16-34. 
La Porte, T. R. (2006). A Strawman speaks up: Comments on the limits of Safety. 
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 2(4), 207–211.  
La Porte, T. R., & Rochlin, G. (1994). A rejoinder to Perrow. Journal of Contingencies & 
Crisis Management, 2(4), 221.  
La Porte, T. R. (2011). On vectors and retrospection: Reflections on understanding public 
organizations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 19(1), 59–64.  
Lettieri, E., & Masella, Cristina & Radaelli, Giovanni, (2009).  Disaster management: 
Findings from a systematic review Disaster Prevention and Management, 18(2), 
117-136. 
Lewins, A. and C. Silver (2007). Using Software in Qualitative Research: A Step-by-Step 
Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lipshitz, R. (1994).  Decision making in three modes.  Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behavior, 24, 47-66. 
286 
 
Locke, K. (2001). Grounded theory in management research. London: Sage Publications 
 Ltd. 
 
Lodge, M. (2009). The public management of risk: The case for deliberating among 
worldviews. Review of Policy Research, 26(4), 395–408.   
Lofland, J. (1971). Analyzing social settings. Belmont, Wadsworth. 
Maclean, N. (1992). Young men and fire: A true story of the Mann Gulch fire. University 
of Chicago Press. 
Martin, P. Y., & Turner, B. A. (1986). Grounded theory and organizational research. The 
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 22(2), 141-157. 
Maitlis, S., & Sonenshein, S. (2010). Sensemaking in crisis and change: Inspiration and 
insights from Weick (1988). Journal of Management Studies, 47(3), 551–580.  
Morse, J. (1995).  The significance of saturation. Qualitative health research, 5(2), 147. 
Mikusova, M. (2011). Changes in the research of crisis. World Academy of Science, 
Engineering & Technology, 80, 307–311.  
Miller, D. (1988). Organizational pathology and industrial crisis. Organization & 
Environment, 2(1), 65–74.  
Mirvis, P. (1996). Historical foundations of organization learning. Journal of 
Organizational Change Management, 9(1), 13–31.  
Mohr, L. B. (1982). Explaining organizational behavior.   Jossey-Bass San Francisco. 
Montgomery, H. (1988). From cognition to action: the search for dominance in decision 
making. In H. Montgomery, & O. Svenson (Eds.). Process and Structure in 
Human Decision Making, Wiley: New York; 471 -483. 
Morse, J. (2000). Determining sample size. Qualitative Health Research, 10(1), 3-5. 
Muffet-Willett, S., & Kruse, S. D. (2009). Crisis leadership: Past research and future 
directions. Journal of Business Continuity & Emergency Planning, 3(3), 248–258.  
Mumford, M. D. (2005). Something old, something new: The mission of the leadership 
quarterly. The Leadership Quarterly, 16(1), 9–15.  
Nafday, A. M. (2009). Strategies for managing the consequences of Black Swan events. 
Leadership & Management in Engineering, 9(4), 191–197.    
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. 
Review of General Psychology, 2(2), 175–220.   
287 
 
Nutt, P. C. (2004). Prospects and problems in the transformation of public organizations. 
Public Performance & Management Review, 27(4), 51–66.  
Parashevas, A. (2006). Crisis management or crisis response system?: A complexity 
science approach to organizational crises. Management Decision, 44(7), 892–907.   
Parks, C. M. (1971). Psycho-social transitions: A field for study. Social Science, 5, 101–
115.  
Pascale, R. (1990). Managing on the edge of chaos. London: Viking. 
Parry, K. W. (1998). Grounded theory and social process: A new direction for leadership 
research. The Leadership Quarterly, 9(1), 85−105. 
Pearson, C. M., Misra, S. K., Clair, J. A., & Mitroff, I. I. (1997). Managing the 
unthinkable. Organizational Dynamics, 26(2), 51–64.  
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1993). A theory of explanation-based decision making. In 
G.A. Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C.E. Zsambok (Eds.). Decision making 
in action: models and methods (pp. 188-201). Norwood, CT: Ablex. 
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies. New York: 
Basic Books.  
Perrow, C. (1994). The limits of safety: The enhancements of a theory of accidents. 
Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management, 2(4), 212.  
Perrow, C. (2007). The next catastrophe: Reducing our vulnerabilities to natural, 
industrial, and terrorist disasters. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.  
Perrow, C. (2009). What‘s needed is application, not reconciliation: A response to 
Shrivastava, Sonpar and Pazzaglia.  Human Relations, 62(9), 1391-1393. 
Pettigrew, A. M. (1990). Longitudinal field research on change: Theory and practice. 
Organization Science, (3), 267-292. 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence perspective. Stanford Business Books.  
Phillips, D. L. (1973). Abandoning method. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Piaget, J. (1967/1971).  Biology and Knowledge.  Chicago University Press; and 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Quarentelli, E. L. (1988). Disaster crisis management: A summary of research findings. 
Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), 373.   
Quick, J. C., & Wright, T. A. (2011).  Character-based leadership, context and 
consequences. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(5), 984-988.  
288 
 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Merging paradigms: decision making, management, and cognitive 
control. In R. Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub, & L. Martin (Eds.). Decision making under 
stress: emerging themes and applications (pp. 67-84). Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Reason, J. T. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational accidents.  Ashgate Aldershot.  
Reason, J. T. (1993). Managing the management risk: New approaches to organizational 
safety. In B. Wilpert, & T. U. Qvale (Eds.), (pp. 7–22). Hillsdale, NJ England: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Rempel, J. K., Holmes, J. G., & Zanna, M. P. (1985).  Trust in close relationships.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(1), 95. 
Renn O. (1992).  Concepts of Risk: a Classification.  In: S. Krimsky and D. Goldin (eds), 
Social theories of risk. Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 53-79. 
Renn O. (1998). Three decades of risk research: accomplishments and new challenges.  
Journal of Risk Research 1 (1), 49–71. 
Renn, O., Burns, W., Kasperson, R., Kasperson, X. & Slovic, P. (1992).  The Social 
Amplification of Risk: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Application, Social 
Issues (Special Issue: Public Responses to Environmental Hazards),  
 48(4), p. 137–60. 
 
Revlin, R. (2013).  Cognition: Theory and Practice, University of California, Santa 
Barbara. 
Roth, W. D., & Mehta, J. D. (2002). The Rashomon effect combining positivist and 
interpretivist approaches in the analysis of contested events. Sociological Methods 
& Research, 31(2), 131-173. 
Sagan, S. D. (1994). Toward a political theory of organizational reliability. Journal of 
Contingencies & Crisis Management, 2(4), 228.  
Salancik, G. R. (1977). Commitment and the control of organizational behavior and 
belief. New Directions in Organizational Behavior, 1–54.  
Samuels, S. M., Foster, C. A., & Lindsay, D. R. (2010). Freefall, self-efficacy, and 
leading in dangerous contexts. Military Psychology, 22, S117-36.  
Santella, N., Steinberg, L. J., & Parks, K. (2009).  Decision making for extreme events: 
Modeling critical infrastructure interdependencies to aid mitigation and response 
planning. Review of Policy Research, 26(4), 409–422.    
Schumpter, J. A. (1942).  Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper.  
Seligman, M. E. P., Abramson, L. Y., Semmel, A., & von Baeyer, C. (1979).  Depressive 
Attributional Style.  Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 88, 242-247. 
289 
 
Sementelli, A.(2007).Toward a Taxonomy of Disaster and Crisis Theories. 
Administrative Theory & Practice, 29(4), 497.  
Shrivastava, P., Mitroff, I., Miller, I., Miglani, D. & Anil, D. (1988).  Understanding 
industrial crises. Journal of Management Studies, 25(4), 285.  
Shrivastava, S., Sonpar, K., & Pazzaglia, F. (2009). Normal accident theory versus high 
reliability theory: A resolution and call for an open systems view of accidents. 
Human Relations, 62(9), 1357-1390. 
Shrivastava, S., Sonpar, K., & Pazzaglia, F. (2009). Reconciliation can lead to better 
application: A rejoinder to Perrow (2009). Human Relations, 62(9), 1395-1398. 
Schutz, A. (1973). Concept and theory formation in the social sciences. In: Natanson, M. 
(Ed.) Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, Martinus Nijho, The 
Hague, Netherlands, p. 48-66. 
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analyzing talk, text and 
interaction (2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
Simon, H. A. (1972). Theories of bounded rationality. Decision and Organization, 1, 
161-176. 
Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Harmon-Jones, E., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., Amdt, J., & 
Abend, T. (1997).  Terror management and cognitive- experiential self-theory: 
Evidence that terror management occurs in the experiential system.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1132-1146. 
Slovic, P. (1991).  Perception of risk and the future of nuclear power.  In M. Golay (Ed.), 
Proceedings of the First MIT International Conference on the Next Generation of 
Nuclear Power Technology (Sec. 6, pp. 2-6).  Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, Program for Advanced Nuclear Studies.  
Smith, D. (2004).  For whom the bell tolls: Imagining accidents and the development of 
crisis simulation in organizations. Simulation & Gaming, 35(3), 347–362.  
Smits, S. J., & Ally, N. E. (2003).  ―Thinking the unthinkable – leadership‘s role in 
creating behavioral readiness for crisis management. Competitiveness Review: An 
International Business Journal Incorporating Journal of Global Competitiveness, 
13(1), 1–23.  
Snyder, C. R. (2002).  Hope theory: Rainbows in the mind.  Psychological Inquiry, 13(4), 
249-275. 
Suddaby, R. (2006). From the editors: What grounded theory is not. Academy of 
Management. 
290 
 
Sweeney, P. J. (2010). Do soldiers reevaluate trust in their leaders prior to combat 
operations? Military Psychology, 22(S1), 70-88.  
Sweeney, P. J., Thompson, V., & Blanton, H. (2009). Trust and influence in combat: An 
interdependence model. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39(1), 235-264. 
Thach, L. (2012).  Managerial perceptions of crisis leadership in public and private 
organizations: An interview study in the United States.  International Journal of 
Management, 712-725. 
 ‗t Hart, P. (1990). Groupthink in government: A study of small groups and policy failure. 
Swets & Zeitlinger Publishers.  
Taleb, N. N. (2010). The Black Swan: The impact of the highly improbable.  Random 
House Trade Paperbacks.  
Thomas, G., & James, D. (2005). Reinventing grounded theory: Some questions about 
theory, ground and discovery. British Educational Research Journal, 32(6), 767-
795. 
Thompson, R. C., & Hunt, J. G. (1997).  The Thompson/Hunt flight plan revisited. 
Academy of Management Review, 22(2), 333–334.   
Tremoliere, B., De Neys, W., & Bonnefon, J. (2012).  Mortality salience and morality: 
Thinking about death makes people less utilitarian. (report).  Cognition, (3), 379.  
Turner, N., & Gray, G. C. (2009). Socially constructing safety. Human Relations, 62(9), 
1259-1266. 
Turner, B. A., & Pidgeon, N. (1978).  Man-made disasters. London: Wykeham,  
Turner, B. A., & Pidgeon, N. F. (1997). Man-made disasters. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann; 2nd ed.  
Useem, M., Cook, J. R., & Sutton, L. (2005). Developing leaders for decision making 
under stress: Wildland firefighters in the South Canyon fire and its aftermath. 
Academy of Management Learning and Education, 4, 461−485. 
Vaughan, D. (1997).  The Challenger Launch Decision. University of Chicago Press. 
Vendelo, M. T., & Rerup C. (2009).  Weak cues and attentional triangulation: The Pearl 
Jam concert accident at Roskilde festival. Academy of Management Meeting, 
Chicago, Illinois, August 7–11., 1–38. 
von Lubitz, D. K. J. E., Beakley, J. E., & Patricelli, F. (2008).  ‗All hazards approach‘ to 
disaster management: The role of information and knowledge management, 
Boyd‘s OODA loop, and network-centricity. Disasters, 32(4), 561–585.    
291 
 
Voogd, H. (2004).  Disaster prevention in urban environments. European Journal of 
Spatial Development, 12, 1–20.  
Wachtendorf, T. (2009).  Trans-system social ruptures: Exploring issues of vulnerability 
and Resiliency. Review of Policy Research, 26(4), 379–393.    
Waldrop, M. (1992).  Complexity: The emerging science at the edge of order and chaos. 
Book, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Weeks, M. R. (2007). Organizing for disaster: Lessons from the military. Business 
Horizons, 50(6), 479-489.  
Weick, K. E. (1999).  Sensemaking as an organizational dimension of global change. 
Organizational Dimensions of Global Change, 39–56.  
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2007).  Managing the unexpected: Resilient 
performance in an age of uncertainty.  Jossey-Bass.  
Weick, Karl E.,Sutcliffe, Kathleen M., Obstfeld, David. (2005). Organizing and the 
process of sensemaking. Organization Science, 16(4), 409.    
Weick, K. E. (1987).  Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. California 
Management Review, 29(2), 112–127.  
Weick, K. E. (1988).  Enacted sensemaking in crisis situations. Journal of Management 
Studies, 25(4), 305.  
Weick, K. E. (1993).  The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch 
disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38(4), 628–652.  
Weick, K. E. (1995).  Sensemaking in organizations. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.  
Weick, K. E. (2001).  Making sense of the organization. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell 
Publishing.  
Weick, K. E. (2008). On the Fireline: Living and dying with wildland firefighters. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 53(4), 774–777.  
Weick, K. E. (2008).  Trust: A bigger picture. Academy of Management Review, 33(1), 
271–274.    
Weick, K. E. (2010).  Reflections on enacted sensemaking in the Bhopal disaster. Journal 
of Management Studies, 47(3), 537.   
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2001).  Managing the unexpected: Assuring high 
performance in an age of complexity. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; 1st ed.  
Wicks, J. (2002).  Table for six billion, please. Focus on Leadership: Servant-Leadership 
for the 21st Century, 269–287. Wiley, New York.  
292 
 
Wolfe, R. A., Gephart, R. P., & Johnson, T. E. (1993). Computer-facilitated qualitative 
data analysis: Potential contributions to management research. Journal of 
Management, 19(3), 637. 
Yammarino, F. J., Mumford, M. D., Connelly, M. S., & Dionne, S. D. (2010). Leadership 
and team dynamics for dangerous military contexts.  Military Psychology, 22, 15-
41.  
Yanagisawa, K., Kashima, E. S., Moriya, H., Masui, K., Furutani, K., Nomura, M, Ura, 
M. (2013).  Non-conscious neural regulation against mortality concerns. 
Neuroscience Letters, 552(0), 35-39.  
Yannopaulo, N. (2011).  Media amplification of a brand crisis and its effect on brand 
trust.  Journal of Marketing Management, 27, 5–6, p. 530–546. 
Yin, R. K. 1994. Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Yukl, G. A. (2006).  Leadership in organizations.  Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 6th ed.  
Yukl, G. (1994). Leadership in Organizations. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
 
  
293 
 
APPENDIX A – Table of Unified Extreme Event Characteristics 
 
List of Unified Extreme Event Characteristics 
Researcher(s) Characteristic Discussion Summary 
Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) 
 
 
Non-linearity as a 
―threshold‖ effect 
Concepts like trust may 
be linear up to the point 
where life and death 
consequences or 
decisions are involved.  
Beyond an undefined 
threshold, the concepts 
take on completely new 
meanings. 
Discusses how the threshold effect impacts 
the way researchers might measure concepts.   
Hannah, et al. (2009) 1.Intolerable magnitude 
2. Preparation time as a 
non-characteristic 
3. Probability 
4. Ambiguity of cause, 
effect, and means 
resolution (leaders fail) 
1. Such threats must 
reach the threshold of 
―intolerable magnitude‖ 
(Hannah, et al. 2009, p. 
898) where goals are 
imperative such as life 
and death and require a 
level of leadership much 
beyond that of a routine 
crisis. 2. Extreme events 
can be slow in inception 
or lengthy. 3. 
―Probability‖ as an 
ingredient but not 
necessarily a stand-alone 
characteristic. 4. 
Organizations may find 
themselves in an extreme 
crisis with the capacity to 
respond but may not be 
able to execute the 
capacity adequately or 
may become hampered 
by ineffective decision-
making. 
 
Leadership is differentiated in a routine crisis 
and extreme event. 
Taleb (2010) 1. Confirmation biases 
narrative fallacy 
2. Lack of human 
imagination 
3. Signal theory (missing 
signals),  
4. Ludic fallacy (tunnel 
vision) 
Lack of planning for 
Black Swan events or one 
does not recognize the 
possibility of an 
impossible catastrophe.  
He focuses on the human 
element that often ignores 
the possibility of Black 
Swan events.   
Humans have blind spots. 
Vendelo and Rerup 
(2009); Weick (1990) & 
Dunbar and Garud (2009) 
1. Risk context 
2. Incubation period 
3. Pluralistic ignorance 
4. Collective sensemaking 
5.Team trust 
6.Panic 
7.Length of disaster 
Situations where threats 
are low; perceived low 
risk environments but 
risks can incubate.  There 
is a period where latent 
weaknesses are present 
but yet unobserved or 
active.  
 
 
Latent conditions go unobserved. 
Boin (2009) Transboundary effects 
1. Tightly coupled 
systems 
2. Extends cross-
functionally and cross-
nationally 
3. Transcends time 
boundaries 
Describes the ―escalatory 
power‖ of a 
transboundary crisis.  
Because globalization 
makes the world flatter 
small perturbations may 
have drastic 
consequences.  A 
Events cascade, escalating the consequences 
dramatically through coupling. 
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4. No defined beginning, 
end, or ground zero 
5.Escalates quickly in 
unforeseen directions 
exploiting linkages 
6. Causes unfathomable 
damage 
coupling of systems 
extends this issue by 
creating the ―highways 
for failure.‖ 
Wachtendorf (2009) Transboundary social 
ruptures 
National and 
transnational system 
vulnerability to and 
resiliency. 
Describes events that reach beyond societal 
boundaries and disrupt multiple social 
systems across nations. 
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APPENDIX B – Summary of Extreme Leadership Concepts 
 
 Throughout this dissertation, I discuss the need to identify leadership ―concepts‖.  
Those concepts are characteristics and actions that may constitute ―leadership‖ and 
enable the systematic examination of leadership (Campbell, Hannah & Matthews, 2010).  
Section 2.1 of this dissertation describes the relationship between the characteristics of 
extreme events and the concepts of leadership.  That relationship is important because the 
unique characteristics of extreme events, e.g., intolerable magnitude, cascading, 
transboundary nature of extreme events, necessitates a very different type of leadership 
needed in these events.  Remember the points made by Dynes (1974); Dynes and 
Quarentelli & Kreps (1981), that the abilities of leaders are second only to the cause of 
the event itself in determining the outcome of a disaster.  Thus, concepts that formulate 
leadership must be considered in the study of extreme events.  This section consolidates 
the concepts identified throughout the dissertation.  This consolidation is useful in 
identifying all of the elements in extreme event leadership.   
 Within this dissertation several sections identify leadership concepts.  For 
example, in discussing the characteristics of extreme events, Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) highlight ―trust‖ in leadership and how trust can vary due to the threshold effect.  
Thus, when formulating the research design for this dissertation, leadership trust and the 
threshold effect are strong variables for consideration. 
 In discussing readiness theory, Voogd (2004) shared that command and control 
along with other readiness concepts have their limits.  Extreme events are difficult, if not 
impossible, to predict; therefore, common leadership concepts such as training, roles and 
responsibilities, role knowledge, training, rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during 
crisis may be of limited value in an extreme crisis.  In fact, training and simulation may 
cause blind spots.  These thoughts are important in designing questions for this study. 
 A significant discussion of leadership concepts within this dissertation surrounds 
the sensemaking theory.  Weick (1988) cautions us that leaders while trying to make 
sense out of a situation may actually change the event thereby making the situation 
worse.  Weick (1988) concludes in his research that developing a ―shared understanding‖ 
is essential for leadership success.  Weick (1988) dissects shared understanding into three 
296 
 
components, i.e., commitment, identity, and expectations.  Weick (1988) identifies 
another construct in wisdom.  Weick (1988) tells us that the elements of wisdom are 
―updating and doubt‖, and importantly, wisdom enables adaptation and innovation.  
Finally, in the section of this dissertation on sensemaking, there is a debate discussed 
between Weick‘s (1988) belief that ―felt emotions‖ can take away from sensemaking.  
While Maitlis and Sonenshein (2010) believe that negative felt emotions may actually 
promote sensemaking.  
 The last leadership construct discussed heretofore is that of Boin (2009) who 
identifies ―executive tasks‖ for extreme event leaders.  While these tasks are not 
technically a ―leadership construct‖ these tasks do provide insights on the types of 
activities leaders must be capable of accomplishing.  Those executive tasks are: 1. 
Preparing in the face of indifference, 2. Making sense of an emerging and evolving crisis, 
3. Managing large response networks, 4. Offering credible answers, and 5. Learning 
under pressure.  Given Boin‘s (2009) description of the cascading and transboundary 
nature of extreme events, it seems reasonable for this study to focus on the tasks that 
Boin‘s (2009) suggests will ―make-or-break‖ leaders in extreme events. 
 
Leadership Concepts Summary Table 
Extreme Leadership concepts in Literature 
Reference Construct Description  Method Results 
Chatterjee and 
Hambrick 
(2007)  
Trust Measuring trust 
is difficult given 
the ―threshold 
effect‖ 
Testing 
Narcissistic 
CEOs 
Consider testing for threshold effects and long-term 
effects of the threshold effect. 
Voogd  
(2004) 
Command & 
Control 
(readiness) 
Challenges 
whether 
readiness can 
prepare leaders 
for extreme 
events 
Case study 
Netherlands 
fireworks 
explosion 
Common leadership concepts such as training, roles 
and responsibilities, role knowledge, training, 
rehearsals, and standards for behaviors during crisis 
may be of limited value in an extreme crisis. This 
dissertation discusses some problems with regard to 
disaster prevention policy in the Netherlands. In May 
2000, a devastating fireworks accident in the Dutch 
town Enschede took place, destroying a significant 
part of the built environment of this town, with an 
investigation by an independent evaluation 
committee painfully highlighting the failure of the 
local and national authorities‘ preventative policies. 
The Enschede disaster stimulated many new 
activities at various levels of government with regard 
to the need to improve disaster prevention and 
control. However, recent studies reveal that the 
lessons of Enschede have yet to be put into practice. 
This raises questions about the usefulness of a 
‗command-and-control‘ prevention approach. 
Weick 
(1988) 
Sensemaking  -shared 
understanding   
a. Commitment 
Case study Mann 
Gulch 
When faced with extreme conditions, people often 
revert back to fundamental training and fail to 
conduct ―sensemaking‖.  Weick‘s work is too 
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b. Identity 
 c. expectations 
-Wisdom 
-Felt emotions 
extensive to fully discuss here. 
Boin  
(2009) 
Executive tasks & 
Transboundary 
1. Preparing in 
the face of 
indifference, 2. 
Making sense of 
an emerging and 
evolving crisis, 
3. Managing 
large response 
networks, 4. 
Offering 
credible 
answers, and 5. 
Learning under 
pressure 
Qualitative piece 
– editorial 
Transboundary and social rupture research and 
future directions.  Discusses the escalatory power of 
transboundary events. 
Boin  
(2009) 
Casto 
Task 
Interdependency 
Relationships 
between the five 
executive tasks 
Qualitative This is not discussed in Boin; however, it seems that 
there would be relationships between these tasks.   
Samuels, et al. 
(2010) 
Self-efficacy Ability to 
remain calm and 
make tough 
high-stakes 
decisions 
Survey of the Air 
Force Freefall 
and Soaring 
programs 
Suggests that successful performance under anxiety-
provoking situations that require personal mastery 
may increase self-efficacy in domains critical to 
leading effectively in extreme contexts. 
Campbell, et 
al. (2010) 
Effective 
leadership 
Effectiveness 
across the 
individual, 
dyadic and team 
levels 
Multilevel 
review of six 
research papers 
Leadership effectiveness is enhanced by: 
a. Shared mental models 
b. Leader creativity 
c. Affect management 
d. Creation of cohesiveness and positive 
climate 
e. Successful performance 
Effectiveness hindered by: 
a. Work overload at the individual level 
b. Stress at the individual and dyadic levels 
c. Conflict at the team and dyadic levels 
 
Hannah, et al. 
(2008) 
Leadership 
efficacy 
Development of 
a multi-level 
and multivariate 
construct 
Longitudinal 
review of 20 
studies 
Development of a framework for leader efficacy and 
leadership efficacy. This framework differentiates 
leader efficacy from leadership efficacy.   
Leader efficacy: 
a. Greater breath of generalization 
b. Self-motivation 
c. Domain-specific leader efficacy 
d. Leader though efficacy 
e. Generalization of efficacy and leader 
adaptability 
f. Efficacy and adaptable leadership styles 
g. Self-system 
h. Automaticity of leaders efficacy 
Leadership efficacy: 
a. Leader and follower bidirectional 
influence 
b. Collective efficacy 
c. Cross-level models 
d. Shared mental models 
e. Multilevel leadership efficacy 
Hannah and 
Avolio 
(2011) 
Leader character 
as a locus 
Characteristics 
of leaders 
character 
construct and 
how character 
and competence 
serve to foster 
sustainable 
leadership 
across contexts, 
cultures and 
challenges 
Address the 
ontology by 
using a meta-
framework 
distinguishing 
between locus, 
transmission, and 
reception of 
leadership and a 
epistemological 
perspective  
The need for a research stream to discuss character 
and character-based leadership.  Suggest that 
character is (if not the) critical component of 
leadership.  Development of this construct is needed 
in the literature. 
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Quick and 
Wright 
(2011) 
Character-based 
leadership, context 
and consequences 
Investigate the 
link between 
morality and 
character 
Literature review 
response to 
Hannah and 
Avolio (2011) 
Is character the locus of leadership? If so, what are 
the locus, transmission and reception linkages? 
Character is not personality; character is not values.  
Character-based leadership is a general construct not 
tied to leadership style.   
Context and consequences – leader-in-practice – 
successful leaders complement their knowledge of 
leadership through the mastery of hands-on practice 
and experience. 
Is character developable? Yes, but need self-
awareness to develop 
Hannah, et al. 
(2010) 
Contextualized 
leadership in 
extreme events 
Call for 
Multilevel focus 
and systems 
approach to 
dynamic 
leadership 
processes 
Proposal for 
relevant concepts 
at each level  
Multilevel –  
Micro - 
a. Emotions 
b. Meaning-making 
c. Cognition and danger 
d. Individual differences and danger 
e. Physiological effects 
f. Motivation and danger 
Dyad – 
a. Leader-member relationship quality 
b. Effective leadership style 
Meso – 
a. Group/team type 
b. Group processes 
c. Group complexity 
d. Social networks 
e. Group prototypes 
Macro – 
a. Organizational adaptability 
b. Organizational structure and systems and 
adaptability 
c. Professions and professional ethics 
d. Ethos 
Baran & Scott 
(2010) 
Ambiguity Social process 
by which groups 
make effective 
sense of the 
hazards while 
avoiding 
catastrophic 
mistakes 
Grounded 
method -
Analyzed 100 
reports of ―near-
miss‖ situations 
in which fire 
fighters escaped 
Integrates interdisciplinary perspectives of 
sensemaking, ambiguity, and high-reliability 
organizational theories.  The fundamental process of 
organizing ambiguity-and it subprocesses of 
framing, heedful interrelating, and adjusting leads to 
goal attainment.  
Fisher, et al. 
(2010) 
In Extremis 
leadership 
―Bright‖ 
leadership 
competencies 
and shadow 
influences 
Single case study 
Australian Army 
Training Team 
Vietnam 
Themes – trust, mateship and training 
―Bright‖ competencies – 
a. Physical courage 
b. Adventurous/risk-taking 
c. Learning organization 
d. Caring ethos 
e. Leading by example 
f. Level of experience 
g. Stamina 
h. Expertise/control 
i. Self-reliance 
j. Humor 
―Shadow‖ Influences –  
a. Highly stressed 
b. Violent credo 
c. Corruption 
Other considerations – role of mateship and training 
as a buffer and facilitator; limits to the amount of 
stress that can be tolerated; in extremis environment 
exposes leader to powerful and subversive forces.  
Thus, before assignment, leaders should be assessed 
for their character, psychological makeup, and 
required skills. 
Yammarino, 
et al. (2010)  
Interdisciplinary, 
multilevel model 
of leadership and 
team dynamics.  
Pragmatic 
leadership at the 
individual 
level, 
individualized 
Proposal for 
experimental 
studies, 
interviews, 
surveys and 
Twelve key multilevel propositions and five 
multilevel exploratory ones are derived from the 
model. Leadership approaches: 
a. Pragmatic at the individual level 
b. Individualized Leadership: A Dyad-Level 
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leadership at the 
dyadic level, 
and shared 
leadership at the 
team 
level provide an 
integrated core 
for the 
approach.  
 
archival data Approach 
c. Shared Leadership and Team Dynamics: 
A Team-Level Approach 
Yammario, et al. propose that the integration of three 
models of leadership and team dynamics (i.e., 
pragmatic, individualized, and shared) that operate 
at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., individual, dyad, 
and team, respectively) are the most beneficial for 
understanding the dangerous military environment, 
and these approaches form the core of a model of 
concepts that operate at multiple levels of analysis 
and involve team formation and assembly (i.e., 
coming together of a group of individuals for a 
common purpose; which result in leadership and 
team dynamics, which in turn yield team 
performance and maintenance (i.e., analysis and 
monitoring of task and socio-emotional demands (p. 
S19)). 
Sweeney 
(2010) 
Trust The purpose of 
this exploratory 
study was to 
investigate 
whether soldiers 
reevaluated 
trust in their 
leaders prior to 
combat 
operations and, 
if so, identify 
conditions 
that would 
prompt it and 
assess the 
impact of any 
reevaluation on 
the level of 
trust in the 
leader–follower 
relationship. 
Seventy-two 
male soldiers, 
ranging in rank 
from private to 
lieutenant,  
participated in 
the study through 
questionnaire. 
Soldiers do reconsider trust many times.  From 
training into combat operation and in new contexts 
soldiers reconsidered trust based upon role 
requirements.  Soldiers seemed to place the most 
importance on the leader‘s trait(s) that upheld their 
greatest dependencies or reduced their greatest 
vulnerabilities. In the case of combat, soldiers‘ 
welfare, especially at the platoon and company 
levels, depends greatly on the competence of their 
leaders.  The data suggest that soldiers reevaluated 
their leaders‘ abilities to manage stress, respond to 
problems, demonstrate technical and tactic 
proficiency, be honest and candid, and take care of 
group members‘ needs during the deployment and 
preparation phases to extrapolate whether they could 
trust their leaders to lead in the new context of 
combat.  In the cases where reconsideration did 
change, it increased the level of trust in the leader.  
this study found that (a) the majority of soldiers did 
reconsider trust in their leaders prior to following 
them in the new context of combat; (b) soldiers‘ 
concerns about their leaders‘ competence to meet 
role requirements in the combat context seemed to 
initiate the trust reconsideration process; (c) for over 
half the soldiers, the trust developed in peace time 
appeared to carry over to the combat context; and (d) 
for the soldiers for whom trust changed, the majority 
experienced an increase in the level of trust in their 
leaders. The results imply that leaders can leverage 
the trust reconsideration process that results from 
preparing to lead a group into a new context, 
especially ones that increase the vulnerability or risk 
to group members‘ welfare.  
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APPENDIX – C Research Threads Identified in Extreme Event Paper 
 
# Author(s) Nature of the 
Thread 
Description of the Thread Consequences or 
Benefits 
1 Mikusova (2011) Methodological  Many researchers simplify the research by 
studying more routine events such as first 
responders and then attempt to extrapolate 
their insights to extreme events. 
Limits insights (validity) 
2 Mikusova (2011) Methodological Scientists from many disciplines have added 
to the research of crisis management 
studying it from their perspective with their 
own context, language, theories and 
approaches. 
Fails to facilitate 
integrated theory 
3 Thompson and Hunt 
(1997) 
Methodological Characteristics of extreme events have 
implications on the concepts used to 
investigate crisis leadership.  For example, a 
mere ―crisis‖ might involve a threat to the 
achievement of a corporate goal or layoff of 
workers.  That threat is much different from 
a threat experienced under extreme 
conditions, which might include life and 
death situations; therefore, this implies that 
concepts such as trust, or followership, 
among others, can be non-linear. 
Common leadership 
concepts take on an 
entirely new meaning in 
extreme crisis versus a 
routine crisis and the 
difference will affect the 
research methodology.  
For example, in 
quantitative leadership 
research, the construct of 
―trust‖ is commonly 
included as the leadership 
variable.  In extreme 
events, beyond the 
threshold of life and death, 
a survey or even an 
experiment cannot 
duplicate the stress of a 
life and death situation and 
therefore that research 
method would be less 
valid than a deeper study 
based in the grounded 
approach that actually 
studies an extreme event.  
Thus, knowing the specific 
characteristics of an 
extreme event becomes 
important not only in 
defining the concepts but 
also in how one 
approaches the research 
methodology.   
 
4 Lettieri (2007) Context 1 - few researchers have delved into 
―transboundary‖ effects of crisis 
2 – Limited to USA & Canada 
Limits scope of findings 
and insights.   
5 Hannah, et al. (2009) & 
Taleb, (2010)   
Casto 
Context This review could find no unified list of 
extreme event characteristics.  Some 
researchers have identified their own unique 
descriptions of the characteristics for 
extreme events.   
Limits consistency in the 
research - These 
characteristics are 
important considerations 
in developing the concepts 
associated with extreme 
events and are a 
foundation for the 
research. 
 
6 Sementelli‘s  (2007) General 
Leadership 
Theory 
There is little in the way of theory 
development in literature.  Mostly the 
literature applies theory but does not add to 
it.  Specifically for the leadership theories, 
he concludes that they are ―heavily examined 
yet poorly understood‖ in this context 
Developing a theory that 
integrates the existing 
literature would be a 
valuable expansion of the 
extreme crisis leadership 
theories. 
301 
 
 
7 Smits & Ezzat-Ally‘s 
(2003) 
 
Readiness 
Theory 
 
Readiness theory adds little theoretical 
development to extreme crisis management.  
Considering that Voogd (2004) identifies 
command and control limitations of the 
theory, Smith (2004) adds the challenges of 
decentralization and Quarentelli (1988) 
concludes extreme events necessitate 
adaptations 
 
Knowing the important 
concepts associated with 
extreme event leadership 
could enable organizations 
to better inoculate 
themselves against the 
uncertainty of extreme 
events through improved 
readiness. 
 
8 Mirvis  (1996)  Complexity 
Theory 
Complexity Theory tends to require that 
people behave outside of norms in 
responding to a crisis.  This requirement is 
counterintuitive to most administrative 
theories of org behavior. 
 
Most organizations want 
to limit uncertainty and 
they do so by building 
procedures and processes 
that constrain individuals 
to behave in predictable 
ways for predicable 
events.  The concern then 
becomes for individual 
and organizational 
behavior during 
unperceived events.  
Typically, when people 
behave outside expected 
norms, the organization 
seeks to return the 
behavior to those within 
norms.   
9 Nutt (2004) Normal Accident 
Theory 
NAT has yet to explain everything about the 
escalation of accidents.  If accidents are 
―normal‖ then, the question is why do most 
organizations avoid them?  Not every 
organization experiences accidents; 
therefore, perhaps most organizations have 
learned to become safer.  It could be that 
they learn to de-couple their processes or it 
could be that they have just become more 
reliable.   
Are accidents inevitable? 
 
10 La Porte (2011) and La 
Porte and Rochlin (1994) 
Normal Accident 
and High-
Reliability 
Theory 
 Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) insist that 
organizations can merge culture and 
organizational structure into a Highly 
Reliable Organization.  While La Porte 
(2011) and La Porte and Rochlin (1994) 
agree with the basic HRT theory, they 
somewhat disagree with Weick and Sutcliffe 
(2011).  La Porte (2011) and La Porte and 
Rochlin (1994) challenge the ability of 
organizations to combine culture and 
structure to limit events.  
Resolution could break the 
deadlock between the two 
theories, NAT & HRT.  
Current research does not 
integrate these two 
theories (HRT and NAT) 
with complexity theory.  
My research may shed 
some light on this 
integration.  It might be 
helpful in resolving the 
deadlock to consider 
whether embracing 
complexity helps move the 
debate forward.  Through 
the investigation of 
extreme events, perhaps 
my research can shed light 
on the argument and settle 
the deadlock.   
11 Maitlis and Sonenshein 
(2010) 
Sensemaking Not explicitly discussed among the three 
themes of sensemaking  is the role of ―felt‖ 
emotions in sensemaking.  i.e., ―felt‖ 
emotions such as panic, on sensemaking 
Investigation would 
strengthen the 
understanding of more 
characteristics of 
sensemaking. 
12 Landau and Chisholm 
(1995)  
Sensemaking Argue that pessimism, with the failure-
avoidance organizational perspective that it 
entails, can actually mitigate a crisis.   
Better understanding of 
the implications of 
optimistic bias and 
pessimism on 
sensemaking. 
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13 Jennings & Greenwood, 
(2003)  
Sensemaking There is little research on the institutional 
effects of sensemaking in crisis, e.g., 
processes, mindset. 
Deeper understanding of 
organizational failure, 
perhaps even latent org 
failure or incubation. 
14 Casto 
(2013) 
Sensemaking While it is obvious that panic exists among 
individuals when a disaster unfolds, it would 
be interesting to find measures of 
organizational or leadership panic.   
(Table 1) 
Very little, almost no 
literature on the 
consequences of 
leadership panic in 
extreme events. 
15 Boin, (2009) Transboundary Few crisis management researchers have 
delved into studying transboundary effects.   
Including – executive tasks during 
transboundary crisis; relationship between 
risk, crises, and public management.  
Lagadec's (2009) focus on innovative 
thinking when in the throes of transboundary 
crises.  Wachtendorf‘s (2009) social-ruptures   
 Transboundary effects are 
highly important concepts 
for this research.  As the 
world flattens, extreme 
events multiply, and our 
ability to create fear 
around the world expands, 
most extreme events will 
take on the characteristics 
of a transboundary event.   
16 Hannah, et al. (2009) Leadership 
Context 
Discuss the tensions between leaders who 
are adaptive versus those who are 
―administrative‖ during an extreme crisis.  
By ―administrative‖, they mean classic 
authoritative or directive leadership.  There 
exists a general tension between using 
adaptation during an event versus following 
the administrative, i.e., classic leadership 
route.   
This tension needs much 
more development in the 
literature. 
17 DeChurch, et al. (2011) 
 Hannah, et al. (2009) 
Leadership 
Context 
A discovery of the unique interrelationships 
between leadership concepts and perhaps a 
discovery of the most important concepts in 
the extreme context. 
recognition that extreme 
leadership research may 
not change the essence of 
leadership, or make 
leadership concepts 
invalid; however, they 
suggest that it could 
discover new relationships 
between concepts and 
necessitate advanced 
methodologies 
18 Farazmand (2009)  
Casto (2013) 
Extreme Event 
Context 
There is a similarity between a 
transboundary crisis and an extreme event or 
an extreme event context.  While there 
appears to be little, or no, literature in this 
area, these crises, events, and contexts 
appear to have similar characteristics. 
Farazmand states this as a 
gap in the literature… 
discusses a perspective 
that all ―grand failures‖ by 
governments have global 
implications. 
19 Farazmand (2009) 
Casto (2013) 
Surprise 
Management  & 
Sensemaking 
These two theories have roots in the same 
areas of chaos, complexity, and dynamic 
systems‘ theories.  They clearly it have roots 
in Weick‘s ―management of the unexpected‖ 
as well.  Especially the characteristics of 
non-linear thinking 
Finding the linkages 
between these theories 
(elements) would be 
helpful in establishing one 
integrated extreme 
leadership theory. 
20 Yukl, (2006)  Adaptive v. 
Administrative 
Leadership 
A fundamental tension exists between 
adaptive leadership and administrative 
leadership styles.  Adaptive leadership 
consists of ―improvisational‖ and 
―ambidextrous‖ leadership styles, which are 
styles that flex between exploitation and 
exploration.  While administrative leadership 
styles are those of classic leadership, for 
example, autocratic or directive, the key to 
the success of this research is to uncover the 
relationships between leadership styles in 
extreme events.  This tension is a very 
important insight for this research.   
Understanding whether 
organizations need to be 
more improvisational or 
whether they need to be 
more ambidextrous will 
provide valuable insights 
for leadership.  As this 
research progresses, 
further exploration of this 
tension is necessary.   
21 Hannah, et al. (2009) Context One major limitation is how extreme event 
leadership can apply across many domains.   
Are the leadership 
strategies identified for 
technical events applicable 
to information technology 
events, public health 
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events, or other non-
technical events? 
22 Hannah, et al. (2009) Readiness 
Theory 
As the potential for extreme events spreads, 
more ―naïve‖ organizations will face 
leadership challenges for which they may be 
unprepared.   
The question arises as to 
how the leadership 
challenges vary across 
organization types, such 
as, the naïve versus the 
trauma organizations. 
23 Hadley, et al. (2011) Decision Making Suggest that there is a need for greater 
precision in the measures of decision-
making.  Those measures must focus on 
―difficulty‖ and ―confidence.‖ 
Others suggest that a 
single measure, which 
might capture all of these 
considerations, is ―self-
efficacy.‖ 
24 Santella, et al. (2009); von 
Lubitz, Beakley & 
Patricelli, (2008) 
Decision Making Authors suggest building ―tools‖ for 
decision-making 
OODA loop, etc.  Out of 
scope for this study. 
25 Parashevas (2006) Decision Making Suggests that decision-making should be a 
living and evolving system and that agents 
must understand their roles in this system.  
He suggests that researchers should use 
complexity science in researching the kind of 
leadership necessary to generate these 
realizations and behaviors.   
Sometimes, a routine crisis 
escalates into an extreme 
event and this escalation 
could bring with it new 
considerations for 
decision-making.  
Parashevas (2006) 
highlights this escalation 
as an acute stage in the 
crisis where the 
organization reaches a 
―critical instability‖ point 
that might involve a 
―bifurcation point‖ or 
―phase transition‖.  This 
transition may become 
important because it often 
decentralizes decision-
making.   
26 Casto (2013) Social Justice Social justice influences on technical justice 
decisions or leader accountability is not well 
understood. 
Understanding how social 
justice pressures create 
heightened accountability 
of political and crisis 
leaders could shed 
significant light on how 
decisions get made and the 
consequences of political 
pressures caused by social 
justice on the crisis leader. 
27 Casto (2013) Dangerous 
Contexts 
Dangerous contexts are the next domain 
beyond extreme contexts.  Dangerous 
contexts have unique leadership qualities.  
There is little or no literature that explores 
the commonalities or differences between 
these two leadership contexts. 
Understanding how 
similar these two contexts 
are would inform our 
knowledge of leadership 
in both contexts. 
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APPENDIX D – Addressing Individual Research Threads 
 
# Research Thread (Context Only – not Methodological Gaps) How the Thread is Addressed in this 
Dissertation Content 
4 1 - few researchers have delved into ―transboundary‖ effects of crisis 
2 – Limited to USA & Canada 
Will address in my results Section 
5 This review could find no unified list of extreme event characteristics.  Some 
researchers have identified their own unique descriptions of the characteristics 
for extreme events.   
Unified List of characteristics developed – 
see Appendix A 
6 There is little in the way of theory development in literature.  Mostly the 
literature applies theory but does not add to it.  Specifically for the leadership 
theories, he concludes that they are ―heavily examined yet poorly understood‖ in 
this context 
Will address in my results Section  
7 Readiness theory adds little theoretical development to extreme crisis 
management.  Considering that Voogd (2004) identifies command and control 
limitations of the theory, Smith (2004) adds the challenges of decentralization 
and Quarentelli (1988) concludes extreme events necessitate adaptations 
 
Will address in my results Section 
8 Complexity Theory tends to require that people behave outside of norms in 
responding to a crisis.  This requirement is counterintuitive to most 
administrative theories of org behavior. 
 
Research area – 1 is there a conflict 
between behavioral theory, e.g., 
rationality and organization theory during 
an extreme crisis? 
9 NAT has yet to explain everything about the escalation of accidents.  If accidents 
are ―normal‖ then, the question is why do most organizations avoid them?  Not 
every organization experiences accidents; therefore, perhaps most organizations 
have learned to become safer.  It could be that they learn to de-couple their 
processes or it could be that they have just become more reliable.   
Research area 2 – Which theories are the 
best fit for leadership during a Black 
Swan event? 
10 Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) insist that organizations can merge culture and 
organizational structure into a Highly Reliable Organization.  While La Porte 
(2011) and La Porte and Rochlin (1994) agree with the basic HRT theory, they 
somewhat disagree with Weick and Sutcliffe (2011).  La Porte (2011) and La 
Porte and Rochlin (1994) challenge the ability of organizations to combine 
culture and structure to limit events.  
 Research area–  See #9 
11 Not explicitly discussed among the three themes of sensemaking is the role of 
―felt‖ emotions in sensemaking.  i.e., ―felt‖ emotions such as panic, on 
sensemaking 
Research Area 3 – What is the role of 
―felt‖ emotions in extreme event 
leadership?  
12 Argue that pessimism, with the failure-avoidance organizational perspective that 
it entails, can actually mitigate a crisis.   
Research area – See #11 
13 There is little research on the institutional effects of sensemaking in crisis, e.g., 
processes, mindset. 
Research area – 4 Is sensemaking a 
crucial component of crisis leadership 
decision-making? 
14 While it is obvious that panic exists among individuals when a disaster unfolds, 
it would be interesting to find measures of organizational or leadership panic.   
(Table 1) 
Research area- 5 What impact, if any, 
does leadership panic play in extreme 
crisis management? 
15 Few crisis management researchers have delved into studying transboundary 
effects.   
Including – executive tasks during transboundary crisis; relationship between 
risk, crises, and public management.  Lagadec‘s (2009) focus on innovative 
thinking when in the throes of transboundary crises.  Wachtendorf‘s (2009) 
social-ruptures   
Research area – 6 As the transboundary 
effects of an extreme crisis accelerate, do 
the executive tasks of the crisis leader 
become more difficult? 
16 Discuss the tensions between leaders who are adaptive versus those who are 
―administrative‖ during an extreme crisis.  By ―administrative‖, they mean 
classic authoritative or directive leadership.  There exists a general tension 
between using adaptation during an event versus following the administrative, 
i.e., classic leadership route.   
Research area – See #8 
17 A discovery of the unique interrelationships between leadership concepts and 
perhaps a discovery of the most important concepts in the extreme context.  
recognition that extreme leadership research may not change the essence of 
leadership, or make leadership concepts invalid; however, they suggest that it 
could discover new relationships between concepts and necessitate advanced 
methodologies 
Research area– See #8 
18 There is a similarity between a transboundary crisis and an extreme event or an 
extreme event context.  While there appears to be little, or no, literature in this 
area, these crises, events, and contexts appear to have similar characteristics. 
Research area – See #4 & #15 
19 These two theories have roots in the same areas of chaos, complexity, and Research area – See #11 & #13 
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dynamic systems‘ theories.  They clearly it have roots in Weick‘s ―management 
of the unexpected‖ as well.  Especially the characteristics of non-linear thinking 
20 A fundamental tension exists between adaptive leadership and administrative 
leadership styles.  Adaptive leadership consists of ―improvisational‖ and 
―ambidextrous‖ leadership styles, which are styles that flex between exploitation 
and exploration.  While administrative leadership styles are those of classic 
leadership, for example, autocratic or directive, the key to the success of this 
research is to uncover the relationships between leadership styles in extreme 
events.  This tension is a very important insight for this research.   
Research area – See #8 & #16 
21 One major limitation is how extreme event leadership can apply across many 
domains.   
See my Future Research Directions 
Section 
22 As the potential for extreme events spreads, more ―naïve‖ organizations will face 
leadership challenges for which they may be unprepared.   
See my Future Directions Section 
23 Suggest that there is a need for greater precision in the measures of decision-
making.  Those measures must focus on ―difficulty‖ and ―confidence.‖ 
Research area – 7 Are there more precise 
measures of decision-making precision?  
24 Authors suggest building ―tools‖ for decision-making Research area – See #23 
25 Suggests that decision-making should be a living and evolving system and that 
agents must understand their roles in this system.  He suggests that researchers 
should use complexity science in researching the kind of leadership necessary to 
generate these realizations and behaviors.   
Research area – See #23 
26 Social justice influences on technical justice decisions or leader accountability is 
not well understood. 
Research area – 8 Is there a relationship 
between social justice and technical 
justice that influences political 
accountability and influences leader 
decision-making in significantly negative 
ways? 
27 Dangerous contexts are the next domain beyond extreme contexts.  Dangerous 
contexts have unique leadership qualities.  There is little or no literature that 
explores the commonalities or differences between these two leadership contexts. 
Research area – 9 What are the overlaps 
between extreme and dangerous event 
leadership? 
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APPENDIX E – Generation of Leadership Interview Questions 
 
Research Areas Leadership concepts National and Crisis Leadership 
Interview Questions 
Social Leadership Interview 
Questions 
Research area 1 – There 
are unique changes in 
normative leadership 
behavior from 
administrative leadership 
to authoritarian leadership 
during an extreme crisis. 
Trust 
Self-efficacy 
Leader character as a 
locus 
Character-based 
leadership, context and 
consequences 
What changes did you see in leadership 
behaviors from the normal mode of 
operation before the event and then 
during the event?  As the event 
progressed, did you sense that your 
followers reassessed their trust in you? 
Did the national and local leaders 
exhibit the proper leadership 
behaviors expected for an event 
of this magnitude?   
Research area 2 – As 
Black Swan events, 
normal accident or high 
reliability theory does not 
apply to an extreme crisis. 
Command & Control 
(readiness) 
 
Was there a lesson of leadership from 
the event that if applied or known 
before the event would have improved 
the event outcome, i.e., were there 
leadership gaps identified as lessons 
learned? 
What were your expectations 
prior to the event for the leaders?  
Were your expectations during 
the event consistent with your 
expectations prior to the event?  
Should the leaders have been 
more prepared? 
Research area 3 – Felt 
emotions play a 
significant role in extreme 
crisis leadership decision 
making.  
Leader character as a 
locus 
Character-based 
leadership, context and 
consequences 
Discuss how your emotions affected 
your leadership effectiveness and the 
decisions that you made during the 
event.  Was there a point or points 
during the event where you felt that 
your followers lost trust in you? 
Discuss how your feelings of 
trust in the leadership changed 
throughout the event. 
Research area 4 – 
Sensemaking is a crucial 
component of crisis 
leadership decision 
making 
Sensemaking Did you use any ―framing‖ method or 
―big picture‖ mapping in your mind 
that helped you guide the event 
response? If so, describe how that 
method worked or did not work. 
Were the leaders able to explain 
the situation clearly?  Did you 
understand what was occurring 
and how it might affect society? 
Research area 5 - In the 
face of an extreme crisis, 
there is an element of 
leadership panic that 
affects decision making. 
Self-efficacy 
Effective leadership 
Leadership efficacy 
Ambiguity 
 
Was there ever a point where you felt 
that the situation was out of control and 
you either hesitated in your decision-
making or lacked for a decision? 
Was there a point or points where 
you thought that the event 
conditions exceeded the 
capabilities of the leaders?  Were 
at any point did they seem 
panicked? 
Research area 6 – As the 
transboundary effects of 
an extreme crisis 
accelerate, the executive 
task of the crisis leader 
become more difficult. 
Executive tasks & 
Transboundary effects 
 
Discuss the effects of this event on 
other nations, infrastructures 
(information technology) or 
jurisdictions out of your control.  How 
did that expansion affect your 
leadership or decision-making? 
Explain the progression of the 
event with regard to the societal 
impacts.  As the event progressed 
Research area 7 – There 
are decision-making 
measures and tools that 
are specifically applicable 
to extreme event 
leadership. 
Leadership efficacy 
 
How did your leadership style, tasks, or 
decision making differ in this event 
versus other lesser events that you have 
led? 
Were you satisfied with the style 
of leadership exhibited by the top 
leadership?  Did they listen to the 
social needs, were they 
responsive to your demands and 
did they relate to you and 
society? 
Research area 8 – There is 
a relationship between 
social justice and 
technical justice that 
influences political 
accountability and 
influences leader decision-
making in significantly 
negative ways. 
Contextualized 
leadership in extreme 
events 
 
Were there political or social pressures 
that impacted your leadership abilities 
or decision-making?  Discuss how 
those impacts influenced you.  Did they 
cause constraints on your effectiveness 
or cause the event to have greater 
consequences? 
Discuss your involvement in the 
event.  Was it necessary for you 
to involve political leaders to get 
your concerns heard or 
addressed?  Discuss in detail any 
involvement by political leaders 
in addressing societal needs. 
Research area 9 – Some 
leadership concepts 
associated with dangerous 
context events apply to 
leadership in extreme 
contexts. 
In Extremis leadership 
Interdisciplinary, 
multilevel model of 
leadership and team 
dynamics.  
 
 
For this event, were there varying 
levels of leadership within your chain 
of command, i.e., how was leadership 
different in the different organizational 
levels?  This is a hypothetical question, 
what if the situation had expanded to 
include dangerous situations, e.g., life 
& death for your or your teammates.  
How would that affect your leadership 
or decision-making?   
Do you think that the leaders 
were ―all-in‖ during this event?  
Did they approach the event as if 
their lives depended on success?  
 
